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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis presents a social ontology. It takes its problem, the emergence of 
social structure and order, and the relationship of the macro and the micro 
within this structure, from social theory, but attempts a resolution from the 
perspectives of contemporary French philosophy and complexity theory. Due 
to its acceptance of certain presuppositions concerning the multiplicity and 
connectedness of all life and nature it adopts a comparative methodology that 
attempts a translation of complexity science to the social world. It draws both 
this methodology and its inspiration from the work of Michel Serres. After 
explaining this methodology, it presents a critique of the work of those 
prominent philosophers of multiplicity who have written on the social: Alain 
Badiou, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Manual DeLanda. Having 
argued for the need of a ‘non-unit’ of social organisation, it then 
unsuccessfully surveys the work of Michel Foucault and Gabriel Tarde in 
search of such a ‘non-unit’. It produces one by extracting elements from 
different theorists and then proceeds to offer a novel explanation of how these 
expectations first emerge from the ‘social noise’ and then go through a 
complex process of self-organisation to produce social structure. Apart from 
complexity theory, this explanation draws on the temporal ontologies of both 
Serres and Deleuze. In doing so, it argues that the social replication 
necessary for this self-organisation cannot be achieved through direct 
imitation. Instead, it draws on an idea from Stuart Kauffman and argues that 
this is achieved through autocatalysis. Finally, it argues that social structures 
and what is perceived to be social order are the effect of the codification, to 
varying degrees, of these emergent expectations. It concludes that this 
structure is at its most creative when on ‘the edge of chaos’, when at a point 
of social chaosmos. 
 
 
 
 1 
1  General Introduction 
 
1.1  Micro / macro problem: Theory 
 
All problems related to social theory, and, by extension, the whole of the 
social sciences, lead to one central problem, that of social order.1 Dennis H. 
Wrong opens his exploration of this problem by suggesting that if the most 
fundamental question in philosophy is Leibniz’s “Why is there something 
rather than nothing?” then its corollary in social theory is “Why do human 
beings maintain a regular social life rather than only minimal and occasional 
contacts with one another” (Wrong, 1995: 1)? The problem of order, he goes 
on to say, “has come to be widely recognized as a major, often the major, 
perennial issue of social theory” (1995: 37). 
 
Approaching the problem from a slightly different angle, Niels Albertsen and 
Bulent Diken point out that “social theory has a basic problem related to the 
nature of its object of investigation, ‘society’”, and quote John Urry in saying 
that (in 1997) it is still “strange that sociology has devoted rather little 
attention to its central concept, that of society” (Albertsen & Diken, 2003: 1). 
They go on to argue that the concept of society has no “clearly definable 
general use”. In their investigation into “what ‘the social’ is” [my emphasis] 
they take their point of departure from classical theory “in three central 
images of thought: unity, purity and order”. Classical theory, they argue, has 
hitherto defined ‘the social’ through these three concepts. They point out, 
however, quite correctly, that no such theory, that no notion of the social, no 
description or definition of society, is capable of possessing either unity, purity 
(homogeneity) or order. No unity because no society, particularly in modern 
times, can be seen as a centred whole with clear-cut borders. No purity 
because no social group withstands the test of homogeneity. No order 
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because classical theory’s attempts to “detect the ‘laws’ of social change 
[that] illuminate why and how ‘the social’ maintains a stable order and 
cohesion” have failed. They call for “a deconstruction of social theory in terms 
of [these] three images of thought and [for] a reconstruction in terms of other 
concepts such as differentiation, heterogeneity and ambivalence” (2003: 1-2). 
This is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, because by pointing out the 
failure of these rather absolute terms and calling for the use of terms that are 
effectively their negative, they are only highlighting the central importance of 
the general concept, the general concept from which they all derive. A 
problem that focuses on either unity or the lack of unity is still a problem 
concerning the concept of unity. Secondly, because all three terms actually 
conflate into the central problem of order. For there to be any recognizable 
sense of unity within any multiplicity there must, by definition, be some 
semblance of order (some repeatable pattern of organisation that is capable 
of being identified as such) – otherwise no amount of unity would be 
discernable. To highlight this further, simply note that Wrong’s book The 
Problem of Order is subtitled What Unites and Divides Society.  And thirdly, 
because their approach brings out the link between the problem of social 
order and that of social ontology. 
 
John Searle has recently suggested “that there is a line of research that is 
more fundamental than either the philosophy of social science or social and 
political philosophy.” This line of research is social ontology, “the study of the 
nature of human society itself” (Searle, 2010: 5). It would appear, therefore, 
that there has been little progress in this area of research; that we still seem 
to be in the same situation as that described by Urry in 1997. We are still 
unable to state with any certainty what ‘the social’ is, what it is that we are 
theorizing about. Yet despite this lack of understanding by academics, 
politicians talk and act as if they fully understand the concept. They propose 
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policy, and spend vast amounts of money on ‘social problems’ trying to ‘put 
right’ a phenomenon for which no adequate explanation has yet been 
produced. Social theory, with the exception of current research focussed on 
flows and mobilities, seems to have lost a sense of direction and purpose. 
Nicholas Gane, who, between 2002 and 2004, interviewed nine leading social 
theorists for his book The Future of Social Theory (2004), points, in an 
interview with David Beer, to a boom time for social theory in the late 1980s / 
early 1990s, a “point at which Marxism (centre stage for so long) entered a 
state of decline”, a time when “[s]ociology, or at least social theory, was 
opening itself up to continental philosophy”. But, he asks, “[w]hy was it that 
by the end of the 1990s social theory along with postmodernism had also 
started to fade from view?” (Beer & Gane, 2004: 2). Finding an answer to this 
question was the purpose of his book. What is needed, he says, are new 
concepts, and for old concepts to be rethought in different ways. What is 
needed, I argue, is not just a radical rethink of how we conceptualise social 
theory but a radically new theory that explains the very existence of the social 
– a social ontology that will provide a solid foundation upon which such a 
social theory can be constructed. 
 
Attempts to provide such a foundation from within social theory have, to 
varying degrees, been less than successful. Barry Barnes notes that “All fields 
of empirical enquiry face a macro/micro problem in some form...how the 
properties and propensities of ‘macro’ things are related to those of ‘micro’ 
things” (2001: 339). He adds that “it is clear that there is now an 
unprecedented level of interest in the nature of human agency, and that the 
macro/micro debates have largely become debates about the relationship of 
agency and structure” (2001: 344). Some theorists have taken a more 
traditional perspective on social order, one that sought totalities, continuities 
and regular causal connections, the predictable characteristics of social 
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interactions that were thought to have been exemplified by rules, values and 
norms. From such a perspective, some type of macro entity or social structure 
influences its constituent membership in such a way that this membership 
behaves as agents of that structure, and reinforces its existence. But, as 
Albertsen and Diken (2003), and many others, have pointed out, classical 
social theory has failed to detect the homogeneous presence of these ‘laws’ of 
social order. In this sense at least, attempts at a structural account of society 
have failed.2 In opposition to such a structural perspective, other theorists 
have taken an interpretive perspective and argued, to varying degrees, that 
any sense of social order is effectively a construct formed in the minds of 
interacting social subjects. The various theories that could fall under such an 
umbrella are vast, but if, for the sake of brevity if nothing else, I can be 
allowed to generalize, they do not so much deny the existence of society as, 
due to their focus on the micro rather than the macro, fail to offer an account 
of it. The danger with such accounts is, at the extreme, that human social 
behaviour is reduced to some form of rational choice theory whereby 
individual social actors behave according to the dictates of self-interest and 
the social is regarded as a mere epiphenomenon. According to such accounts 
the “powers of human beings to engender shared understandings across 
cultures, and coordinated action for the indivisible good of collectives, is 
simply unintelligible” (Barnes, 2001: 342). 
 
Anthony Giddens is explicit in confronting this ‘pernicious dualism’.3 In The 
Constitution of Society he offers an introduction to his theory of structuration, 
the basic premise of which is that this dualism (structural and interpretive 
accounts of society) “has to be reconceptualized as a duality – the duality of 
structure.” He explains that “the basic domain of study of the social sciences, 
according to the theory of structuration, is neither the experience of the 
individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social 
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practices ordered across space and time” (Giddens, 1984: 2). According to 
this argument neither structure nor individual social action exists 
independently; it is social action that creates social structure and it is through 
social action that structures are produced and reproduced, but social structure 
makes social action possible. This social structure is made up of rules and 
resources. The rules need not be written down; they may only exist in the 
minds of individual actors, but they carry many of the social conventions, 
norms or ‘ways of doing things’ that hold social groups together. In 
formulating his concept of social rules he acknowledges the influence of 
Wittgenstein and illustrates their use through the example of language.4 
People use the basic structural rules of language without necessarily being 
aware that they do so. He also likens social rules to formulae that allow the 
reproduction of social practice, such that “to understand the formula is not to 
utter it…it is simply being able to apply [it] in the right context and way in 
order to continue the series” (1984: 20). This approach, particularly the 
relationship it establishes between the structural rules of language and the 
ordering of social practices across space and time, together with its arguing 
for the non-independence of structure and agency, was a definite move in the 
right direction. But there are problems. Critics of this theory point to the lack 
of detailed explanation as to how this might actually work and how it can 
account for the emergence of new forms of social phenomena, and for its 
similarity to more traditional structuralist explanations.  For example, 
Margaret S. Archer has said that “The theory of structuration remains 
incomplete because it provides an insufficient account of the mechanisms of 
stable replication versus the genesis of new social forms” (quoted in Barnes, 
2001: 346), and Barnes comments that his account looks “very like the 
outmoded functionalism of Talcott Parsons, wherein the reproduction of the 
status quo was similarly linked to ‘forms of normative regulation’” (2001: 
346).  
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Barnes notes that “the ‘internal’ arguments between macro- and micro-
sociologists and social theorists have not been dominated by metaphysical 
and ontological issues” (2001: 342). Perhaps it is time that this changed, at 
least as regards ontology. What is needed is a radical re-conceptualisation of 
what society is; what is needed is a social ontology that explains the 
relationship between the agency of individual social actors at the micro-level, 
and the observable social patterning, the ordering of social practices across 
space and time, what might generally be regarded as ‘social order’ at the 
macro-level. This needs to be achieved, I will argue, using such concepts as 
those of ‘differentiation, heterogeneity and ambivalence’ suggested by 
Albertsen and Diken (2003), but most importantly, through the 
deconstruction of any notion of conceptual unity. If any one idea can be said 
to be absolutely central to this thesis, it is this: that when examined closely, 
no concept used to explain or describe any aspect of the social can be 
understood as a unity; that all such concepts are actually multiplicities of 
(usually) less complex concepts that form open relationships to a whole 
network of concepts. This idea is a presupposition accepted by this thesis; I 
can find, when examined closely, no exception to it; I have been unable to 
falsify it. At a pragmatic level, in our day-to-day dealings, we may use these 
concepts as if they were unities. This does not usually pose a problem. But if 
we want to construct a social ontology, such an approach masks the 
underlying complexity and dynamism of the social process. This point is 
crucial at both the micro and macro level. Barnes quite rightly points out that 
“Whilst individuals, and situations, and encounters, are by no means 
unproblematically ‘there’, they give rise to fewer practical-epistemological 
problems...than institutions and social systems do.”5 These “macro-objects 
are the harder to see, and indeed they often have the standing of invisible 
theoretical entities and not of objects that can be seen at all” (2001: 341-2).6 
 7 
For epistemological problems read ontological problems. From a reductionist 
perspective it is all too easy to deconstruct any notion of such macro entities, 
for whilst arguably the effects of their existence can be experienced, their 
actual existence cannot. We find it very difficult to think of multiplicities 
without thinking of a unified concept – something that can be delimited and 
enveloped. It is much easier to focus on the actions of individual social actors, 
for at least their behaviour can be observed and recorded – it can be 
delimited, enveloped and analysed. But such actions are just as much the 
creation of false unities. They too hide the background complexity and 
dynamism, and this concealment has hindered the development of an 
effective social ontology – one that explains the relationship between the 
micro and macro, that explains how social order is actually produced (or more 
accurately, how it emerges). 
 
1.2  Micro / macro problem: Praxis 
 
However, the problem is not only theoretical. Wrong, writing in 1995, reviews 
the “wars, revolutions, and rebellions” of the twentieth century and argues 
that fear of either widespread social disorder or of a “totalitarian excess of 
order” have “contributed to recognition of the problem of order as a central if 
not the central issue of social theory” (Wrong, 1995: 240-1, author’s 
emphasis). Our actual practical experiences of the lack of social certainty, our 
insecurities, together with our often reactionary attempts to mitigate them, 
have had a direct input into the debate. He cites contemporary controversies 
concerning multiculturalism and diversity and the power and influence of new 
communication technologies as contributing to these fears. I would suggest 
that such social phenomena as multiculturalism and the rapid development of 
communication technologies simply accentuate a problem that has always 
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existed, but one that we would rather close our eyes to: that life, social life, is 
(in a very profound sense) uncertain.7 
 
What Wrong could not have predicted, of course, was the ‘war against terror’ 
that resulted from the events of September 2001. These events not so much 
brought new issues to the fore as made those that already existed more 
acute. In 2006, Gordon Brown, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
Prime Minister in waiting, gave a speech at the New Year Conference of the 
Fabian Society. In it he raised a question that has been lurking around the 
political agenda for some time, a question that seems to slip out of the 
shadows of public debate anytime events or newspaper headlines conspire to 
question our sense of social identity, a question that has been fuelled by the 
near paranoia that has resulted from this ‘war’. He asked: “…what is it to be 
British?” One particular statement encapsulates the political reality of the 
circumstances of asking such a question: “Britishness”, he said: 
is not just an academic debate – something just for historians, just for 
the commentators, just for the so called chattering classes. Indeed in a 
recent poll, as many as half of British people said that they were worried 
that if we do not promote Britishness we run a real risk of having a 
divided society.8 
 
He correctly points out that a large number of the voting public are genuinely 
concerned that their sense of social identity and unity is under threat. The 
Chancellor’s naive but political response was to call for “…a distinctive set of 
values which influence British institutions”.  
 
Whilst this call for ‘British values’ may have voter appeal (or appeasement), 
its academic kudos is somewhat less. As Albertsen and Diken point out 
(2003), and as I shall be arguing later in this investigation, any attempt to 
define a ‘distinctive set of values’ fails to achieve any sense of unity, 
homogeneity or order. It seems that throughout the centuries, certainly from 
Hobbes onwards, at times of heightened uncertainty (for Hobbes of course, it 
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was the horrors of the English Civil War),9 when what we understand and are 
accustomed to in terms of our social relations appears to be under threat, we 
fear the loss of (false) certainty. We fear that whatever it is that forms our 
social relations is about to disappear. This seems totally natural and to be 
expected. The problem is, of course, that we still have not worked out what 
these social relations actually are: we do not actually know what it is that we 
fear losing. The traditional responses, both in terms of norms / values and 
economic / power relationships, whilst all contributing to our understanding, 
have all failed, either individually or collectively, to provide an understanding 
that actually works. We all have a sense of order that is there to be 
threatened or lost, but we have very little understanding of what this sense of 
order is or how it came about. 
 
Let me take this problem to a deeper level of practicality. This research 
project is the result of both a theoretical study of philosophy and practical 
experience of working within the social sector. At the time of the election of 
Tony Blair and the ‘New Labour’ government of 1997 I was employed in the 
careers service. With the onset of the social inclusion agenda the careers 
service was transformed into the Connexions Service and tasked with offering 
seamless and universal services that would support young people in all the 
issues they face. More specifically, apart from the very noble aims of 
interagency cooperation and the removal of the bureaucratic face of 
government services, the service was expected to make interventions into the 
lives of young people that changed those lives. For example, three of the 
eight governing principles of Connexions were: 
• Raising aspirations – setting high expectations of every individual 
• Inclusion – keeping young people in mainstream education and 
training and preventing them moving to the margins of their 
community 
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• Extending opportunity and equality of opportunity – raising 
participation and achievement levels for all young people; influencing 
the availability, suitability and quality of provision and raising 
awareness of opportunities10 
The problem was, that no one actually explained how you set high 
expectations of every individual, how you keep young people in approved 
education, how you raise participation and achievement levels. It is of course 
one thing to set expectations of someone in the sense that they fully 
understand what is expected of them, but how do you make an intervention 
into that person’s life such that that they take ownership of that expectation, 
that they believe that that is what should or will happen to them?11 We will 
see later (5.3) that Wrong (1995) makes much of the ambiguity and subtlety 
of his take on social ‘norms’, what he terms expectations. This ambiguity 
arises from the breadth of meaning we attach to them. Such meaning ranges 
from what a society, school or parent expect of their citizens, students or 
children to what those individuals actually believe will occur in any given 
situation; from clear cut statements of intention, through what is taken to be 
‘normal’ in any social situation, to blind habits that guide and constrain social 
action. It occurred to me (at the time) that it was probably only when 
expectations were somehow translated from some sense of the objective 
(social) to the subjective (psychological) that the ‘desired’ action would occur. 
But how does such a translation come about? No one told me. 
 
To return to the problem of the relationship between the macro and the 
micro: The Government’s vision was based on a macro view of British society, 
and largely a statistical view at that. It was decided that in order for the UK to 
thrive economically at the world level that 50% of young people needed to 
progress into Higher Education and this would require a general raising of 
expectations, the raising of the numbers of young people generally engaged 
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in learning, and the general removal of barriers that prevented this. There 
appeared, however, from my perspective at least, to be no understanding of 
the relationship between such a macro view of society, and its translation into 
actual interventions into people’s lives at the micro level. The thinking 
appeared to be that if you simply set out your macro vision, and spent 
sufficient money (and a large amount of money was spent) then somehow 
this would translate into the necessary social action. Such thinking was not in 
accord with my (then) intuitive understanding of how social structure 
emerged from the micro to the macro. What I wanted to understand, both at 
a theoretical / philosophical level and at a practical level concerning my 
actions as a practitioner, was: How do such structures emerge? What actually 
is the relationship between the micro and the macro? 
 
I was fortunate enough later, before I had completed this research project 
(but nevertheless was sufficiently advanced with it that I was confident in the 
direction it was heading), to undertake, in conjunction with my project 
supervisor, a more practical piece of research that would effectively test my 
theoretical findings. This HEIF412 funded project was developed to work with a 
local social sector organisation that made interventions to promote social 
change. It was our hypothesis that such organisations tended to develop both 
the overall aims / outcomes of their interventions and the actual practices 
that bring them about. However, despite policy and practice decisions being 
evidence based (normally based on reports of what has worked in similar 
situations elsewhere) we believed there to be a lack of understanding as to 
the precise mechanism that links practice to outcomes, in particular regarding 
the object of intervention. By object of intervention we meant that actual 
‘thing’ that the practitioner works to amend, change or influence in some way. 
Reflecting my on-going research we suggested that such practice actually 
intervenes on people’s expectations; a term we took to refer to embedded 
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sets of complex relations that undermine any simple understanding of cause 
and effect. We further suggested that these expectations display many 
characteristics of complex systems, including self-organisation. This project 
was carried out with a local regeneration scheme, and a summary report is 
attached to this thesis as an appendix. 
 
1.3  General approach to problem 
 
Whilst this thesis takes its central problems from social theory its approach is 
philosophical. Its premise is that social theory provides a theoretical 
framework that can be used to study and interpret social data (sociology) and 
enable interventions to be made (social policy). This thesis will not, without 
further research and development, be able to provide such a framework – 
though it not only could be so developed, the attached appendix records my 
own initial tentative research steps towards such a goal. Rather, in line with 
the call from Searle (2010) for a line of research more fundamental than the 
social sciences, and that from Albertsen and Diken (2003) for research into 
what the social actually is, this thesis claims to be social ontology. It takes its 
basic assumptions from outside of social theory. These assumptions (or 
presuppositions) are:  
1. That the general approach taken by philosophers of multiplicity is, in 
principle, valid; that life, and particularly social life, cannot be 
understood as homogenous and that the notion of unities within it is 
deeply problematic. 
2. Rather, that life displays all the characteristics of dynamic systems and 
can only be understood using concepts taken from complexity science; 
in particular that what we take to be order is not the solid and certain 
order that we would like it to be, but rather is emergent, fluid and 
creative. 
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3. And, in line with the above, that within life and nature a deep 
connectivity exists; that social life and humanity cannot be understood 
as in any way separate or distinct from life in general - life from which 
it has emerged – and that in its turn, life in general cannot be 
understood as radically distinct or separate from the material nature it 
has emerged from. 
As such, the target audience of this thesis are those social philosophers who 
have an interest in social ontology, and who will be in a position to provide 
the necessary critique that will enable its inevitable failings to be overcome, 
and those social theorists who will be in a position to provide the more applied 
research that will be required to translate this thesis into a theory that has a 
more direct practical application to social phenomena. 
 
I justify this philosophical approach broadly in line with the distinction made 
by Deleuze and Guattari between philosophical concepts and scientific 
functions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). For them, these concepts and functions 
are differentiated by their relationship to chaos, with the latter attempting a 
certain stability, certainty and predictability, whilst the former are at home 
with fluidity and uncertainty. Whilst certain social theorists have started 
working from the perspectives of fluidity and complexity (Bauman, 2000 and 
Urry, 2003 for example) there is still a tendency within social theory to align 
itself to the sciences, as a social science. In order to attempt the social 
ontology that this thesis aims for I would suggest that a clear distinction 
needs to be made between a scientific approach and a philosophical one. In 
saying this I in no way wish to be critical of science in general or social 
science in particular, but feel that aligning this thesis too closely to them 
would restrict the scope such a fundamental reappraisal needs. In short, a 
philosophical approach has a far greater degree of freedom to challenge 
certain presuppositions. 
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It is central to my hypothesis that the work of Michel Serres provides both the 
methodology and several key ideas that will allow the problems at the heart of 
this thesis to be addressed from the direction outlined above. However, whilst 
I shall draw on Serres extensively, this project is neither a direct study of 
either him or his body of work. I am not attempting an exposition, analysis, 
evaluation or critique of his work, though of course, elements of these may 
result. My aim is to use aspects of his work to solve a problem that he does 
not address, at least not directly. In line with this methodology I shall also 
draw on the work of several other contemporary philosophers and social 
theorists, together with complexity theory, in an attempt to discover a certain 
self-similarity of description that can be mixed together. It is my hope that 
the resulting ‘tatters’ (as Serres would describe such a product or mixing) will 
provide a sufficiently effective description of the emergence and dynamics of 
social structure.13 The only test of this description will be that it works – that 
it can be applied to social issues and problems! 
 
In Chapter Three I shall outline the methodology of Serres and make the case 
for why it, in general terms, will be adopted for this project. This will involve 
explaining both his comparativism and his empiricism, and making links 
between these and the emergent science of complexity. In the course of doing 
this I will demonstrate why, in view of the considerable links between Serres’ 
approach and that of complexity science, I do not just adopt the latter as my 
basic approach to the problem. Part of the reason I shall give for not taking 
such a direct approach will be that there are two particularly key ideas offered 
by Serres that will prove invaluable, namely noise and ‘thinking the multiple’. 
Both of these ideas will also be introduced at this stage. The other part of the 
reason for keeping Serres at the centre is that in applying complexity science 
to the social, in translating from a general field (or even, at times, from a 
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biological one) to a social field, ideas used by a number of contemporary 
French philosophers will be needed, and whilst Serres is only one of these he 
does provide a necessary counterfoil to Gilles Deleuze at a crucial stage of my 
argument. 
 
The two key ideas noted above, noise and ‘thinking the multiple’, are 
discussed by a number of contemporary philosophers in ways that attempt a 
direct application to the social. As I’ve already stated, I cannot think of any 
aspect of society, of any social phenomenon, that can be understood as a 
unity; that cannot, when examined closely, be found to be open, multiple and 
complex. If we accept this, an obvious place to commence this research would 
be with those philosophers who have made such an inroad into the problem. 
In Chapter Four, therefore, I shall examine the positions adopted by Alain 
Badiou, by Gilles Deleuze in his collaborations with Felix Guattari, and by 
Manual DeLanda in their differing attempts to explain social multiplicities. 
Whilst I will argue that each, for different reasons, falls short in their attempt, 
I will be able to draw sufficient from these arguments to establish a tentative 
first hold on the task ahead. 
 
This first hold will take the form of a search for a ‘unit’ of social organisation; 
or rather, as I will be seeking to avoid unities in favour of multiplicities, whilst 
at the same time accepting the need for a certain something that is the 
subject of organisation, a ‘non-unit’ of social organisation. This will be my task 
in Chapter Five. In researching such a candidate ‘non-unit’ I shall concentrate 
on two main writers: Michel Foucault and Gabriel Tarde, though I shall 
approach Foucault from two perspectives and the actual term I adopt comes 
from a third person, Dennis Wrong. I shall start by exploring Foucault’s 
understanding of power relations in the hope of uncovering exactly what it is 
that is the subject of these relations. I shall then explore Tarde’s The Laws of 
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Imitation. There has been quite a lot of academic discussion as to the 
existence of a social replicator (a meme) that mimics much of the 
organisational capacities that the gene does in biological replication. Tarde 
has been closely linked to this line of research, with one academic (Marsden, 
2000) going as far as to bestow the title ‘forefather of memetics’ upon him. 
Such a replicator would appear to be an obvious candidate as such a ‘non-
unit’, and not least because of the strong links between Tarde and Deleuze, 
though I shall argue that such an approach poses serious difficulties. I then 
return to Foucault to concentrate on the role statements play in his 
discussions on discourse, and to blend them with Wrong’s understanding of 
expectations to produce an actual candidate ‘non-unit’ that can be taken 
forward into the next section. I adopt expectation14 as the name of my non-
unit. 
 
In chapter six I first of all explore the relationship between Deleuze’s notions 
of difference and repetition, and Serres’ understandings of noise and time, in 
order to offer an explanation as to how expectations could emerge from the 
social noise15 and undergo preliminary self-organisation. Having previously 
discovered problems with the notion of a social replicator, a certain something 
that is passed from individual social actor to individual social actor, and 
consequently with Tarde’s argument for imitation as a direct cause of social 
repetition, I then find a solution in the work of biologist Stuart Kauffman – the 
notion of auto-catalytic sets, or a method of indirect repetition that could also 
be described as indirect imitation. I conclude by arguing how these emergent 
expectations, to varying degrees, go through a process of codification to 
become norms, laws and institutions (each of these being a manifestation of 
the process). For this last section I return to the collaborative work between 
Deleuze and Guattari, but without adopting a straightforward Deleuzian 
solution.
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2  Literature review 
 
2.1  Philosophy 
 
There is only a limited amount of Serres’ work available in English translation, 
and none of it refers directly to the problems being addressed by this project 
– in fact it could be argued that none of his work addresses any problem 
directly. For an understanding of his methodology the two most useful texts 
are The Five Senses, an extended essay on empiricism in which he is explicit 
in recognising the limited value of abstract thought and analysis, and 
Conversations on Science, Culture and Time, a series of ‘conversations’ with 
Bruno Latour, where the second ‘conversation’ is devoted to method. 
 
The Natural Contract is the closest Serres comes to directly addressing the 
social. In this book Serres argues that whilst we live according to a social 
contract, what we lack is a contract with the planet Earth. This makes 
numerous references to ‘bonds’ and ‘cords’, but otherwise has no direct 
bearing on this thesis. The text, other than the two above on methodology, 
which does have a major bearing on this thesis, is Genesis. In it he offers up 
the challenge to ‘think the multiple’ and writes at some length on time and 
multiplicities. The Birth of Physics, a reflection on Lucretius’ On The Nature of 
the Universe and Greek atomism, together with the mathematics of 
Archimedes, is useful for his thoughts on dynamics and the fluidity of life and 
existence. The Troubadour of Knowledge, which focuses more on 
epistemology (to the extent that any of his texts have a single focus) is of 
more limited relevance. Serres’ earlier work, published in the Hermes series, 
has not been translated, but ten essays from this series have been and 
published in English as Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy. These essays 
generally reflect his interest in fluidity and the second law of thermodynamics 
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and are good examples of his comparative methodology. Of particular interest 
is the postface on dynamics by the leading exponents of complexity science 
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. 
 
There is a very limited amount of secondary material available in English. The 
most relevant of this material to this thesis is that by David Webb. His two 
journal articles (‘Michel Serres on Lucretius: Atomism, Science and Ethics’ and 
‘Thinking Multiplicity without the Concept: towards a Democratic Intellect) 
together with his introductions the English publication of The Birth of Physics 
and Peter Hallward’s interview with Serres (‘The Science of Relations’) are all 
directly relevant and very informative.16 The collection of essays edited by 
Niran Abbas (Mapping Michel Serres) are interesting as background reading to 
Serres but none are directly relevant to this project. Steven D. Brown’s 
journal article, ‘Michel Serres: Science, Translation and the logic of the 
Parasite’ is also interesting, but, again, is not directly relevant to this project. 
Steven Connor has also written many insightful papers on Serres, though 
from the perspective of modern literature and literary theory rather than 
social theory or ontology. 
 
Alain Badiou (in Being and Event) and Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (in Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus) are both philosophers of the multiple: they 
not only explore ‘the multiple’ and multiplicities, using very much the same 
language as Serres does, but, in their different ways attempt to apply these 
explorations to the social. The sections related to codification in the Deleuze & 
Guattari texts are particularly insightful. Deleuze’s seminal Difference and 
Repetition text provides vital technical insight as to how the expectations (as I 
go on to describe them) actually emerge. Michel Foucault’s exploration of 
discourse, and particularly of ‘statements’, in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
is directly relevant to the notion of expectations, a concept that is absolutely 
 19 
central to the results of this thesis. Foucault’s works on power relations 
(particularly Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge) are also directly 
relevant to this thesis. Also of importance is W.B. Gallie’s 1956 paper 
‘Essentially Contested Concepts’. 
 
Also of interest are several writers who straddle both philosophy and politics. 
The Frankfurt School’s general criticism of modern science as inherently 
positivistic and its dependence on logic of identity, together with their 
separation of philosophical truths from scientific truths, provides further 
background to the general methodology of this thesis. Of prime importance 
here is Theodor Adorno’s Negative Dialectics. In The Theory of Communicative 
Action Jürgen Habermas discusses the concept of the lifeworld. Of interest 
here is Habermas’ understanding of the lifeworld as the immediate milieu of 
the social actor, as the world and horizon of his consciousness and 
communication, a world the structure of which he can modify. Of similar 
interest, therefore, is the earlier book of the social phenomenologist, and 
pupil of Husserl, Alfred Schutz – The Phenomenology of the Social World. For 
Schutz the lifeworld is the world of everyday life, the world as taken for 
granted. A serious problem with this book, however, is Schutz’s attempt to 
reconcile objectivity and subjectivity in the social sciences by recourse to ideal 
types – a solution that is overly abstract for the methodology adopted by this 
thesis. 
 
Two books by Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics and New Reflections on the Revolution of our 
Time, are of interest in a context wider than the necessarily narrow one 
adopted for this project. The former (written jointly with Chantal Mouffe) is 
interesting for its understanding that no social structure is entirely closed, for 
the centrality it gives contingency in the social process, and for the role it 
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ascribes to sedimented practices. The latter makes an interesting link 
between the constitution of social identity and power. 
 
Two books by political philosophers at Johns Hopkins University are also worth 
noting. In A World of Becoming William E. Connolly directly engages with a 
view of the world as composed of open, complex and multiple interacting 
systems, and does so in a language and way of thinking very sympathetic to 
Deleuze, but without offering any insight into the actual being of these 
systems. He argues, quite correctly, that we need to find ways to adapt to the 
complexities of the modern pluralistic world, without attempting an 
explanation of how these systems have emerged and interact. Jane Bennett, 
in Vibrant Matter, approaches the world of human experience from a very 
similar perspective but tries to incorporate the active participation of 
nonhuman elements into the process. Whilst outside of the focus of this thesis 
this is a very interesting direction of research. 
 
2.2 Social theory 
 
Albertsen & Diken’s research paper ‘What is the Social?’ is an invaluable and 
concise summary of one aspect of the central problem of this thesis. Brain 
Fay’s Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science is interesting from a 
multicultural perspective and very much supports many aspects of Serres’ 
philosophy but does not provide any great insight into the problems being 
addressed by this thesis. Nicholas Gane’s The Future of Social Theory is a 
collection of interviews with the world’s leading social theorists and provides 
innumerable links. David Weissaman’s A Social Ontology discusses aspects of 
the problems without adding anything new. Dennis H Wrong’s The Problem of 
Order also discusses aspects of these problems but attempts resolutions that 
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do not easily fit with the approach taken by this thesis. It does, however, of a 
basic outline of expectations that is developed by this thesis. 
 
Sage Publication’s Handbook of Social Theory surveys many aspects of 
contemporary social theory and contains Barry Barnes’ paper ‘The Micro / 
Macro Problem of Structure and Agency’. This paper gives a very concise 
overview of the problem. It notes the centrality of Anthony Giddens’ The 
Constitution of Society to this debate. Giddens’ book is probably the most 
prominent attempt from within social theory to bridge the macro / micro 
problem, but is ultimately unsuccessful because of its lack of an explanation 
as to how new social rules come about. 
 
Many texts dealing with the problems outlined above refer to Gabriel Tarde as 
a forgotten ‘great’ of social theory, lost in the shadows of Auguste Comte. He 
is also referenced in many passages by Gilles Deleuze, who acknowledges his 
influence. Tarde is also referenced in several texts in relation to memetics 
(particularly in Marsden’s paper ‘Forefathers of Memetics: Gabriel Tarde and 
the Laws of Imitation’ and Susan Blackmore’s The Meme Machine). Memetics 
can be traced back to Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene in which he proposes 
the possibility of a unit of social replication that behaves in a similar manner 
to the gene in biological replication. A facsimile of the 1903 edition of Tarde’s 
The Laws of Imitation has recently been published and is an essential source. 
 
Manual DeLanda’s A New Philosophy of Society was published in 2006. He 
approaches his work from the general perspective of complexity and 
emergence, which is broadly in line with the approach taken by this thesis, 
and he has written on the work of Deleuze and non-linearity. Despite the 
promise offered by this background his book is disappointing and contributes 
nothing positive to the task of this project. Another recent publication is John 
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Searle’s Making of the Social World. Searle’s position reinforces the general 
point that such a social ontology as being proposed by this thesis is needed, 
and the need for such an ontology to conform to the basic facts of a 
materialistic understanding of our world. On the other hand, he argues in the 
opposite direction regarding Serres’ critique of abstraction and analysis. 
 
The works of two other thinkers are of direct importance to this research 
project. G.H. Mead’s Mind, Self & Society contributes to an understanding of 
the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness, and the social 
dimensions of the latter. The works of Claude Lévi-Strauss, particularly his 
Structural Anthropology, provides invaluable background information and 
understanding regarding a comparative methodology in a (near) social 
context. 
 
In Liquid Modernity, Zygmunt Bauman argues that the modern social world is 
characterised by the continuous fluidity of things; not just actual human 
locations, but particularly inter-human bonds. In this respect he is very much 
aligned against a more traditional scientific understanding that seeks stability 
and attempts explanations in terms of solidity, and very much in line with 
Serres’ general approach. He does not, though, offer a sufficiently 
fundamental exploration of exactly what flows, the precise nature of these 
inter-human bonds and how they emerge. This book is Bauman’s attempt to 
move forward from his analysis of the postmodern condition he offers in 
Imitations of Postmodernity. However, some concepts contained in this earlier 
text, particularly the ‘privatisation of fears’, may still be of value in attempting 
to apply to results of this thesis to practical social problems, like the recent 
social unrests and the current ‘economic crisis’. 
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Two current and prominent themes within social theory, technology and 
globalisation, are worth noting. Whilst not falling within the narrow ontological 
focus of this thesis, they do offer interesting directions for further research. 
Nicholas Gane notes the importance of the first of these in his introduction to 
The Future of Social Theory. Here he makes the obvious point that modern 
technology is blurring the boundaries between human subjects and 
impersonal objects. Despite Bruno Latour’s well publicised reservations about 
his previous work on Actor Network Theory (Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network Theory and ‘On Recalling ANT’) in a later work 
on the sociology of mobilities, inspired by Gabriel Tarde (‘Gabriel Tarde and 
the End of the Social’), in working on the mobile connection between things 
he still seems to place the analysis of objects at the centre of his research. In 
this respect the work of Scott Lash (Another Modernity, A Different Rationality 
and Critique of Information for example) is also worth exploring. In his move 
beyond postmodern theory he focuses on an analysis of technological forms of 
life. Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (discussed above) is also, of course, 
relevant in this context. 
 
John Urry’s Global Complexity provides an excellent study of globalisation. He 
offers an explanation of the way in which social relationships are networked 
across the globe, and the way in which entities (power relations and ideas) 
flow across time and space, by drawing on the concepts of complexity, 
networks, emergent systems, information processing and local / global 
attractors. It does not, however, offer a sufficiently detailed explanation of 
what a flow of ideas or power relations actually involves. Also of background 
interest in this respect are two books by Saskia Sassen (in Globalization and 
its Discontents he analyses the global mobility of people and money, and in 
Cities in a World Economy he analyses inequalities in the world economy) and 
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What is Globalization? by Ulrich Beck (in which he analyses what he terms the 
‘transnational realities’ that lead to increasingly fluid life forms). 
 
For an exploration of the relationships between power and government 
inspired by the work of Foucault see Nickolas Rose’s Powers of Freedom. In 
line with Serres’ frequent use of literature, see Judith Butler’s article ‘Bodies 
and Power, Revisited’ and her Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (with 
Laclau and Zizek) for an exploration of the boundaries between social theory 
and literary theory. Finally, for an exploration of the contemporary 
sociological implications of a highly inter-connected society and how such an 
understanding of the social as presented by this thesis could be used to 
analyse or offer a critique of the notion of a ‘big society’, see Robert D. 
Putman’s now infamous article ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social 
Capital’. 
 
2.3  Complexity Science 
 
The main problem in offering a review of texts available under the general 
title of complexity science is that it is very much an emerging body of 
knowledge with no coherent theory, and that it lacks clear boundaries. It is, 
therefore being researched and applied in a very wide range of academic 
disciplines, including information theory, biology, health, philosophy, 
economics, business, town planning, architecture and sociology, with each 
researcher attempting to apply a broad range of concepts to their particular 
area of specialism. 
 
Gregoine Nicolas and Ilya Prigogine are highly respected complexity scientists, 
and their book, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction, is an excellent and 
authoritative starting point for a general introduction to this emerging science. 
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Also of value as background texts are Roger Lewin’s Complexity (an excellent 
introduction to the subject), Steven Johnson’s Emergence (a very good 
introduction to the concept of emergence that highlights the value of a 
comparative methodology by making explicit the similarity of emergent forms 
between ants, brains and cities) and the classic by James Gleick: Chaos. 
Gleick’s latest book, The Information, offers a very readable introduction to 
information theory. 
 
For a good introduction to the self-similarities of nature being discovered by 
scientists working in the field of complexity see The Collapse of Chaos: 
discovering simplicity in a complex world by Jack Cohen and Ian Steward. 
Philip Ball’s The Self-Made Tapestry is another invaluable source of 
information regarding this self-similarity of form across nature, but has the 
additional value of providing some truly inspirational photographs by way of 
illustration. The two books by Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life and The Hidden 
Connections, also provides much background information as to the 
connectivity of life, as does Mark Buchanan’s Small World, though this latter 
text does so from much more of a social perspective than the biological / 
environmental perspectives of the former.  
 
Of texts directly related to philosophy, that by the philosopher Paul Cilliers 
(Complexity & Postmodernism) is probably the most informative. Also of value 
(and more straight-forward in their approach) are the online journal articles 
by Francis Heylighen (‘The science of self-organisation and adaptivity’) and 
Francis Heylighen, Paul Cilliers, and Carlos Gershenson (‘Complexity and 
Philosophy’). For an attempt to apply many of the concepts of complexity 
science to the work of Deleuze, see Manuel DeLanda’s Intensive Science & 
Virtual Philosophy. Also of value as a more general text is DeLanda’s much 
cited A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. 
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Of texts directly related to biology, the two books by Brian Goodwin, How The 
Leopard Changed Its Spots and Nature’s Due are by far the most cited, 
particularly when being applied to philosophy. They both apply many of the 
features of complexity science to biology and discuss at length the self-
similarity of process and form across the biological world. The two books by 
Stuart Kauffman, The Origins of Order and Investigations are much the same, 
but, particularly the former, by way of a more in-depth biology. The latter of 
these is more philosophical in its approach, with its title being a direct 
reference to the work of Wittgenstein.  
 
There are also a number of texts, in addition to those mentioned above under 
social theory, that apply complexity theory to the social sciences. Of note 
amongst these are Edgar Morin’s On Complexity (an exploration of the 
relationships between systems theory, complexity and the human sciences), 
D.S. Byrne’s Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: an introduction (as 
its name suggests, a good introduction to the ways complexity theory is being 
directly applied to the social sciences), and Graham Taylor’s The New Political 
Sociology: Power, Ideology & Identity in an age of Complexity. 
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3  Methodology and Michel Serres 
 
3.0  Introduction: the methodology of Michel Serres 
 
If the general presuppositions outlined in 1.3 regarding the multiplicity and 
fluidity of the social world, together with a deep sense of connectivity 
throughout nature and life in general, are accepted, even if only tentatively, 
then a comparative methodology similar to that used by Serres is the most 
appropriate to the task of this thesis. This is in part because Serres’ approach 
is from the direction of the multiple, and from the perspective of fluidity and 
non-linear dynamics. It is also, in part, because this comparativism has the 
aim of bringing to the surface those deep similarities that cut across the 
boundaries of traditional areas of academic research. But it is also because 
this comparativism is more than just the comparing of two otherwise distinct 
domains and noting their similarities, and it is much more than just the 
application of one theoretical approach (complexity science, for example) to a 
new domain (the social world). It concerns its translation. Translation accepts 
that, despite the similarities, the direct application of one language into a 
different context, a transliteration, loses meaning and subtlety. Translation 
requires sensitivity and creativity, and Serres is acutely attentive to this 
problem. 
 
But such an approach has its limitations. The initial translation, in the case of 
this thesis from complexity science to the social world, has to be approached 
with caution (and even though partial translations have been attempted 
before, this, as far as I can ascertain, is the first attempt at a thorough 
translation such that the problems earlier outlined are resolved). If it was 
possible for a straight application to take place it would be reasonably obvious 
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if had been successful – the pieces would fit together like a jig-saw puzzle. 
But as it is, the theory produced by this thesis will require further acts of 
translation (from the philosophy to social theory, from the theoretical to the 
practical, and from the general to the local) before it can applied directly to 
social phenomena, and only then can its validity be assessed. In many ways it 
is related to social theory in the same way that theoretical physics is related 
to experimental physics, in as much that the latter devises experiments that 
test the claims of the former. The problem with such an analogy, of course, is 
that even though ‘complexity’ is referred to as science, it is not science in the 
traditional sense of the term that claims accurate predictions can be made. It 
is, if anything, the science of uncertainty. This inherent uncertainty will pose 
further problems for any further translation. 
 
This thesis, then, derives its methodology and its inspiration from Michel 
Serres. Serres was not the first person in the history of philosophy to think in 
terms of multiplicity. He had two main influences from this history: ancient 
atomism and the mathematical models of Leibniz. The results of the former of 
these on his thinking led to the publication of The Birth of Physics, and the 
latter to Le système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathematiques (which, 
unfortunately, is not available in an English translation). In relation to Leibniz, 
it is interesting to note that Hideaki Hirando (1997) suggests that the fractal 
geometry promoted by Mandelbrot drew on Leibniz’s notions of self-similarity. 
Serres explains that he was himself a “structuralist in the mathematical sense 
of the term” before abandoning this perspective in favour of a “second 
mathematical revolution” inspired by information theory and algorithms 
(Hallward, 2003b).17 All these intellectual sources, together with his seafaring 
experiences (where the complexity and uncertainty of the weather is so 
significant) seem to have produced a thinker particularly sensitive to the 
complexity and multiplicity of life and nature. 
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This thesis is not, however, an exposition or critique of Serres’ work – though 
these may be produced along the way. Its hypothesis is that his methodology 
could provide a way, a map as it were, into the terrain of this investigation.18 
However, to the first time reader unfamiliar with his work, Serres can appear 
an enigma. Bruno Latour, the sociologist whose contribution to the 
development of Actor Network Theory (Latour, 2005) was inspired by his 
reading of Serres, reflected the common reaction to his work back to him 
during a series of interviews in 1991: “Your books aren’t obscure, but the way 
to approach them is hidden. You map out a path, you go everywhere – the 
sciences, mythology, literature – but at the same time you often cover up the 
traces that led you to your results” (Serres & Latour, 1995: 1); and asks: 
“Why, in the space of one paragraph, do we find ourselves with the Romans 
then with Jules Verne then with the Indo-Europeans then, suddenly, launched 
in the Challenger rocket, before ending up on a bank of the Garonne River?” 
(1995: 43). The aim of these interviews, said Latour, was to “go behind the 
magician’s curtain, that we may...see the underlying design of a body of work 
that doesn’t appear to have one” (1995: 1). There is, though, no underlying 
design as such. In line with Wittgenstein, whom he read in England, Serres’ 
‘philosophy’ is “not a body of doctrine but an activity”, a body of work that 
consists “essentially of elucidations” or demonstrations (1995: 69); his work 
is a methodology; one that, whilst implying a general ontology and 
epistemology does not, in itself, address the detailed understanding that this 
project seeks. It does, though, provide the methodological framework on 
which such an understanding can be constructed. 
 
Serres, in stating that his philosophy “is not a body of knowledge nor a 
discipline among the usual sciences” explains that this is so because “it insists 
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on a balance between everything and nothing”, and uses an image of a 
double cone to elucidate: 
Philosophy works on a two-layered cone, occupying its apex. I see the 
encyclopedia on the first layer and, on the second, nothing – learned 
unknowing, the suspension of judgement, solitude, questioning, doubt, 
incertitude, reconstruction starting from zero. (Serres & Latour, 1995: 
90) 
 
Serres’ methodology is comparative, not hermeneutic and not dialectic. Whilst 
these latter methods take unities as their subjects of either interpretation or 
conflictive understanding, the former takes multiplicities (this will be 
discussed in detail in sections 3.3 and 3.4). This comparativism is made 
possible by a particular understanding of time (or to be more accurate times) 
that gives birth to the multiple; this is an understanding of time that will 
become integral to this thesis (6.1). It produces a freedom of thought that is 
able to respond to the deep patterns in life and nature in a way that the other 
methods cannot – for they are either born from, or give rise to, conflict. 
Serres’ methodology itself is born of an abhorrence for violence and conflict 
and is “driven by a strong disinclination to ‘belong’ to any group” (1995: 20) 
and a desire to invent and follow his intuition. Intuition, in the sense used by 
Serres, is the vital creative element to any serious piece of research. After all, 
even in the physical sciences the original hypothesis formation is largely 
intuitive, prior to testing by experiment. As Russell has pointed out, “the 
opposition of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. [It] is what first leads to 
the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes.” (1953: 19) 
 
In working on a problem Serres attempts to demonstrate the self-similar 
patterns that exist across space, time, cultures and academic disciplines; 
patterns that a growing number of scientists are actually discovering in their 
respective fields.19 These patterns though are not fixed, solid, transcendent 
statues,20 rather they are patterns constructed from a turbulent and 
fluctuating dynamic. But they are also patterns that reflect the underlying 
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fluidity and complexity of life and nature; patterns that, because of their fluid 
and turbulent nature, need to be redrawn afresh each time a problem is 
tackled. Hence the image of the double cone that he uses to illustrate his 
comparative method. The first layer of the cone is everything the philosopher 
has read or studied; insight drawn not only from philosophy, but from any or 
as many ‘disciplines’ as possible. The second cone is akin to standing in front 
of a blank canvas and relying on your intuition to recall those aspects or 
elements of your insight that throws light, that illuminates the problem in 
hand, that guides the images that emerge from the brush in your hand. This 
comparative methodology discloses traces of patterns that only ‘exist’ as 
virtual patterns or forms, and can only be disclosed by the rapid movement of 
a messenger (making connections) or a thief (stealing or collecting 
fragments) – hence Serres’ use of the god Hermes as a motif.21 Thus 
“comparativism and the complexity of things and time require swift 
movement and a new style” (Serres & Latour, 1995: 72), a methodology that 
presupposes leaps and speed, a methodology where “the most elegant 
demonstration is always the shortest one” (1995: 69), a methodology that 
because of the distances leaped and the speed of travel produces work that 
can leave the reader disoriented and dizzy, but a methodology that can 
demonstrate the deep self-organising and self-similar patterning found in all 
aspects of life and nature. And once such a self-similarity is acknowledged to 
exist, it is a methodology ideally suited to the translation of ideas from one 
area of research to another.  
 
In this chapter I intend to do a number of things: 1. Explain Serres’ 
comparative methodology in greater detail than that outlined above. I will 
make links between this methodology and work being undertaken by a 
number of other academics, and explain the relevance of these links to the 
aims of this thesis. This, methodologically speaking, is comparativism in 
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practice – and such a practice permeates this thesis. 2. Make a connection 
between Serres’ body of work and complexity science.22 Even though Serres 
does not directly refer to ‘complexity theory’ a great many of the concepts he 
uses are to be found within this emerging science – not least of which is that 
of emergence itself, a notion that will be central to this thesis. 3. Introduce 
two key ideas: noise and ‘thinking the multiple’. The first of these is central to 
an understanding of emergence as used in this thesis, as applied to the social, 
whilst the second is quite simply a point of focus and a guide, a constant 
reminder not to retreat to the safety of unities. 4. Outline Serres’ empiricism. 
This is essential in so far as it will quite literally keep this thesis grounded; it 
will imbed the emergence of the social form in the ground, in our connection 
to our world, our environment (the given) through our senses; it will reject, in 
any definitive sense, any abstract, Ideal or transcendent explanation of the 
social. 
 
3.1  Serres: key ideas 
 
Of the various ideas used by Serres, perhaps two are central to this thesis: 
noise and ‘thinking the multiple’. The first of these is closely related to Serres’ 
understanding of time.23 The time or times that need to be understood are 
non-linear. I use the plural because it is important, in order to understand 
what time means for Serres, to drop any notion of a singular time – systems 
and structures are pluritemporal. This is not to deny the existence of linear 
time, both in the form of reversible mechanical times and unidirectional 
thermodynamic times, but to claim that these forms are emergent out of a 
non-linear time born itself from chaos, or noise, or total symmetry. As an 
entry point into explaining this claim, it is worth briefly noting two statements 
made by Serres.  During his interview with Latour he claims that “Hegel’s 
error was in reversing [the] logical evidence and in claiming that contradiction 
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produces time, whereas only the opposite is true: time makes contradiction 
possible” (Serres & Latour, 1995: 49-50). In Genesis he states that “[f]or a 
long time I believed that history was producing [noise] before thinking that it 
was producing history” (Serres, 1995a: 83). In the former statement, Serres 
argues that Hegel confuses time and history. Historical time, chronological 
time, Bergsonian abstract time, is the time we are used to – it is the time of 
the narrative of events, born, no doubt, from contradiction. Time for Serres, 
however, is the background noise from which these events emerge; it is, as I 
shall proceed to explain (in section 5.1), the emergence of rhythm, of pattern, 
from that in which no rhythm or pattern can be distinguished. Thus the 
emergence of any pattern (order) is the emergence of a time sequence. 
 
Serres uses the word noise in the way it was used in Old French, to mean 
fury, uproar and wrangling, as well as sound, as in the French phrase 
chercher noise – to pick a quarrel with. For Serres, noise (italicised to 
differentiate it from the word meaning just sound in English) is metaphysical 
and he suggests that background noise “may well be the ground of our being” 
(1995a: 13). It is the pure chaos, the pure undifferentiated, totally 
symmetrical fury, the pure multiplicity out of which everything emerges like 
Aphrodite out of the sea: “Noise cannot be a phenomenon; every 
phenomenon is separated from it, a silhouette on a backdrop...” (1995a: 13). 
Noise or chaos, in this sense then, lies in contradistinction to any notion of 
chaos in the sense inferred by Hobbes’ war of all of all against all – as war, 
despite the conflict, already implies a significant amount of organisation: 
The primal state, the primitive state, before any contract, is a pre-
ordered state, undecided, undeclared, unprepared for, not stabilized in 
institutions. No, it is not war, it is noise; no it is not war, it is the 
multiple in a fury. (1995a: 83) 
 
And for the same reasons it lies in contradistinction to the conflict that arises 
out of a dialectical process. In this sense it could be linked to the emergence 
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of any complex system – from the undifferentiated plasma immediately 
following the ‘big bang’ to the undifferentiated cells of an early embryo. 
 
These points are important for an understanding of both emergence and self-
organisation. “Classes”, states Serres, “are a result of fury” – fury being a 
synonym for noise (1995a: 82, my emphasis). All patterns, any notion of 
order – classes, genera, concepts, unities, entities – emerge out of noise. I 
will return to and elaborate on these essential ideas later (in sections 5.3 and 
6.1), but for the purposes of these introductory remarks let me say ‘simply’ 
that noise is pure multiplicity (and a link can be made to Lucretius and 
atomism here):24 a grouping composed of a multitude of elements or atoms 
that is, in a sense, unthinkable, in as far the perfect symmetry of the laminar 
flow prevents any differentiation, and thus any sense of either space or time. 
No atom has any relationship to any other atom – all is chaos. Emergent 
patterns will be formed from those elements that form quasi-stable 
relationships with other elements: 
All at once, I am speaking of time, of physical time, and the flux is no 
longer a metaphor, I am speaking of the flux, the laminar flow that is 
sown, here and there, with turbulence...I am speaking only of pure 
process now. It is the time of worlds and things, of history, of the group 
and of knowledge...(1995a: 95-96) 
 
From this turbulence all things, all classes are born, born from these first 
relationships between certain elements, born from these first codes: “Life, 
invention, violence...a processual flux codes a classing” (1995a: 95-96). Fury 
becomes a classifier, a giver of form. This is emergence in a nutshell; and the 
relations that produce the emergent forms are internal and self-organising. 
 
Serres offers a critique of the way we think, of the ease in which we grasp 
hold of these forms, these Ideas,25 and think of them as unities, whilst 
forgetting the multiplicities from which they have emerged, and which, apart 
from the superficial disguise we give them, they still are. In the opening 
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section of Genesis, Serres offers “a new object for philosophy.” This new 
object is the multiple as such. His aim, he says, is “to raise the brackets and 
parentheses...whereby we shove multiplicities under unities”. He warns of the 
dangers of subsuming “multiplicity under unity”, and asks a profound and 
challenging question: “Can I possibly speak of multiplicity itself without ever 
availing myself of the concept?”  Space, all space, any space, whether it is 
biological, geo-physical, socio-political or epistemological, is composed of the 
multiple; but, Serres, points out, “we are fascinated by the unit; only a unity 
seems rational to us.” (1995a: 2-7) Even our attempting to think the multiple 
as such seems to require our use of conceptual unities. We only seem to 
attach the status of being to the groupings of the world, he says, when we 
subsume them beneath a unity. The problem is that when we attempt to 
delimit such a multiplicity, when we try and draw a line, a boundary around 
and between the fragments or crowds within such a multiplicity, we try and 
capture what we like to think of as a pre-existing a unity, a being that has 
been awaiting our discovery. The problem is that such beings simply do not 
exist, and inventing such unities prevents us from understanding the 
emergence of social phenomena. We need to avoid this seductive call of the 
Sirens; we need to avoid the rocks by awakening from the trance, by 
reminding ourselves to ‘think the multiple’! 
 
3.2  Serres: comparative methodology 
 
But it is not just the emergence of pattern, of classes, that causes Serres to 
refer, in his interview with Latour, to time being folded and crumpled, a 
gathering together, a percolation; it is a certain invariance of these classes 
across space and time, a sense of their repetition. It is this gathering together 
that makes his whole methodology possible, and it is also this that allows his 
‘philosophy’ to emerge from the noise of philosophical history. 
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This emergence of patterns that exhibit a strong degree of invariance across 
space and time is being described by a growing number of scientists. Stuart 
Kauffman (1993 & 2000) and Brian Goodwin (2001 & 2007), for example, are 
both biologists who strongly support a theory of evolution, but who also 
strongly argue that current theories, as passionately promoted by people such 
as Richard Dawkins (1989), place far too much emphasis on the role of a 
replicator (the gene) and differential selection whilst ignoring the role of self-
organisation in biological systems. Goodwin describes what he regards as a 
remarkable phenomenon, one only implied by Kauffman:  
similar patterns of activity can arise in systems that differ greatly from 
one another in their composition and in the nature of their parts. It does 
not matter much whether we are dealing with chemical reactions, 
aggregating slime mold amoebas, heart cells, neurons, or ants in a 
colony. They all show similar types of dynamic activity – rhythms, waves 
that propagate in concentric circles or spirals that annihilate when they 
collide, and chaotic behavior. The important properties of these complex 
systems are found less in what they are made of than in the way the 
parts are related to one another and the dynamic organization of the 
whole – their relational order. (Goodwin, 2001: 77)  
 
He explains this phenomenon in biological systems through what he calls 
morphogenesis, the development of an organism’s distinctive form through a 
process of progressive self-stabilising symmetry breaking or bifurcation - the 
transition from a state of high symmetry / low complexity to one of lower 
symmetry / higher complexity: the emergence of forms / classes possessing 
lower symmetry / higher complexity out of Serres’ higher symmetrical / less 
complex noise. In contradistinction to more orthodox theories of evolution, 
where individual species go through independent incremental chance 
variations, and where it is therefore difficult to explain how chance can give 
rise to such similar and complex structures as eyes, this application of self-
organisation to evolutionary theory provides a picture of a dynamic process 
that produces self-similarity of structure both in terms of scale, as in fractal 
patterns, and across species. At the risk of gross over-simplification, this is so 
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because a biochemical process, triggered by genes responding to the 
immediate biochemical environment in a cell, only have a limited number of 
options, of which only a very limited number are stable. This means, Goodwin 
argues, that pattern is bound to arise. Kauffman (1993) refers to this limited 
number of stable states as the adjacent possible, whilst Serres refers to them 
as the multiplicity of the possible, the “intermediary between the phenomena 
[that] rustles in the midst of the forms that emerge from it” (Serres, 1995a: 
23-4). Of the many examples Goodwin uses to explain this process, one is the 
emergence of tetrapod limbs from fish limbs: whilst the latter are simpler 
structures than the former, he explains, this is only so because the former 
have gone through two additional symmetry breaking processes. And 
concerning eyes: they “have arisen independently many times in evolution 
because they are natural, robust results of morphogenetic processes” 
(Goodwin, 2001: 168). Goodwin argues for the assimilation of theories of 
natural selection with our emerging understanding of the intrinsic dynamics of 
complex systems such that evolution is understood as the evolution of generic 
forms.  
 
Serres’ understanding of time appears to be deeply influenced by an intuitive 
grasp of complexity theory, even though he refers to chaos theory: 
which says that disorder occurring in nature can be explained, or 
reordered, by means of fractal attractors...But in this, order as such is 
harder to perceive, and customary determinism has  a slightly different 
appearance. Time does not always flow according to a line...nor 
according to a plan but, rather, according to an extraordinary complex 
mixture, as though it reflected stopping points, ruptures, deep wells, 
chimneys of thunderous acceleration, renderings, gaps – all sown at 
random, at least in a visible disorder. (Serres & Latour, 1995: 57) 
 
It is important at this point to add a few brief points of explanation concerning 
the differences between chaos and complexity theory, and attractors and 
state space. Chaos theory emerged from the work of many mathematicians 
(including those who made contributions to quantum theory) and challenged 
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the mechanical predictability of the Newtonian scientific paradigm, but 
whereas quantum theory refers essentially to the very small, chaos theory 
often referred to large systems, famously, through the work of Edward Lorenz 
and his butterfly effect, to systems such as weather systems. The basic point 
was that due to features such as sensitive dependence on initial conditions, 
the sheer complexity of such systems and the non-linear relations between 
their ‘elements’, it was impossible to predict how a system would behave – a 
large element of uncertainty was injected into science. Whilst I am reluctant 
to make too much of this distinction, because many of the effects and 
explanations found in chaos theory also feature in complexity theory, it is 
worth noting that for many scientists complexity restores a certain order to 
how we understand and describe complex systems, but an order that, whilst 
retaining uncertainty, nevertheless appears throughout nature. If a distinction 
is needed it is that complexity theorists are trying to understand how this 
order emerges, not just why there is so much uncertainty. I hope that it will 
become obvious that whilst Serres uses the phrase ‘chaos theory’ he is, in 
effect, referring to the features of complexity theory;26 that he had an 
intuitive grasp of such a theory before it had been named as such. I mention 
complexity theory now simply to introduce one of its aspects – it will be 
discussed in greater detail in 3.3 below. 
 
One of the famous features of the work of Lorenz was the computer-
generated pictures of strange attractors – pictures that almost took on a cult 
status at the time. An attractor is a 2D representation of nD state space, a 
graphic representation of a complex system that otherwise, due to its very 
high number of dimensions, is incapable of being ‘seen’ by an observer. At 
any ‘moment in time’ any complex system can, theoretically, be recorded 
though ascribing a numerical value to a very large number of variables.27 With 
the rapid development of computers Lorenz and others became able to ‘plot’ 
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successive states of such a system. If a system was in a mechanic state, in a 
state when each successive state could be predicted, the attractor produced 
something like a simple circle or eclipse; if the system was in a chaotic state, 
when each successive state could, with equal probability be any of the N 
dimensional possible states, the attractor would exhibit no discernable or 
recognisable pattern at all. What Lorenz et al discovered, and what became 
known as strange attractors, were representations of system states such that 
whilst no successive state repeated any previous state, and could not be 
predicted from that previous state, when viewed as an attractor a very 
discernable pattern was obvious. There are strong similarities between such 
patterns and the state of a dynamic system that Kauffman (1993 & 2000) 
terms the edge of chaos. Goodwin (2007) describes, in a later work, how “a 
complex process such as the weather revealed a new type of pattern called a 
strange attractor, in which there is never a repetition of activity although the 
process stays with certain bounds”, the attractor, and adds that such 
“unexpected, orderly patterns from disorderly elements are known as 
emergent properties” (Goodwin, 2007: 34-5). 
 
Goodwin proceeds to describe what he terms “fractal patterns in space”. 
Noting that mathematically “fractals are defined as self-similar structures on 
all scales” he points to the self-evident self-similarity between the patterns 
extended in space between river systems, a lightening bolt, the root system 
of a plant, the branching structure of trees, and the human circulatory 
system. “These can all be understood”, he says, “as patterns that use minimal 
energy to achieve the most efficient flow through a system” (2007: 43). Mark 
Buchanan (2003), in his work on uncovering nature’s hidden networks, 
focuses on the order hidden within fractal river systems. “Scarcely anything 
can look less planned and lacking in design than the drainage basin of the 
Mississippi, or any other great river network”, he says, but adds that “this 
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random, haphazard appearance disguises a hidden order. If every river 
network is unique, they are also in many respects deeply similar, indeed, 
even identical” (2003: 100-1). He points to a constant relationship, a power 
law, between the distribution of the number of streams in any area and the 
area they drain, a pattern, he claims, that scientists have uncovered “in every 
river network they have ever studied”, a phenomenon that he says “points to 
some deep organizing tendency behind the apparent disorder of all these 
networks” (2003: 102). 
 
Whilst Serres claims that he derives his structuralist background from 
mathematics, the similarities of his comparative methodology to that of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss’ cannot pass without comment. In a passage that seems 
in total accord to what we are discussing, Lévi-Strauss describes his goal as: 
to grasp, beyond the conscious and always shifting images which we 
hold, the complete range of unconscious possibilities. These are not 
unlimited, and the relationships of compatibility or incompatibility which 
each maintains with all the others provide a logical framework for 
historical developments, which, while perhaps unpredictable, are never 
arbitrary. (1963: 23, my emphasis) 
 
In the same way that Goodwin argues that in biology there are only a limited 
number of stable forms available, Lévi-Strauss appears to be arguing the 
same for human culture and that whilst each of these forms will be different 
according to context, and thus unpredictable, there lurks beneath the surface 
appearance a self-similarity of structure. In his essay on social structure Lévi-
Strauss argues that the traditional boundaries between different disciplines 
should be overridden, that “social time and space should be characterized 
according to scale” (1963: 289), and that “structures of the same type may 
exist on quite different time and space levels” (1963: 290). This 
characterisation according to both scale and space is the fractal patterning, a 
fractal dimension, or possibly two dimensions, referred to by Goodwin, and 
links to the emphatic call, from Serres, Kauffman, Goodwin (and, as we shall 
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discover, Paul Cilliers amongst many others) for the boundaries between 
academic disciplines to be broken down. 
 
Whilst not dismissing the links between his methodology and that of Lévi-
Strauss, Serres explains to Latour that he felt closer to Georges Dumézil, for 
the simple reason that the latter “had a Greco-Latin, Indo-European basis for 
his research, which was familiar to me, while I never had any kind of mastery 
over Native American mythology” (Serres & Latour, 1995: 36). He adds that 
he considers that Dumézil “applied an authentic structuralism to the 
humanities” (1995: 36) and elsewhere refers to the three invariant classes or 
anthropological classifications of social functions that Dumézil describes in 
many of his own writings: 
The structural system of Georges Dumézil’s comparative method lead to 
classification. They help identify among Indo-Europeans of every branch 
the invariability of three classes or social functions: sovereignty, 
struggle, and production. Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus, under different 
names, in diverse places, remain the gods of these peoples, in their 
religion, their philosophy, their history, and their assembly. We do not 
contest these findings...(Serres, 1995a: 81) 
 
Whilst not contesting the apparent universal presence of these three social 
classifications – Jupiter, the ruling, sovereign or sacred function; Mars, the 
armed or military struggle function, war; and Quirinus, the function of 
production, commerce and exchange – he does stress a vitally important 
mode of their presence, that “the invariance of these classes is not of the 
essence” (1995a: 82). The forms of these three classes or structures are not 
ideal in the Platonic sense; they did not exist in some manner prior to the 
structures they gave birth to. Rather they are emergent from their 
background conditions, they are islands of order within a sea of disorder, they 
are themselves born: 
...born of the noise from which those three gods, these three concepts, 
these three objects, these three theoretical classes, these three social 
groups are born. History is not born of provinces, but of circumstances. 
(1995a: 100) 
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That these circumstances or environmental conditions consistently allow for 
the emergence of the same basic form is explained by the arguments already 
given concerning progressive symmetry breaking and the availability of only a 
limited number of ‘adjacent possible’ states of which even fewer are stable. 
This is probably the key concept in understanding the methodology of Serres. 
 
Following this methodology the boundaries between areas of knowledge open 
up. For the philosopher at least, a single field of enquiry begins to replace not 
only the separate academic disciplines, but also those areas that may have 
been dismissed as being outside academic enquiry (or, if they were the 
subject of enquiry in their own terms they were kept outside the fold because 
of the irrelevance of their subject matter to rational thought or modern 
science). With Serres, mythology would be a prime example. But, in the 
terms being described here: “There is some mythology in science and some 
science in mythology” (Serres & Latour, 1995: 158). Serres describes 
Dumézil’s comparative methodology in exactly the same manner as his own, 
as moving quickly in both space and time, “circumventing the intermediate 
steps”, even questioning, in the fabric of his folded space-time, whether these 
intermediate steps exist at all (1995: 69). For Serres, being modern means 
being “ancient in most of our actions and thoughts” (1995: 138). At the 
beginning of Statues he compares the Challenger rocket accident to the 
Carthagian sacrifices to Baal and concludes that “a certain number of 
contemporary actions, behaviors, or thoughts repeat, almost without change, 
extremely archaic modes of thought or behavior.” (1995: 138) Or, as Lévi-
Strauss comments: “a myth always refers to events alleged to have taken 
place long ago. But what gives the myth an operational value is that the 
specific pattern described is timeless” (1963: 209). In Myth and Meaning, he 
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describes the above movement between different codes or meanings, in his 
case between the domains of music, literature, art etc, as one of ‘translation’: 
The problem is to find what is in common to all of them, It’s a problem, 
one might say, of translation, of translating what is expressed in one 
language – or one code... – into expression in a different language. 
(2001: 6) 
 
Translation is a word used by Serres to describe exactly the same movement, 
and as explained earlier, it also describes the methodology of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Serres: complexity science 
 
Anyone familiar with complexity theory would struggle not to notice the 
similarities between many of its main features and many of the concepts used 
by Serres. But this raises a possible objection to the methodology of this 
thesis. In Complexity & Postmodernism Paul Cilliers produces both a very 
clear description of complexity theory and a model of how to understand 
emergent and self-organising systems. So if, as I am proposing, complexity, 
emergence and self-organisation are central to an understanding of social 
order, why not develop a social ontology directly from this model? Why refer 
to the work of Serres at all? In other words, as the social has all the 
characteristics of a complex system, why not just use complexity theory as 
such as a basis for this project? Whilst no doubt Serres was fully aware of 
much of the science that developed into complexity theory, and it is worth 
bearing in mind that it is still not possible to agree on a precise definition of 
such a theory, it was not being widely described as such until after Serres had 
written most of the books that feature in this project. The Birth of Physics, for 
example, was written between the years 1970 and 1977. It could be argued 
that in this book Serres was attempting to bring the importance of the ideas it 
contained, reprised from the works of the ancient atomists, their expression 
by Lucretius, and the mathematics of Archimedes, to the attention of the 
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thinking world, but, that in line with his view that philosophy “is not a body of 
knowledge nor a discipline among the usual sciences” he felt it was not for 
him to work them into a theory, and that such a task fell outside his 
methodology. Arguably, the fact that people such as Cilliers are attempting to 
develop such a theory testifies to the foresight of Serres, but may place a 
question mark against the value of focusing on his work for our present task, 
as the baton has been passed on. And whilst his work champions many of the 
elements of such a theory, it also has some, potentially, serious omissions. 
According to Cilliers’ account of complex systems, for example, one serious 
failing of Serres would be his dislike and avoidance of conflict – a vital 
element of such systems: “you cannot escape the agonistics of the network” 
(1998: 138). 
 
My reply to such an objection is in line with my earlier comments regarding 
translation. It is not simply a question of using or applying complexity theory 
to the social – an act of translation is required. Serres’ work is able to provide 
at least three key ingredients that make such a translation possible. First, his 
attempt to think the multiple provides a nuanced but vitally important focus 
to our methodology. In this respect, ‘thinking the multiple’ is an essential 
philosophical / methodological device needed for such a project. Second, the 
other key idea mentioned above, noise, whilst not being in itself novel, allows 
and facilitates the translation of scientific ideas into the realm of the social in 
a way no other thinker of multiplicity has been able to achieve. This will be 
fully explored in section four. Third, Serres’ empiricism and his critique of 
abstraction (outlined in 3.5 below) brings to light where other attempts to 
describe the social along these general lines have failed. Put simply, 
abstraction (and formalisation) masks the complexity and multiplicity that 
needs describing. Additionally, though this is by no means crucial, Cilliers’ 
description fails to mention a vitally important feature of self-organising 
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systems that is revealed through Serres’ methodology. This feature is only 
hinted at by that other great exponent on self-organising systems, Stuart 
Kauffman (1993 & 2000), and is left to his one-time collaborator, Brian 
Goodwin (2001 & 2007), to explain fully – namely, the emergence and 
recurrence of common forms in nature – the self-similarity described above.28 
I am not suggesting that these ingredients are unique to Serres, but I am 
suggesting that their accentuated presence together in one body of work is. I 
wish to suggest that Serres’ attempt to provide a philosophical perspective 
based on multiplicity, fluidity and non-linear dynamics, together with these 
three particular ingredients, makes a translation from complexity theory to 
the social world possible. This thesis does not claim that this is the only way 
such a translation can be made, but it does suggest that it is a way that 
should at least be attempted. 
 
Bearing all this in mind, I present here a brief description of both the main 
features of complex systems, as offered by Cilliers, and a brief outline of the 
method he proposes for their modelling. As many of the phenomena described 
by both him and Serres are similar, such an outline will act as a reference 
point, and possibly as a further means of explanation, when discussing 
Serres. I shall attempt this by referencing in both directions; by making links 
to Serres’ ideas whilst outlining Cilliers’ descriptions, and by referring back to 
Cilliers’ very clear model whilst proceeding with this investigation. I have 
taken the following list of the main features of complex systems mainly from 
Cilliers (1998: 3-5; all quotes, unless otherwise referenced, are taken from 
here) though have made additions from other sources. It needs noting 
however, as others have done, that complexity theory, if indeed it warrants 
the title theory, is in its early stages of development and no definitively 
agreed list of such features exist.29 However, the following seem to be 
generally agreed by most who write on the topic. 
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Complex systems not only consist of a large number of elements, but these 
elements interact dynamically – the system changes with time. These 
interactions, however, need not be physical; they can involve the transference 
of information. Such a premise forms the backdrop, and is implicit, in all that 
Serres writes, and in The Birth of Physics he argues that such a premise is not 
new, but can be traced back to the physics of Epicurus, as described by 
Lucretius, and to the mathematics of Archimedes. Genesis takes such 
multiplicities, or “the multiple as such”, which he describes as “a set 
undefined by elements or boundaries” (Serres, 1995a: 4) as a new object for 
philosophy, with Serres suggesting that philosophers become “the shepherds 
of multiplicities” (1995a: 23). For Serres, not only do such multiplicities 
change with time, an “irreversible, irrevocable time, pointing like the endless 
flow of atoms, flowing, rushing, crashing towards fall and death” (2000: 125), 
but they are time: “Time is pure multiplicity” (1995a: 115). I shall return to 
this vitally important aspect of Serres thought later (section 6.1) as for him 
time (or more accurately times) result from, and are integral to, the 
emergence of multiplicities. 
 
There is, therefore, a relatively high degree of connectivity (what Cilliers 
refers to as being ‘rich’) between these elements: “any element in the system 
influences and is influenced by, quite a few other ones.”30 Again, for Serres, 
such connectivity is central to any model he proposes or describes, and his 
work is literally infused with references; to take just two examples: “All things 
are transmitters, without interruption in every direct” (2000: 49), and that 
everywhere “there are models of the most general theory, that of floods and 
paths, of elementary rhèmes, capable of intertwining, here and there, into 
syrrhèmes, connective rhythms.” (2000: 89)31 A vitally important point 
though, as stressed by both Cilliers and Serres, is that each element only acts 
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or responds locally, to the information that is available to it at the local level; 
it is “ignorant of the behaviour of the system as a whole”. It is from this key 
feature of all complex systems that a genuine solution to the problem of the 
relationship of the macro (global) to the micro (local) emerges. 
 
As a consequence of the above, interactions usually only have a fairly short 
range – to their immediate neighbours. Long range interactions are usually 
restricted by local, practical constraints but, due to the high connectivity of 
the system, there can be, and often is, wide-ranging influence.32 Yet again, 
this relation between the local and the global informs much of what Serres 
investigates. In The Birth of Physics he offers three models: The first is “local 
and original”, the second is global, and “takes the whole path into account”, 
but the third is what connects the two – the emergence of “Aphrodite from a 
flux of elements” (2000: 49-50). As he says later, “there are no solutions, 
reasons or sciences, other than the local” (2000: 95), each node within the 
system only behaves in accordance with local conditions, but due to the 
connectivity of the system “as soon as [each object or node] is born, complex, 
twined, twisting its long thick hair, it begins to transmit, in floods and in all 
directions, a star of flow” (2000: 50). Such connectivity allows local 
topography to give birth to global form (2000: 116). This concept of the 
emergence of form is a key feature of complex systems that will feature 
throughout this thesis, and in many ways becomes central to its conclusion. 
In Serres’ writing, though, emergence is often likened to Aphrodite rising from 
the sea, an effective metaphor when it is considered against the idea of life 
emerging from the sea, from the prebiotic soup as he refers to it in Genesis. 
This influence across the system, however, is not straight-forward and can be 
enhanced, suppressed or altered in a number of ways. It is my hypothesis 
that the problems outlined in 1.1 and 1.2 will be resolved with such an 
approach to the micro / macro problem – an approach that describes the 
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dynamic and emergent relationship that exists between the local and the 
global. 
 
One of the reasons preventing wide-ranging influence being straightforward is 
the presence of feedback loops. These can be either positive, in which case 
they enhance the interactions, or negative, in which case they dampen them. 
Another reason is that the interactions are non-linear: any series of 
interactions can split into two simultaneous series, a process that is often 
referred to bifurcation and / or as progressive symmetry breaking due the 
progressive decrease in invariance. When Serres states that “the fall through 
space is a metaphor” (2000: 40) he is referring to the laminar flow of atoms 
described by ancient atomism, a metaphor for the symmetry that is 
progressively broken by the chance and minimal deviation from the flow, an 
event he terms the clinamen. However, when he states that “all at once, I am 
speaking of time, of physical time, and flux is no longer a metaphor, I am 
speaking of the flux, the laminar flow that is sown, here and there, with 
turbulence” (1995a: 95) he is referring to the real life dynamics of progressive 
symmetry breaking. This is a vitally important concept for both Kauffman 
(1993 & 2000) and Goodwin (2001 & 2007) in explaining the morphogenesis 
of biological systems – for the development of tetrapod limbs, for example, 
from the embryonic state through the growth of first one bone, then two, then 
multiple. This also has caused Kauffman to propose a fourth law of 
thermodynamics, namely that: 
as an average trend, biospheres and the universe create novelty and 
diversity as fast as they can manage to do so without destroying the 
accumulated propagating organization that is the basis and nexus from 
which further novelty is discovered and incorporated into the 
propagating organization. (Kauffman, 2000: 85) 
 
Without taking away anything from Kauffman, was not Serres saying the 
same thing when he wrote: “Now the law of circulation is henceforth known, it 
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is extremal. The flows spread as fast as possible, always taking into account 
the conjunction of constraints” (2000: 51)?33 
 
The organisation and survival of complex systems depends upon a constant 
flow of energy that requires that the systems operate under conditions far 
from equilibrium. This has caused the second law of thermodynamics to be 
widely referred to as a way of explaining the energy flow through such 
systems, but it must be noted that the classical laws of thermodynamics refer 
to closed systems. One of the essential features of complex systems, 
however, is that they are, by definition, open – they interact with their 
environment. Serres refers to the second law and flows of energy in places 
too numerous even to begin to list.  
 
Such systems have a history that is in part responsible for its present 
behaviour – this is often referred to as the system being path dependent. 
Using a language system as an example this would support Derrida’s criticism 
(Derrida, 1997) of Saussure’s prioritisation of the synchronic over the 
diachronic – both are intrinsic dimensions to any understanding of a system’s 
present behaviour. As mentioned above, when Serres gives his three models, 
he notes that the second, the global model “takes the whole path into 
account”, and in Genesis he refers to “the drama of history” (1995a: 76). This 
last comment, however, is made in the context that “the law of history is 
noise” and will be explained in detail later when Serres’ concept of noise will 
be shown to be central to his understanding of the emergence of both form / 
classes and time. It is also related, I want to suggest, to the emergence of 
weights within a complex system that will be discussed below under modelling 
complex systems. One of the difficulties in describing such systems, as will be 
becoming obvious by my endless references to what needs mentioning now, 
to set down a marker, as it were, but will need to be explained in detail later, 
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is the impossibility of giving a linear narrative to a non-linear process. 
Although I am not aware of any place in which Serres says as much, I am 
convinced that such a difficulty is part of the reason for his style – he is 
actively demonstrating the non-linearity of what he is describing. 
 
Cilliers also discusses what he terms as ‘two indispensable capabilities of 
complex systems’. Firstly, in “order to respond appropriately to its 
environment, a complex system must be able to gather information about 
that environment and store it for future use” (1998: 11) – it must be able to 
represent the information in needs in order to survive. And secondly, such a 
system “has to develop its structure and be able to adapt that structure in 
order to cope with changes in the environment” (1998: 12) – in other words, 
the system must be capable of self-organisation. Whilst Cilliers does not refer 
to the concepts of state space and the edge of chaos, Kauffman (1993 & 
2000) does in order to explain self-organisation as what occurs when a 
complex system is maintained in the creative middle ground between order 
and chaos. Using the model of 6N dimensional state space he explains an 
ordered space as being one where the ‘next’ state is predictable from the 
‘present’ one, and a chaotic space as being one when the ‘next’ state could be 
any of the 6N possible states.34 When the system is ‘at the edge of chaos’, 
whilst the ‘next’ state cannot be predicted it ‘exists’ as a limited number of 
what he terms adjacent possible states. Whilst the model of 6N dimensional 
state space is a closed system, because a real complex system is an open 
system, the adjacent possible is neither actual nor certain, though only one 
step away from being actual. It is the novelty of this adjacent possible that a 
complex system will explore “on average, as fast as it can” (Kauffman, 2000: 
207) and which his proposed fourth law refers to (2000: 85).35 And referring 
to the above notion of far from equilibrium he notes that the “nonequilblium 
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flow into a persistent adjacent possible may be the proper arrow of time” 
(2000: 48). 
 
It should be obvious that none of the above conditions are independent of any 
of the others and cannot be adequately explained in such a brief overview. I 
offer them only as a means of orientating ourselves on a particular landscape. 
Let me summarise by quoting directly from Cilliers: 
Complexity is the result of a rich interaction of simple elements that only 
respond to the limited information each of them are presented with. 
When we look at the behaviour of a complex system as a whole, our 
focus shifts from the individual element in the system to the complex 
structure of the system. The complexity emerges as a result of the 
patterns of interactions between the elements. (1998: 5) 
 
It is just such an understanding of this relationship between the local and the 
global, and between the elements of a multiplicity, that is the drive behind the 
collected work of Serres. But before I pursue this further it will be useful for 
me to outline how Cilliers proposes to model such systems – having a model, 
something tangible, will greatly assist the aim of this project. As such, when I 
refer to this model in future pages I am not suggesting that this is how things 
‘are’,36 merely that such a model provides a map that facilitates the 
exploration of unfamiliar terrain – that acts as a heuristic device. 
 
Cilliers examines two possible ways of modelling complexity. The method he 
rejects is what he terms the classical approach. This is the formal, symbolic, 
rule-based approach used by modern digital computers and the most general 
method used by those researchers trying to develop artificial intelligence. 
Such a system “consists of a number of tokens or symbols, like pieces in a 
game. These symbols can be combined into patterns by means of a set of 
rules that define what is or is not permissible (e.g. the rules of chess). These 
rules are strictly formal, i.e. they conform to a precise logic” (1998: 14). The 
problem for such an approach in trying to model a real complex system, he 
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says, is finding the rules, assuming that they exist in the first place, and 
questions whether the behaviour of such a system can be so reduced. This 
has been the problem faced by those social scientists searching for the norms 
and rules that regulate society. In more philosophical terminology, this could 
be understood as the approach of a transcendental philosophy that sought the 
necessary conditions of the social. 
 
The alternative model, the one he proposes, is modelled on the human brain, 
and is referred to by a number of terms including neural networks, distributed 
processors or connectionist models.37 Cilliers offers the following very clear 
and succinct description: 
From a strictly functional point of view, the brain consists of nothing 
more than a huge network of richly interconnected neurons. Each 
neuron can be seen as a simple processor that calculates the sum of all 
its inputs, and, should this sum exceed a certain threshold, it generates 
an output. This in turn becomes the input to all the neurons that are 
connected to the present one. Each connection is mediated by a 
synapse. The synapse can cause the incoming signal to either excite or 
inhibit the target neuron and it also determines the strength of the 
influence...This level of the brain’s operation can be modelled by means 
of a network of interconnected nodes. Each node takes the sum of its 
inputs and generates an output. The output is determined by the 
transfer function of the node, which has to be non-linear. The 
connection (‘synapse’) between any two nodes has a certain ‘weight’, 
which can be positive or negative and which determines the strength of 
the influence of node A on node B. In any specific connection, the 
information flows in only one direction, but nothing prevents two 
connections between A and B – one from A to B and one from B to A. 
Any node can also be connected to itself, either directly, or via other 
nodes. (1998: 16-17) 
 
He goes on to explain that the output value of any node is determined by both 
the input values and the “present values of the weights in the network”, and 
that the weights increase in direct proportion to the frequency of use of the 
connection, or, to phrase it differently, these weights increase in direct 
proportion to the repetition of their connection. It is by this method (in very 
simple terms) that the network develops an internal structure – a method that 
is purely based on “the local information available at each neuron” (1998: 
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17).38 In section six I will propose something very similar to this regarding the 
social. 
 
At this point let me take a look at a similar network proposed in an early work 
of Serres’. In the introduction to Hermès I: La Communication he invites us to 
imagine... 
...drawn in a space or representation, a diagram of a network. It is 
made up, at a given instant (since we shall see that it represents a state 
in a changing situation) of a plurality of points (peaks) linked to one 
another by a plurality of branches (paths). Each point represents either 
a thesis or a definable element of some sort within a determinate 
empirical whole. Each path represents a link or relation between two or 
more theses, or a flux of determination between two or more elements 
of the empirical state. By definition, no point is privileged with respect to 
any other, and none is subordinate to any other. They each have their 
own power (which can vary over time), or their sphere of influence, or 
their original determining force. And as a consequence, although some 
may be identical to one another, they are, in general, all different. The 
same may be said regarding the paths, which convey the flux of 
different and variable determinations.39 
 
Serres, then, appears to be describing something very similar to Cilliers.40 
Elsewhere in this introduction he talks a great deal about many of the 
features of complex systems described above, including feedback and non-
linearity, and ends with the comment that this model “breaks the linearity of 
traditional concepts: complexity is no longer an obstacle to knowledge”.41 It 
appears obvious that Serres is trying to work through and model many of the 
features of complex systems, in exactly the same way as Cilliers, but perhaps 
the most notable feature about this text was that it was written in 1964, in 
the early days on Chaos Theory, well in advance of the emergence of 
Complexity Theory. There is though, from Cilliers’ perspective, a serious 
problem with Serres’ description. In the above, each node in the network 
“represents either a thesis or a definable element of some sort”. 
 
Cilliers’ main reason for rejecting the former of the two models he presents 
and accepting the latter focuses on their respective methods of 
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representation. In the former, as in Serres’, each symbol or node “has a 
precise, predefined meaning” (1998: 19). He rejects this in favour of the 
connectionist model where no node or neuron has such a meaning. In the 
latter, any individual node or neuron could be removed from the network 
without affecting the ‘meaning’ that is distributed across the network. In using 
the example of a language system he likens these two different paradigms of 
information processing to those presented by Chomsky and Saussure. For 
Chomsky, he argues, “models of language and the mind work with systems of 
production rules and are explained in formal and representational terms”, 
whilst for Saussure “models of language and the brain work with systems of 
relationships and are not understood in representational terms” (1998: 30). 
He does though adopt Derrida’s critique of Saussure. Without going into the 
details, it would be useful to mention briefly two concepts developed by 
Derrida (1997) that are both central to Cilliers’ argument linking complexity to 
post-structuralism and an understanding of the neural networks he describes. 
First: différance. This accepts Saussure’s understanding of meaning as being 
derived from the synchronic set of relations of difference, but overturns his 
prioritising of this over the diachronic. In the terms of the distributed 
networks we are discussing, this describes the important concept described 
above, whereby meaning is distributed across the network. No node 
‘represents’ any piece of information about the systems environment, instead 
any such representation is invoked by a loose set of differential relations 
emerging from a richly connected group of neurons. But it also describes the 
equally important concepts of path dependency, non-linearity and feedback. 
Meaning or ‘representation’ is constantly being deferred, both in the sense 
that the histories of the pathways of those nodes active at any one moment 
are in a constant state of flux, and in the sense that due to feedback meaning 
is always being anticipated or waited for. Second: trace. Memory, Cilliers 
argues, is a vital mode of any such distributed complex network. It “is not a 
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cognitive function performed by a conscious subject”, he explains, “but an 
unconscious characteristic of the brain...No neuron is significant by itself. 
Memory does not reside in any neuron, but in the relationship between 
neurons.” (1998: 46) And, in contradistinction to Bergson (1988), it is worth 
noting that memory is never complete or of something, but is always in a 
process of being created and lost. It is created by the relative weights 
(derived through repetition) referred to earlier, and is therefore subject to the 
same set of differential relations. Cilliers argues that “as Derrida uses the 
concept of ‘trace’ to point to the influence that each component in the system 
of language has on every other component” it would seem “fruitful to suggest 
that the two terms – weight and trace – can in this context be used to 
describe each other” (1998: 30). In the first part of Of Grammatology, for 
example, Derrida refers to the trace as a non-present, constantly differing / 
deferring pathway through the text (Derrida, 1997). Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak in her preface states that “The structure of the sign is determined by 
the trace or track of that other which is forever absent” (Derrida, 1997: xvii) 
and reminds us that the French word trace “carries strong implications of 
track, footprint, imprint” (1997: xv). Any event in such a network is always 
the result of such a pathway; a non-present or forever absent pathway; a 
pathway of ‘pure’ difference. 
 
As the model proposed by Cilliers is modelled on the human brain, the organ 
through which I (attempt to) make sense of both the natural world and the 
social world, and as any model of the social world must ‘model in’ the 
information processing abilities of those who act socially, this appears to be 
the most obvious model for the humanities to adopt. I will have more to say 
on this at a later point in this thesis, but any model of the social must be a 
model of how ‘individual’ behaviour organises into social patterns, and such 
‘individual’ behaviour in itself must be modelled on how that ‘individual’ social 
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actor processes social information – a process that can only be carried out by 
individual brain function or activity.42 This, therefore, provides this thesis with 
the correct level of ‘the local’ appropriate for an understanding of the social. It 
is only through the processing power of brains that information is processed 
such that behaviour that can become organised into social patterns. In other 
words, individual brains act as centres of organisation – as attractors of social 
action. This will be further supported by Serres’ advocacy of empiricism and 
the bodily senses as the only way through which information is harvested and 
from which understanding is produced. 
 
3.4 Serres: thinking the multiple 
 
 
In Genesis, Serres’ position seems to have developed from the earlier 1964 
position to one that not only appears to be close to that occupied by Cilliers 
and Derrida, but that also employs terms that are of use, have a practical 
value, to this project. He not only describes his object, he also describes his 
subject. Thinking the multiple is the other side of the methodological coin to 
his understanding of time and the emergence of classes and forms out of the 
noise; perhaps the epistemological face to the ontological face. As such, it not 
only describes this emergence, but how we are to think of the emergent 
forms and classes, how we are to use them. Serres’ exploration of thinking 
the multiple not only addresses the key features of complex systems (as laid 
out by Cilliers) but also points to how we think, how we acquire knowledge of 
our world. This epistemology cannot be separated from, in fact follows the 
same process as, that which it acquires knowledge of. It is at this point that 
all could be lost – that we could ‘understand’ the complexity of the world, the 
social world, but do so in terms of conceptual unities; in other words, without 
appreciating the complexity of the thinking process. The being of the world 
and how we process information about it are the same – there is a self-
similarity of process. The great value of Serres’ methodology lies in the 
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importance of this disclosure – that epistemology and ontology are 
inseparable; that epistemology emerges out of ontology in the same way that 
our brain’s ability to represent and assign meaning to its world emerges out of 
the same material world. There is a self-similarity of process because, in 
essence, it is the same process. This will prove to be an important guide to 
the direction this project takes. In Genesis Serres develops his position 
through reference to a short story by Honoré de Balzac, The Unknown 
Masterpiece; I shall do likewise to explain my position and its links to both 
representation and self-organisation as described by Cilliers. 
 
Poussin, a young and aspiring painter, seeks an audience with the former 
court painter Porbus, and gains entry to his studio in the shadow of the 
master Frenhofer. Porbus, in response to the master’s interest in an already 
famous painting of his, a canvas representing Marie the Egyptian preparing to 
pay the boatman, asks if he thinks well of it. “Yes and no”, he replies, adding: 
“Your good woman is not badly put together, but she is not alive. You artists 
think that you have done all that is necessary when you draw a figure 
correctly, and put everything in its place according to the laws of anatomy!” 
After further critique the master cries: “The mission of art is not to copy 
Nature, but to give expression to it! You are not a copyist, but a poet!” 
(Balzac, 2007: 4). Serres’ analysis of the relationships between the various 
generations of artists, and between each artist and his model of affection is 
complex, but could be summed up as being critical of the classical view of 
representation, in the same way as both Saussure (1983) and Derrida (1997), 
and for that matter Deleuze (1994), do; of the representation where 
“someone takes the place of someone else”. Such representation Serres 
describes as ‘hatred’, a ‘struggle for place’ (1995a: 76). The climax of the 
story sees the master persuaded, through the use of Gillette, Poussin’s lover, 
as model, to reveal the canvas that he has been working on for a great length 
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of time, the belle noiseuse; a canvas that he would otherwise have revealed 
to no one, a canvas that he was only able to complete because of the 
unsurpassed beauty of Gillette, a canvas that would be the summation of his 
work and career. “My work is perfect,” he cries, “and now I can exhibit with 
pride. Never will painter, brushes, colors, canvas and light produce a rival...” 
Poussin and Porbus, though, cannot at first see the canvas, and when they do 
they cannot believe their eyes. Poussin thinks that the master is playing with 
them, for he “can see nothing there but colors piled one upon the other in 
confusion, and held in restraint by a multitude of curious lines which form a 
wall of painting.” (Balzac, 2007: 15) 
 
Serres suggests, though, that neither artist appreciates the genius of the 
master. Accepted, he has not produced a representation of nature. There is 
no disputing that. But has produced something far greater, for the belle 
noiseuse “is nature herself” (1995a: 33), “she is not the one, she is the 
multiple, and a thundering mix, yes, chaos.” This canvas, this “flat 
projection”, is “the inaccessible object of metaphysics”, the background noise 
(1995a: 22). Serres then, along with Saussure (synchronically) and Derrida 
(both synchronically and diachronically) presents a critique of representation 
in terms of difference, of the “irreducibly individual [receding] like the 
horizon” (1995a: 3), of “the collective with its inaccessible edges” (1995a: 6) 
but does so not only by providing a description of difference from a 
perspective within the emergent structure, where all is receding horizons, but 
also from the perspective of the background noise from which the structure is 
emergent. It is from such a perspective that the complex, dynamic and 
emergent nature of this structure can be understood. These concepts and the 
critique of representation will be developed in greater detail later (6.1) 
through a comparison to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. For now it is 
sufficient to note that representation is an emergent process – emergent out 
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of the being of the world; it is not a representation of a radically different 
world, nor the outcome of the imposition of form on inert matter. 
 
I noted earlier of how important the ‘trace’ was for Cilliers. Serres appears to 
be using the same concept for the same purpose when he focuses on the 
importance of the foot discovered in the belle noiseuse. Poussin and Porbus at 
first believe that the canvas is nothing but chaos, but they are mistaken: 
On drawing nearer, they spied in one corner of the canvas the end of a 
bare foot standing forth from that chaos of colours, of tones, of 
uncertain shades, that sort of shapeless mist; but a lovely foot, a living 
foot! They stood fairly petrified with admiration before the fragment, 
which had escaped that most incredible, gradual, progressive 
destruction. (Balzac, 2007: 15) 
 
So the master had been correct in his claims. He had produced a masterpiece 
that went beyond any mere representation, he had produced something 
living. But still he had not been satisfied. In trying to get even closer to 
nature he had returned to the noise from which everything is emergent. Just 
the foot, a trace of his journey remained. 
 
Serres talks of ‘the trace of a foot’ in relation to the belle noiseuse in many 
sections of Genesis, and more generally to “the trace of steps” when referring 
to the many myths he evokes. They sketch the paths actually trodden out of 
“the totality of the possible”, noise itself; they sketch, in Kauffman’s terms, 
the path actually followed in state space into the adjacent possible: 
The print of this foot means that noise holds this space, that it has set 
itself up there. In Greek, they call it: a thesis...Thesis is the action of 
putting something in place. What is important is the place, and only 
then the manner of occupying it. Of taking it, holding it, setting oneself 
up there. Setting one foot on it. The foot, here, is the trace of a thesis, 
and the wall of colors, the noise, is at once battle and racket, the two 
strategies...of taking place and getting a foot in the door. Balzac’s 
painting was an unknown masterpiece of philosophy. (Serres, 1995a: 
53) 
 
The foot symbolises the trace, the path actually followed, deepened by use, 
by repetition, that allows a form, a thesis, a particular, an actual, to emerge 
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from the background noise; it symbolises the path of self-organisation. 
Theses, concepts, form out of the noise, they are collectives held together by 
the path created, by the path actually walked or trodden, but a path that does 
not ‘exist’, at least not as a presence.43 
 
The importance of ‘thinking the multiple’, the single most important idea in 
this entire thesis, is the recognition that any concept or thesis is but a 
particular actualisation that has self-organised out of the noise. As such it is a 
one time collective that is path dependent. It is, in effect, a dissipated 
network that has no unity, no definitive set of atoms, but does have a fractal 
dimension and a virtual background. It has no unity because the path 
followed through the process of self-organisation, due to its non-linearity and 
feed-back loops, will always be venturing into new state space; it will always 
be occupying new ground, putting something else in place, and as such the 
collective held together will always be different at each actualisation. Whilst 
there are ‘atoms’ or elements within the virtual background they cannot be 
examined as ‘individuals’ in their contribution as their ‘identity’ is derived from 
the system, from their relationship with other elements; due to the dissipated 
nature of this background any of the elements that are held together to form 
the collective could be removed without changing the collective. And even if 
one of these elements were extracted, and placed under a microscope, it too 
would be found to be multiple. Hence a fractal dimension: “The irreducibly 
individual recedes like the horizon...” (Serres, 1995a: 3). 
 
This problem seems to share many of the characteristics of W.B. Gallie’s 
(1956) essentially contested concepts to be introduced later in this thesis. 
Because Gallie has already noted the existence of these characteristics within 
the realm of the social concepts we will need to examine how his ideas can 
contribute to this thesis. These concepts are internally complex in that behind 
 61 
each concept lies a multiplicity of elements – a multiplicity that is not only 
temporally open, because the elements are continuously being exchanged, 
because they are continuously flowing and evolving, but also spatially open in 
the sense that they are variously describable – different observers will have 
differing priorities for the selection of the elements used to describe the 
event, no set of which could exhaust the totality of elements being described. 
So whilst it is possible to offer various descriptions of the phenomena 
experienced, it is not possible to offer a definitive concept; a concept that 
would, in effect, delimit and unify its elements. This difference between 
description and definition will also be shown to be vitally important, and will 
be examined in its practical or social aspects in later chapters. A definition, as 
I understand it, is of the essence, it is fixed like a statue. A description, on the 
other hand, only takes those elements from an open multiplicity that serves 
the purpose for a particular event – as such descriptions are imbued with 
difference. 
 
3.5 Serres: empiricism 
 
The emergence referred to above is premised upon a non-reductionist 
materialism. By this I mean that everything has its roots in the material 
world, though cannot be reduced back to and explained through that material 
base. Something original is produced through emergence that cannot be 
explained either as the sum of its parts or through an examination of those 
parts. In terms of complex systems this means that each system needs to be 
understood within the environment in which it survives and flourishes – and 
can only be understood in such local terms. A brain or a community of living 
beings are each an open system that self-organise in response to the 
environment in which they are embedded. But that environment, in its turn, is 
an open system itself embedded within its own environment. As such, each 
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system can be thought of as a nested set within a nested set,44 but at each 
level new phenomena emerge that can only be understood at that level of 
scale and as a response to its particular environment. It is through such an 
understanding that the relationship between the local and the global begins to 
be disclosed. In these terms, biological human beings are complex biological 
systems nested, along with other biological life forms, in their physical / 
ecological environment. It is within these environments that the biological 
systems survive, and it is from these biological systems that first 
consciousness, and then self-consciousness and the social emerge. Such at 
least is the hypothesis of this thesis (and which will be explained in detail in 
later sections – particularly 5.4 and 6.1) – a hypothesis that is supported by 
Serres’ empiricism. 
 
The English translation of Serres’ Les Cinq Sens, an extended essay on 
empiricism, carries the Library of Congress catalogue secondary 
categorisation of phenomenology. In it he echoes Husserl in hoping “for a 
return to things themselves” (2008: 112). The things themselves are our 
world, our environment, the given – things that can only be encountered 
through the senses (as it is only through the senses that we are on contact 
with, and receive information from our environment) and from which all our 
understandings are built: “There is nothing in the intellect that has not first 
been in the senses” (2008: 327). We originate, argues Serres, we are formed, 
from the accumulated variety that has been stitched together by the senses. 
We are, to use another of his metaphors, a vortex; we attract information 
from our environments, we join this information together to make sense of 
our environments, we are quite literally formed from our environments – not 
just biologically, but also as self-conscious and social human beings. We 
emerge from the various and disparate information received through the 
senses. We are tatters, variegations, hybrids (2008: 73). And it is not just 
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from the information we have received directly, but also from that received 
through the experiences of our ancestors (and codified into DNA): “I am made 
up of the others I claim to have left behind” (2008: 93). 
 
This process of emergence is bottom-up – even allowing for the presence of 
top-down feedback loops (which themselves were emergent from their 
material roots and which may well have undergone some degree of 
codification). This means, following Serres, that we need to be very cautious 
of abstract knowledge. It is not that such knowledge (the only knowledge; 
knowledge is abstract) can or should be avoided (this would be impossible) 
but that this knowledge should be seen as what it is, and not as the source, 
the Ideal or transcendent source, of our understanding. Abstraction is a step, 
or many steps, removed from the multiple, the given. Serres argues that to 
abstract “means to tear the body to pieces rather than merely to leave it 
behind: analysis” (2008: 26). When we abstract, when we analyse, we 
remove selected elements from our interactive environment and examine 
them out of context, often in isolation, as little unities. This is what we do with 
standard notions, linear and non-complex notions, of reason and logic, often 
believing that we are getting somehow closer (as opposed to further away 
from) the ‘truth’. And, in evolutionary terms, such a process has been very 
successful. Serres sees this success epitomised in the philosophy of language: 
“The philosophy of language is our reason, and always will be; it has 
converted us, and is winning. There is no doubt that it has the upper hand 
over phenomenology; we must declare it the winner” (2008: 112). It has 
proved to be successful because quite simply we need logic and science, 
however we phrase it, for basic day-to-day living and survival. The world, the 
given, may be fluid, unstable, uncertain, complex and dynamic, but we cannot 
cope, on a daily basis, with such things. This is the absurd position we find 
ourselves in.45 Despite the fluid and dynamic nature of the given, our general 
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survival does not require (and could quite possibly not cope with) such an 
understanding. In fact our survival requires the opposite: 
Stability is required...Invariants are needed, constants. No one can act 
without them, nor think in the absence of their logic, nothing can exist 
without their sum...We need stability, and constants. What ever flows 
over there does not remain here. Imbalances always hide an equation, 
an equivalence, even transformations do. From which we get science, 
which organizes the thousands upon thousands of ways of writing an 
equal sign. (2008: 216-7) 
 
For the day-to-day business of survival, easy to understand and apply 
approximations of the ‘truth’ are all that have been required. ‘An equal sign’ is 
actually an approximation sign, and is the basis of code. An understanding of 
the emergence of such codes in a social context will form a vital aspect of this 
thesis. 
 
However, just because such a way of understanding has been useful so far in 
our evolution does not mean that it will remain so. In fact, such an emphasis 
on the abstract, on analysis, on logic, on unities, prevents us from seeing the 
underlying complexity and multiplicity from which all has emerged. I cannot 
stress this point strongly enough: that whilst of pragmatic value for certain 
purpose, focusing on the abstract, on analysis and formalised concepts, 
masks the complexity and multiplicity that gives rise to them. It is this that 
we need to be mindful of, for each time we accept the comfort, the solidarity, 
and the certainty of unities, we loose sight of this dynamic background: “A 
lack of subtlety prevents us seeing the forest of knots beneath the canvas or 
behind the tapestry, dazzled as we are by the representation of intelligence” 
(2008: 78).46 This thesis is attempting to salvage some of this subtlety and to 
gain some insight of the forest of knots that lies beneath canvas of the social. 
 
A final methodological comment on Searle’s call for the development of a 
social ontology: Whilst this thesis cannot support his use of “one formal 
linguistic mechnanism” (Searle, 2010: 7 my emphasis) nor his reliance of the 
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resultant formal ‘status functions’ on the concept of collective intentionality, it 
does endorse his empiricism – his call for such an ontology to be based on 
certain basic facts. These facts are “the atomic theory of matter and the 
evolutionary theory of biology.” From the latter is drawn the understanding 
that both “conscious and unconscious mental phenomena are caused by 
neurological processes in the brain and are realised in the brain” and that the 
“Collective mental phenomena of the sort we get in organized societies are 
themselves dependent on and derived from the mental phenomena of 
individuals.” (2010: 4) I have outlined why I cannot endorse his formal 
methodology in comments above. A formal, rule based model as adopted by 
Searle is the one rejected by Cilliers in favour of one based on distributed or 
neural networks. Such a model is far more in accord with ‘certain basic facts’. 
This argument will be developed during the course of section 3 where a 
critique of collective intentionality will be added. 
 
3.6 Conclusion: the methodology of this thesis 
 
The methodology adopted by this thesis, therefore, is comparative in the 
senses outlined above. I have, in part, attempted to apply Serres’ metaphor 
of the double cone. I have attempted to approach the problems outlined in 
1.1 and 1.2 not necessarily in a systematic or logical way, but more as a 
blank canvas that awaited an intuitive response. This was the starting point of 
the act of translation; a creative and philosophical endeavour rather than a 
social scientific one. In addition to my earlier comments regarding Russell and 
science there is, on the other hand, an additional factor that renders this 
approach more ‘scientific’ or ‘academic’ than some may grant. When a 
dynamic system is at its most creative, when it is at the edge of chaos, it 
responds to, in fact requires, perturbations to trigger further adaptation and 
self-organisation – a new order is found through an injection of disorder. This 
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new order emerges across the system in a non-linear fashion and could not 
have been predicted in advance. The same applies to our thinking with our 
minds / brains47 – perhaps the most dynamic and complex of systems. The 
act of general or preparatory reading involves the ingesting of new ideas and 
concepts which effectively perturbs the system. It is then the application of 
thought to the problem in hand (standing in front of the blank canvas) that 
triggers a self-organising process that produces what is often described as an 
intuitive response. It is intuitive because it is non-linear – it is the result of 
self-organisation across a distributed network. The main problem, of course, 
is that these thoughts and solutions need writing up into a linear narrative 
that gives the impression that the thought process that led to its writing was 
linear. This was not the case – but I see no solution to such a problem. 
 
The methodology adopted is also comparative in the sense that it has 
compared the thoughts and approaches from a wide range of writers and 
thinkers, and has attempted to note the rhythms and patterns that have been 
repeated there in. In so doing it is hoped that the deep connectivity that 
exists between all of life and nature’s systems can, in part at least, be 
revealed. In later chapters I use Deleuze’s reading of univocity to refer to this 
deep underlying self-similarity of pattern and organisation across nature – to 
the notion that the world speaks with a single voice, that all is part of a single 
process. There is nothing mystical about such a claim. It should be expected if 
we follow the general precepts of empiricism and emergence outlined above, 
and is supported by the work of such scientists as Kauffman (1993 & 2000) 
and Goodwin (2001 & 2007), and documented by science writers such as Ball 
(1999). 
 
The above two key ideas of Serres (noise and ‘thinking the multiple’) are 
worth one final note of explanation. I have used the motif, or even the 
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command, ‘think the multiple!’ as a constant reminder to be aware of the 
dangers of abstraction and the production of unities, as a reminder of what I 
believe to be the complexity of the social given. This is based on the 
presupposition that everything outlined above concerning the complexity and 
dynamism of the world is accurate – and I have discovered nothing to suggest 
otherwise. With such a presupposition there can be nothing that is not 
multiple. This motif, therefore, will act as a constant guide, as the familiar 
territory of the social world is explained in a new way. And finally, noise. This 
has not just been a theoretical concept. Most of the fine and detailed points of 
this thesis only arose though the process of writing. They felt like they quite 
literally emerged from the noise of my thinking. 
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4 Existing approaches to social multiplicities 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I surveyed Serres’ methodology and made a 
connection to complexity science. The purpose of this was to provide an initial 
framework: a general methodology (comparative) and a set of concepts that 
will be of value in the task of constructing a social ontology that not only 
offers a resolution to the problem of the relationship between the micro and 
the macro in society and the emergence of social order, but also provides a 
map for our encounters with the social, and, by implication, social issues. This 
approach accepts that there is no ground, no foundation upon which to build 
such an ontology, but rather that we cannot avoid sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions, that we cannot avoid certain presuppositions. These 
presuppositions are that ‘society’ or ‘societies’ are complex multiplicities that 
in some way (yet to be determined) self-organise in a way general to all 
complex systems, a claim that is supported by the adoption of a comparative 
methodology. Also, that such systems should be modelled on distributed 
networks rather than formal, rule based models, and that the key to 
understanding these systems is to focus on the local conditions – on what 
takes place at the micro level. This claim remains subject to confirmation 
through empirical experience, but to achieve this I first need to construct an 
ontology of the social that is capable of such testing. 
 
In this section we I exam three key thinkers who, in their own ways, are 
attempting to think in terms of multiplicities, and who comment either directly 
or indirectly on the social. My task, therefore, will be to gain a first hold on 
the problem through an examination of the approaches made by those who 
have not necessarily ‘been there before’, but who have at least considered 
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similar issues from a similar perspective. This will be as close as it will be able 
to get to an initial survey of the new terrain that I seek to explore. My aim will 
be to discover some aspect, perhaps some concepts, that I can take forward 
with some confidence into the next two sections where the construction of 
such a social ontology will be attempted. 
 
4.1  Badiou: the void and multiplicities 
 
At a superficial level it would appear that Badiou, in Being and Event, is 
proposing a similar project to that proposed by Serres in Genesis, namely that 
“the multiple, left to the implicitness of its counting rule, be delivered without 
concept, that is, without implying the being-of-the-one” (Badiou, 2007: 42). 
Any possible consensus of method, however, is abruptly destroyed once it is 
realised that for Badiou this is to be achieved through axiomatisation.  Being 
and Event is, if nothing else, an immensely complex, rich and well written 
book, too complex and rich to be adequately assessed in the very limited 
space I have at my disposal. My remarks, therefore, will be confined to its 
contribution to the task in hand, namely the attempt to think the social and 
social structure in terms of multiplicities, with the avoidance of unities. It is 
Badiou’s decision to utilise the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory 
(hereafter referred to as ZFC when including the axiom of choice,48 which 
Badiou does) that poses the greatest problem (following Serres) to the 
empiricist approach being taken by this project. This, from Serres’ 
perspective, leads to an excessive level of analysis and abstraction and, I will 
argue, lead to very real philosophical problems. Out of this emerges three 
further issues that will keep forming obstructions to the path of this thesis, 
and which, by discussing in relation to Being and Event, will actually 
illuminate its task: over codification, collective intentionality, and the thorny 
issue of what, in social terms, is actually being organised. Finally, I will 
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suggest that by taking a more descriptive approach to the book a profound 
similarity can be found to Genesis, and at least one useful concept can be 
uncovered. 
 
In Being and Event there is one central equation, that of the equivalence of 
ontology and mathematics; Badiou is unequivocal on this: “mathematics is 
ontology – the science of being qua being” (2007: 4). As Jon Roffe notes in 
his review of the first English translation of this book: “Not only will it be read 
poorly if the centrality of mathematics is downplayed, it will be read poorly if 
the nature of this centrality is misunderstood.” (Roffe, 2006) In the 
philosophy of mathematics there is still much controversy as to the nature of 
mathematical ‘objects’, but Badiou, through repeated references to ‘laws’ and 
‘formalisation’ adopts a formalist approach, in fact such an approach would 
seem essential to his overall aim: 
What is a law whose objects are implicit? A prescription which does not 
name – in its very operation – that alone to which it tolerates 
application? It is evidently a system of axioms. An axiomatic 
presentation consists, on the basis of non-defined terms, in prescribing 
the rule for their manipulation. (Badiou, 2007: 29) 
 
Let me examine this statement via a general understanding of mathematical 
formalism. A fairly standard definition would be the position that 
“mathematics consists merely of formal symbols or expressions which are 
manipulated or combined according to preassigned rules or agreements.” 
(Davis & Hersh, 1983: 413) These symbols are not objects as such, certainly 
not in any Platonic sense, and are devoid of meaning and content – they are 
not about anything, do not refer to anything, they have no meaning – they 
are simply rules for their own manipulation. What matters (all that matters) is 
their internal coherence, their integrity, their lack of contradiction; “all that 
matters are the rules of the game – the rules of influence by which we 
transform one formula to another” (1983: 394). And because these rules are 
not ‘about’ anything, they do not name anything, their terms (Badiou’s 
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general ‘term’ for an element or item referred to or implied) remain 
undefined. It is through such an approach that Badiou thinks he can remain 
within the multiple, within the claim that “every multiple is a multiple of 
multiples” (2007: 29) and avoid any claim concerning the existence ‘of the 
one’, and refute any ontology of presence. 
 
In what (if any) sense can such axioms be said to ‘exist’ though? This is not a 
trivial question considering, for Badiou, the equivalence of ontology and 
mathematics. Davis and Hersh state that as “a philosophy of mathematics, 
formalism is not compatible with the mode of thought of working 
mathematicians” (1983: 343) and make the claim that although at one level it 
is thoroughly discredited, “Platonism was and is believed by (nearly) all 
mathematicians. But, like an underground religion, it is observed in private 
and rarely mentioned in public” (1983: 339). Why is this? Why should a 
mathematics that dare not speak its name, a mathematics that claims that 
their objects of study exist eternally and totally independent of human 
research, survive? How can it survive amongst scientists who at all other 
times would dismiss any notion of Platonism out of hand? I would suggest 
that such a mathematics only exists in the rarefied atmosphere breathed by 
those engaged in pure mathematics – for here no problems ensue from such 
an approach; they are so far up the mountain that cloud cover obscures their 
view of the ground. Providing that the mathematics being worked on is not 
applied to any actual physical situation or event integrity and self-constancy is 
all that is required, and it surely becomes a matter of convenience or habit to 
‘imagine’ that the ‘objects’ being worked upon actually exist. In fact it may be 
more that just a matter of convenience, it may well be that the mind posits 
entities that it constructs as actual because it has evolved to do so through a 
process of abstraction derived from our actual empirical experiences – but 
more of this shortly. On the other hand, for those engaged in applied 
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mathematics, the situation is quite different. For the Nobel Prize winning 
physicist Frank Wilczek, mathematics is about compressing data for ease of 
‘transportation’: 
Constructing profoundly simple theories of physics is an Olympian game 
of data compression. The goal is to find the shortest possible message – 
ideally, a single equation – that when unpacked produces a detailed, 
accurate model of the physical world. (2009: 140) 
 
For Wilczek mathematics codifies physical observations to produce theories 
that can be ‘transported’ or applied to other situation, and those theories 
“that make wrong predictions are disqualified” (2009: 140). In other words 
the mathematical entities used by the applied mathematician are openly 
acknowledged to be entities that have been abstracted from the physical 
world and are only of value in their ability to be reapplied. In other words, 
they are descriptions of the world rather than definitions; they are emergent 
from ontology rather than being equivalent to it. 
 
In his essay ‘Mathematics & Philosophy’ Serres adopts a similar position. He 
suggests that the Thales’ idea for the measurement of pyramids and the 
subsequent development of mathematics was born of the necessity of gaining 
access to the inaccessible. Thus geometry produced easily transportable 
models that scaled down the inaccessible and allowed for their measurement. 
But he attaches a cautionary note: 
Now it is probable that true knowledge of the things of this world lies in 
the solid’s essential shadow, in its opaque and black density, locked 
forever behind the multiple doors of its edges, besieged only by practice 
and theory. (Serres, 1982: 94) 
 
In other words, despite the pragmatic value of this geometry, something 
always escapes the measurement. The true knowledge of the object remains 
in the shadows, hidden from the geometer and mathematician. It therefore 
seems obvious that we should not mistake the model so produced for the 
reality of the object itself. 
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For Serres, particularly in The Five Senses, abstraction goes hand in glove 
with analysis and mitigates the reality and complexity given by empiricism, by 
our bodies’ direct contact with their world. He revives the old empiricist battle 
cry that ‘there is nothing in the intellect that has not first been in the senses’, 
and explains that “this means that the intellect has collected what has 
remained of the senses, that it therefore becomes a memory, a reserve, a 
data bank” (2008: 327). In the intellect, something of the senses, of our 
experiences, always remains, and this is, by definition, abstract; it forms the 
basis of our language, what we talk about. This is not ‘wrong’, he does not 
suggest that we should not abstract and use language – far from it, he 
confesses his love of language – merely that we be aware that language and 
abstraction on its own, forgetful of its sensible source, divorced from its 
landmarks in the physical world, leads to us becoming anaesthetised to the 
aesthetics of the world, and leads to what Serres terms an addiction. The 
world and our experiences of it are ‘given’ to us, they are ‘the given’; our 
language, our analysis, is what we say; and the “addition of saying and giving 
equals addiction” (2008: 97). He adds: “Addiction, the first diction, the first 
word, confirms all others.” (2008:98)49 I suggest that this addiction is an 
addiction to certainty, the certainty that we strive for in analysis – in the 
rather strict, and perhaps philosophical sense of the term. As Serres points 
out: “In the language of [analysis] confusion means failure” (2008: 160). This 
is what led to the ZFC axioms following the formulation by Russell of his 
paradoxes against Cantor’s original theory – the need to remove any 
paradoxes, because paradoxes mean confusion, and there is little room for 
confusion in the nice, clear, pristine, clinical world of analytical philosophy. 
However, the experiencing of paradox and uncertainty is to be expected in a 
complex world. Serres’ methodology is as opposed to an analytical approach 
as it possible to be. For him, to “confuse means...to pour together...a 
solution” and that “...the philosophy of confusion should be the common 
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ground of sapience” (2008: 160-1). Serres’ approach is synthetic rather than 
analytic; it is an approach that is comfortable with complexity, uncertainty 
and confusion because that is how the ‘real world’, our world as we 
experience it, is. We acquire wisdom when we can accept this and build it into 
our theories – theories that, as in applied physics and applied mathematics, 
are abstracted or derived from our experiences, and are constantly tested or 
reapplied to them. 
 
For Badiou, though, the axioms of ZFC somehow manage to ‘exist’ without 
existing. They have not been derived or abstracted from experience – if they 
were they would be subject to constant testing and evaluation - but neither 
do they exist in some Platonic realm. As formalisations, I am not suggesting 
that such axioms are without pragmatic value – that they do not have the 
ability to allow us to describe certain situations. Like Thale’s model, they allow 
us access to a certain level of understanding and analysis that otherwise 
would remain inaccessible. The problem with such an approach arises when 
we question the ontological status of these axioms, particularly when we 
question any causal relation that may result from them.50 This problem really 
comes home when we ask: how do they affect or influence actual social 
structures? In what sense do the laws of his formalisation actually produce an 
experience? Or rather, as this question is biased towards my approach to this 
problem: what is the nature of the relationship between ZFC and actual social 
events? If there is no relationship, if the axioms only exist in the same sense 
as formalised mathematics exists, then their only relevance in terms of the 
social is as abstract descriptors. The best way to explore this problem will be 
to use just about the only actual example offered by Badiou. I would add that 
whilst, again on the surface, Being and Event is a generalised ontology, in 
practise it is a social or even a political ontology; in places it reads more as an 
attempt to revitalise Marxism than an attempt to radically rethink the problem 
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of social complexity and multiplicity. It is no coincidence that his general use 
of the phrase ‘the state of the situation’ has not only a metaphorical affinity 
with politics, but in many places refers to an ‘actual’ State. Which particular 
state is not made clear, but under such an axiomatic approach all states 
would, at this level of analysis, be the same. The actual social situation 
offered as an example is: 
Here is an image (which in truth is merely approximate): a family of 
people is a presented multiple of the social situation (in the sense that 
they live together in the same apartment, or go on holiday together, 
etc), and it is also a represented multiple, a part, in the sense that each 
of its members is registered by the registry office, possesses French 
nationality, and so on. If, however, one of the members of the family, 
physically tied to it, is not registered and remains clandestine, and due 
to this fact never goes out alone, or only in disguise, and so on, it can 
be said that this family, despite being presented, is not represented. It 
is thus singular. In fact, one of the members of the family is, remains, 
himself, un-presented within the situation. (Badiou, 2007: 174) 
 
A presented multiple, for Badiou, is the presentation of beings, the 
presentation of a consistent (and therefore countable as several ‘ones’) 
multiplicity out of the void – the inconsistent multiplicity which is the being of 
beings, or being qua being. In the language we have been using it is the 
emergence of differentiated entities out of the undifferentiated noise. In the 
language of set theory a presented multiple is the ‘set’ of elements or atoms 
of which the set is comprised. For set theory, as it is a formalised system, 
these elements, or ‘terms’ as Badiou refers to them, never refer to anything 
in particular. However, if we intend to apply this set theory language to the 
social (or any other actual situation) we surely need to be able to specify what 
these elements are – for it is their relationship, organisation and manipulation 
that the axioms themselves refer to. Badiou, sheltering behind the non-being 
of formalism, never attempts this – which would be acceptable if he remained 
in the formalist world of abstract description. However, as his ultimate 
purpose appears to be socio-political this cannot be acceptable – such a 
purpose implies change, and this requires an understanding of causal 
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relations that go beyond the descriptive. Not that this is easy task, as will be 
discovered in the next section – in fact I shall argue later that specificity is not 
actually possible, but that working through this problem and developing 
concepts that can cope with it are. But to return to the problem in hand. At 
first sight it would appear that the individual family members are the 
elements of the presented multiple. If this is the case there is a need to 
understand their emergence from the inconsistent multiplicity. Badiou makes 
no attempt to explain this, and I have no idea how he could, at least not in 
the socio-political context. Rather than focus on biological individuals, an 
alternative approach might be to focus on their behaviour; after all, it is what 
they do, their living together, their going on holiday together, that allows 
them to be counted as a one, as a family. However, attempting to use set 
theory to describe behaviour is no easier task. 
 
The main problem that I want highlight at the moment, however, comes to 
light when we compare this presentation or belonging to representation or 
inclusion. These are two different ‘presentations’ or acts of ‘counting’: 
Once counted as one in a situation, a multiple finds itself presented 
therein. If it is also counted as one by the metastructure, or state of the 
situation, then it is appropriate to say that it is represented. This means 
that it belongs to the situation (presentation), and that it is equally 
included in the situation (representation). (Badiou, 2007: 99) 
 
In fact, these are not only two different ‘presentations’ or ‘acts of counting’, 
but they are opposed, such that an “un-relation between presentation and 
representation” exists (2007: 281); the state ‘as operator of the count’ and 
the ‘individual’ family member presented or resisting the count of the state 
are in a Marxist State of conflict. The state ensures inclusion within the state 
by forcing each member of the family to register at the registry office and 
possess French nationality – presumably through the issue of a French 
passport. Now, without becoming embroiled in a debate about the merits or 
demerits of Marxist socio-political analysis, let me pose one question: How do 
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the axioms of set theory, axioms that formalise the ontology of the socio-
political arena, affect, influence, control or in any other manner come into a 
relationship with either individual social actors, their social actions, or, indeed, 
The State itself? If these ‘axioms’ exist as some type of social code, norm or 
law, as arguably they must in order to cause the necessity of holding a 
passport or registering at the registry office, then these ‘axioms’ are no longer 
axioms. They have a referent and a particularity; they have an existence (as 
code) and a causality that can be explained. Alternatively, they could exist as 
formal mental concepts whose primary purpose is to allow descriptions of 
social events, but even here they could only ‘exist’ within individual minds as 
particular concepts. I suggest that for axioms to have any causal ability they 
need to be ‘converted’ into codes – into some type of norm, rule or law. 
 
There are two other problems that are worth mentioning before I extract two 
valuable ideas from Being and Event. Firstly, I would suggest that Badiou’s 
slippage into Marxist rhetoric and his constant references to the state actually 
run counter to his project of arguing that ‘the one is not’. The state seems to 
emerge as some type of intentional unity, or at least as a unified multiplicity 
with collective intentionality.  To reverse the above problem, which 
questioned the ontological status of the axioms: what is the ontological status 
of the state? If the void is “the first level of being” from which emerges “a 
hierarchy of being” such that there exist a number of levels that correspond 
to the series or ordinals (2007: 298), then where does the state sit in this 
hierarchy? Does it nest further up the scale than presented situations? In 
which case, it must, in some sense, be emergent from it.  Or, if the state is 
opposed to presentations as is suggested by there being an ‘un-relation’ 
between them, are they two separate hierarchies that come into conflict with 
each other? Either way, assuming that “every multiple is a multiple of 
multiples” (2008: 29), how can the state achieve sufficient unity such that it 
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is capable of knowing, having a standpoint, forming a recognition, making a 
declaration - to take just a few examples from just one page (2008: 208). I 
would suggest that one of the great merits of trying to find a way of thinking 
the multiple of the socio-political arena is to expose the problems associated 
with forming any unified concept of class or social classification; not just to 
expose the profound difficulty in delimiting any complex multiple, but to show 
how decisions, actions and communication are always carried out at the local 
level – even if they have global effects. In fact, if my presupposition that the 
correct way to model the social is through complexity theory and distributed 
networks is valid, we must focus on the local conditions of any decision. The 
state is incapable of any intentional act; it is the individual social actors 
employed or working for the state who know things, form recognitions, have 
standpoints and perform actions. What remains to be worked out is how these 
intentional individual actors emerge and form relationships such that it 
appears that the state, or any other collective, is acting intentionally. Being 
and Event, whilst opening with the stated aim of exposing ‘the one’ for what it 
is, in socio-politcal terms at least, ends by reinforcing it. 
 
The second problem concerns over codification. In a way that seems to have 
many similarities to the three ‘lines’ given by Deleuze and Guattari, Badiou 
presents three different permutations of how presentation and representation 
affect a term in any situation; normal, singular and excrescence: 
I will call normal a term which is both presented and represented. I will 
call excrescence a term which is represented but not presented. Finally, 
I will term singular a term which is presented but not represented. 
(2007: 99) 
 
One problem with this very simple differentiation has already been alluded to, 
namely the nature of ‘a term’; does it refer to an individual social actor or to 
their behaviour / actions? I fail to see how this could be applied to the former, 
even though that is the implication of the reference, as such an application 
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would effectively create a unity out of a multiplicity of differentially described 
roles and actions existing both synchronically and diachronically; but if applied 
to the latter problems emerge from the sheer complexity of human behaviour. 
Not only is the problem of isolating elements of human behaviour profoundly 
difficult, as I shall examine in more detail latter, but even should such an 
analysis be possible, each element would itself, by Badiou’s own admission, 
be multiple, and as such would never fall into just one of these three 
categories. No action is ever pure, in the sense of being either totally under 
the control of the state’s count (represented but not presented), nor totally 
free from it (presented but represented). All action would, to varying degrees, 
be normal. In Badiou’s defence, he does admit that the “degree of connection 
between the native structure of a situation and its statist metastructure is 
variable” and that the “question of a gap is the key to the analysis of being, of 
the typology of multiples-in-situation” (2007: 99) but does such a 
codification, or even such an over codification, allow for the complexity and 
multiplicity of social behaviour and structures to be seen? Or rather does it 
over simplify to the point that the detail that explains the social is lost from 
view? 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus, originally published in 1980, eight years prior to 
Being and Event, Deleuze and Gauttari offer a similar three fold differentiation 
of social structuration (2004a: 244-5). The first of these, “a relatively supple 
line of interlaced codes and territorialities” seems to correspond to roughly the 
normal situation; the second, “a rigid line” where “the social space implies a 
State apparatus” has a strong correspondence to the excrescent, as does the 
third, “one or several lines of flight” to the singular, where the terms involved 
offer a resistance to state control. But at least Deleuze and Gauttari offer their 
description in terms of codifications, with the second line being a “generalized 
overcoding” and the third being “defined by decoding and deterritorialization”. 
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The advantage of using the language of codification is firstly, as Wilczek 
points out, the codes have a referent, they actually refer to something, and 
are not formal like the axioms of ZFC, and that secondly they allow for 
degrees of codification. For Deleuze and Gauttari, the greater the codification 
the more rigid the situation and therefore the less the degree of flexibility or 
adaptability the system, state or situation has to respond to a constantly 
changing and dynamic environment. They often refer to the severe 
overcoding of state control as cancerous, a reference to Solzhenitsyn’s 
allegorical novel Cancer Ward and the ‘cancerous’ Soviet police state of the 
1950’s in which it is set. I would suggest that Being and Event, with its 
axioms and its plethora of technical definitions is itself an overcodificaction. 
Badiou must have had all this in mind when constructing his terminology, or 
perhaps it was just a coincidence that he chose excrescence to refer to 
excessive state control. 
 
Codification and definition are all acts of abstraction that extract key features 
of their referent and then attempt to freeze them such that they reduce the 
complexity and multiplicity of the referent to a simplified and easily 
transportable commodity. Axiomatisation is the same except that once 
abstracted the axioms remain without a referent and are manipulated only at 
the formal level.51 In a sense, in the sense described by Wilczek, this is an 
absolutely necessary procedure. It becomes a problem when we no longer see 
the said as a code of the given, but as the given – as the defining truth of the 
situation. If we approach the same phenomena not with the intention of 
defining but of describing we keep in mind not only that the description refers 
to something, but that this something is multiple and can be described in a 
number of different, but in equally valid ways – it becomes a question of 
where you draw the lines that delimit the multiple, and whether the resulting 
description works, whether it communicates what you intended to 
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communicate. There are at least two concepts within Being and Event that are 
worth referring to in this context: The void and its similarity with noise, and 
the act of ‘counting-as-one’. 
 
In a similar, if not identical way that for Serres noise is the primal, primitive 
and pre-ordered state, the “background of our being”, the pure 
undifferentiated multiplicity out of which all classes, patterns or orderings 
emerge, for Badiou the void is “the nothing...the pure multiple upon which the 
count operates” (2007: 55), it is the ‘inconsistent multiplicity’, the ‘not-one’ 
out of which all ‘consistent multiplicities’ or ‘several-ones’ emerge. It is 
inconsistent because it is undifferentiated, it is literally ‘no-thing’, and as such 
it is the ‘being qua being’ of all beings. I can find no difference between these 
concepts. But whereas Serres attempts a description of how entities, through 
time or repetition, so emerge, Badiou offers nothing. He comes close to such 
a description when he says that: “Insofar as the one is a result, by necessity 
‘something’ of the multiple does not absolutely coincide with the result...this 
‘there is’ leaves a remainder” (2007: 53). But he does not attempt an 
explanation of why ‘this’ remainder from the emergence of this ‘there is’ 
should return to the ontological sump rather than ‘that’ remainder. Again, in 
Badiou’s defence, such a formalisation would not require such particular 
detail, but, from Serres’ perspective, I would suggest, it is an appreciation of 
the local conditions that give rise to a particular ‘there is’ that is central to an 
understanding of this process. Badiou’s insistence, though, that what is 
presented is not one, but only a ‘count-as-one’, is a good description of the 
process of presentation. It recognises that the referent is a multiplicity, not a 
unity, but that for pragmatic purposes, for purposes of communication and 
recognition, we will refer to it as if it were one. What he does not pursue, 
however, is the nature of the count.  Regarding inclusion or representation, 
he very emphatically argues that the state is the operator of the count. 
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However, as I have argued above, he does so without a description or 
analysis of how (implying a collective intentionality); he offers no suggestion 
of who counts that which is presented, how this count occurs, or what is 
counted. This count by the state reads as the opposite of a process of 
emergence, as a top down imposition (which, for political reasons, is no doubt 
his intention). Either way, this would all be easier to understand if we could 
have some notion of what is being counted. From a formalist perspective 
there is no need for a referent, but from the perspective of this thesis there 
is. 
 
4.2 Deleuze and Guattari: the arborescent and the rhizomic 
 
Having already established a link between Badiou and Deleuze and Guattari, I 
now wish to examine their collaborative work in a little more detail. It is 
perhaps easy to see why Albertsen and Diken (2003) devote so much of their 
paper to an exposition of this collaboration. They quote John Urry as arguing 
that “much of what happens in a ‘society’ is influenced by flows or fluids” 
(2003: 27) and, in following this concept of flow, make the decision to dwell 
on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy “in order to look at what is perhaps the 
most radical elaboration of ‘the social’ as flow”. And following the general 
outlook being followed by this thesis this would seem a sound decision. 
 
The similarities of their approach to that of Serres are, again, on the surface 
at least, obvious. In describing their principle of multiplicity they are explicit 
that it has no relation ‘to the One’, either as object or subject, and that there 
“is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject...not 
even the unity to abort in the object or ‘return’ in the subject.” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004b: 8-9) Two years later,52 as I have already noted, Serres took 
as his object of study ‘the multiple as such’, which he described as “a set 
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undefined by elements or boundaries. Locally, it is not individuated; globally it 
is not summed up” (1995a: 4). There is barely a cigarette paper between the 
two descriptions. Not only this, they both describe the emergence of their 
multiplicities out of the noise or chaos through the same process of repetition:  
From chaos, Milieus and Rhythms are born...Every milieu is vibratory...a 
block of spacetime constituted by the periodic repetition of the 
component...Every milieu is coded, a code being defined by periodic 
repetition...Rhythm is the milieu’s answer to chaos. What chaos and 
rhythm have in common is the in-between – between two milieus, 
rhythm-chaos or the chaosmos. (Deleuze & Gauttari, 2004b: 345) 
 
Chaosmos is the edge of chaos, or the edge of the void in Badiou’s 
terminology; it is that creative middle ground from which rhythms as codes of 
communication emerge. We are in the third place. We are in Serres’ world of 
synthesis, a “synthesis of disparate elements [that] is not without ambiguity”, 
a world of fuzzy aggregates (2004b: 379). These multiplicities have “no 
beginning or end”; they are “always in the middle, between things, interbeing, 
intermezzo”. Just who is it that is speaking here? It was Deleuze & Guattari 
(2004b: 27). To push the similarities even further we have the speed of 
Hermes as well. These multiplicities are formed from lines, lines of 
communication, never from the plotting of points, and it is speed that “turns 
the point into a line!” (2004b: 27). Another and very significant area of 
agreement, one that will be looked as in some detail later (5.1), though in 
relation to Deleuze’s solo work, is their critique of ‘representation’. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari actually present two models of multiplicities, and it is 
here, in the differences between them, that the problems with their approach 
start to become apparent. They term these two models the rhizome and the 
tree, or the arborescent; the latter being the model of structure and 
hierarchy, the former being the model that constantly escapes structure and 
hierarchy. Representation is linked to the model of the tree, to a logic of 
tracing and reproduction. “The rhizome”, they say, “is altogether different,” it 
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is “a map and not a tracing” (2004b: 13). What distinguishes the two 
approaches is the experimental nature of the map in its contact with the real 
or given; rather than reproducing a closed unconscious, a representation of a 
static, fixed ‘reality’, a mis-represented given, it constructs an open 
unconscious, it becomes Hermes fostering connections between fields, a guide 
to the turbulent reality, to the flows that constitute the true given. 
 
In the previous section, when discussing the nature of complex systems, I 
noted that one of their features is their high degree of connectivity. This is 
essential for non-linearity and feedback to occur. The two models here 
described refer to two models or principles of connection within two types of 
assemblage or multiplicity. With the model they refer to as the rhizome (and 
in other places as the molecular), the degree of connectivity is high and 
unstructured, for “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, 
and must be” (2004b: 7) such that “the linear unity of the word, even of 
language” is shattered in the same manner, they claim, as “Nietzsche’s 
aphorisms shatter the linear unity of knowledge” (2004b: 6). With the model 
they refer to as arborescent (and in other places as the molar) this fluid and 
constantly changing non-linear communication has been tamed, 
communication has been codified, if not over-codified, relationships between 
components have become fixed, and a hierarchical structure appears – 
definite points and positions can be plotted. Unities appear. In contrast to this 
coding or over-coding, rhizomes constantly escape codification, and they act 
as a universal model in as much as it applies to all systems, “ceaselessly 
establish[ing] connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, 
and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles” (2004b: 
8). And with a no doubt unintended display of irony they summarize the 
principle differences between these two models as the differences “between 
rigid segmentarity and supple segmentarity”, where in the former “binary 
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segmentarity stands on its own and is governed by the great machines of 
direct binarization” whilst in the latter “binarities result from ‘multiplicities of n 
dimensions’” (2004b: 234). 
 
The question that must be posed is: what is the relationship between these 
two models? Are they two different modes or poles of the same process? If 
they are then we would need to understand the movement from one pole to 
the other. Or are they creating a dualism? I would like to suggest that 
Deleuze and Guattari are simply unclear, or ambiguous on this point – that 
would be the most positive reading. Ultimately, however, they become very 
clear and their politics appears to get in the way of their philosophy, creating 
a serious difficulty. In their Introduction to A Thousand Plateaus their position 
appears clear: The tree and the rhizome “are not two opposed models” – 
“there is no dualism” (2004b: 22). In fact they argue that “mental correctives 
are necessary to undo the dualisms we had no wish to construct but through 
which we pass” (2004b: 23). Dualisms here are the enemy. We cannot stop 
them appearing, so in that sense they are an entirely necessary enemy, but 
they must, following Derrida (1997), be deconstructed as they appear. So if 
these two models do not create a dualism, what do they create? Perhaps a 
mixture of some kind? This certainly appears to be the suggestion when they 
state that there are “knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic 
offshoots in roots.” (2004b: 22) But does this make things any clearer? The 
question remains: what is the relationship between these two models that 
form a mixture? If, as I will later argue, what we have is a ‘progressive’ 
process of codification operating in one direction, but at the same time a 
constantly moving process of decodification operating in the other direction, 
we have a single complex and dynamic process of both structuring and de-
structuring. Is this what they mean? 
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A later section seems to maintain a certain ambiguity: two states of a single 
process and an opposition between two different processes: “This opposition 
between arborified and rhizomatic segmentarity is not just meant to indicate 
two states of a single process, but also to isolate two different processes” 
(2004b: 234). It would seem that we have two distinct but inseparable 
processes that coexist in some state of entanglement but are not a mixture, 
that maintain a distinction “because they do not have the same terms or the 
same relations or the same nature or even the same type of multiplicity” 
(2004b: 235). Now they appear to present two very distinct but interacting 
processes that even if they could not exist separately nevertheless are 
different in kind. So if one is emergent from the chaos through rhythm and 
repetition, from where does the second emerge? Answering this question 
leads to a very ambiguous situation. 
 
It is necessary to understand that for Deleuze and Guattari “everything is 
political” and that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a 
micropolitics.” (2004b: 235) It is also necessary to understand that both A 
Thousand Plateaus and Anti-Oedipus had two critical targets, capitalism and 
schizophrenia, the sub-titles of both books. Regarding the latter, their aim 
was a critique and a radical overhaul of psychoanalysis in terms of what they 
call schizoanalysis. As this is outside the aims of this project I mention this 
only in passing. Regarding the former, in a similar manner to Badiou a few 
years later, their aim was a critique and radical overhaul of Marxism. On the 
one hand, following the events surrounding May 1968, there was a frustration 
or radical disappointment in the ability of the left to bring about social and 
political change, but there was still a strong adherence to a Marxist analysis. 
Despite their obvious difference from Marx, in as much as they “define social 
formations by machinic processes and not by modes of production” (2004b: 
480) A Thousand Plateaus still holds on stubbornly to a Marxist view of 
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history, the ‘evolution’ of an ancient slavery into a feudal serfdom into the 
oppressive capitalism of today, and a series of strong binary oppositions that 
includes the proletarian working class set against the capitalist State (2004b: 
505 & 513). In fact despite the ironic acknowledgement of the need to 
deconstruct binary oppositions, the whole book seems to be built around them 
- the main one being the two types of multiplicity where the State and ‘the 
system’ are synonymous with the arborescent. 
 
So, to return to the question of where the arborescent emerges from – the 
answer, rather puzzlingly, is that the State “comes into the world fully formed 
and rises up in a single stroke” (2004b: 472). The State, which in their terms 
is extensive, metric, centred, arborescent and striated, appears unconditioned 
in contrast to the natural ‘war machine’, which is intensive, nonmetric, 
acentred, rhizomatic and smooth. There are two spaces, the smooth and the 
striated, and they are not the same; the striated “produces an order” (2004b: 
528) whilst the smooth escapes order. If the latter is an assemblage that is in 
a constant state of flux both codifying and decodifying its space and relations, 
what is the different type of order that it is in opposition to? If we follow one 
reading of the book, the section where they refer to the Body without Organs 
(BwO) (2004b: plateau 6), this problem can be avoided. Here the Full BwO 
simply refers to the healthy organisation or organism on the edge of chaos – 
not pure chaos (Empty BwO), not the void or noise, an inconsistent 
multiplicity where no differentiation is possible, but a consistent multiplicity in 
a constant state of flux and flow, where codes are formed but just as quickly 
break down as the multiplicity constantly adapts to its changing environment. 
Here the process of overcoding that eventually leads, at its upper limit, to a 
totalitarian state, is termed the Cancerous BwO; the codes that allow social 
relations have been rigidified, turned into stone or into statues, such that 
adaptation to a constantly changing environment, under the auspices of ‘good’ 
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governance, is prevented, and eventually the system stagnates and destroys 
itself. As a metaphor, as a broad description of the single process of 
codification and decodification, I would suggest that it has plenty of potential, 
and with more detail, could be made to work as a description of the social. 
The problem is that this interpretation seems to have been developed largely 
through their response to psychotherapy, from comments made by Antonin 
Artaud, but does not work when applied to their response to capitalism. 
 
At the risk of a gross oversimplification, capitalism itself, as a target of a 
critical analysis, runs counter to this description. When I use the term 
‘capitalism’ I do so with all the warnings attached to any essentially contested 
concept; that it has no unified meaning, that it is a concept that is in effect a 
multiplicity of other concepts of which there is no one agreed definitive set. 
That said, it appears to me that the battle cry of most state governments and 
economists that are supporters of capitalism is ‘the free market!’ – the 
removal of excessive codes of regulation that prevent the free flows of 
money, labour and consumer goods. More socialist states, on the other hand, 
have tended to support greater regulation of the economy and the market 
place, have codified, or, from the perspective of their opponents, over-
codified the flows. Such an analysis would place capitalism at the ‘right’ end of 
the continuum, at the free and nomadic end, if the above ‘single process’ 
model was adopted. Such a simple binary opposition, of course, would lead 
Deleuze and Guattari into a politically untenable position. Their response is to 
make the State process fundamentally different from the free flowing and 
emergent nomadic, rhizomatic process, and to argue that capitalism “arises 
as a worldwide enterprise of subjectification by constituting an axiomatic of 
decoded flows” (2004b: 505). They accept that capitalism requires decoded 
flows, but invoke the formalist, empty axiom as a target of their critical 
analysis - as the cause of a process that they otherwise support. These 
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axioms “are primary statements, which do not derive from or depend upon 
another statement” and are invented and multiplied by capitalism (2004b: 
510). Such a response can perhaps be best explained through Foucault’s 
description of the emergence of neo-liberalism following World War Two 
(2008). Here Foucault suggests that such states created the conditions for 
good governmentality by formalising the conditions necessary for a highly 
competitive free market and then transferring these formalisations across to 
the state in general. The difference between these two approaches is that 
whilst Foucault attempts to describe this formalisation as a practice of 
government (as an attempt to utilise formalisations that have been the result 
of economic analysis) Deleuze and Guattari describe these formalisations as 
non-dependent ‘primary statements’.53 
 
So let me be clear as to what is being suggested here. States appear fully 
formed, and they, as capitalist states and together with ‘capitalism’ invent 
axioms that decode flows not for the maintenance of the freedom of a 
nomadic and smooth space, but for the subjectification of its occupants and 
the production, presumably, of capital and wealth for the minority. What this 
analysis completely fails to do is reveal the genesis of the State, capitalism or 
the axioms (assuming that the latter actually exist – a problem that has 
already been discussed). In completely ‘othering’ the process of state 
structure from what I will later argue is its field of emergence they fail to 
identify the relations that actually give rise to such structures, structures that 
emerge out of multiplicities, that are produced rather than being the 
producers. This distinction has real importance if we genuinely want to bring 
about social / economic change. To give one simple, brief yet current 
example: The recent ‘economic crisis’. In the conflict driven Marxist model 
suggested by the above ‘second’ reading of Deleuze and Guattari, the crisis is 
always the fault of the other, whether this is capitalism, the state, or bankers. 
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It fails to identify the social and economic relations that we are all entangled 
in; it concentrates on the differences between the global or macro and the 
local or micro, without identifying how the former emerges out of the latter, 
and therefore without realising that if we want to change the former we need 
to change the latter – that we need to focus on the local (not primarily the 
global) and the process of codification. One of the consequences of such a 
mistaken analysis is the preservation of the fallacy of collective intentionality; 
that states or capitalism, as collective unities, are capable of acting as an 
intentional agent. One of the supreme ironies in A Thousand Plateaus, even 
beyond the invocation of an endless series of binary oppositions, is the de 
facto creation of unities (the State, for example) rather than its 
deconstruction into the non-denumerable fuzzy sets they actually are. 
 
The above reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to the social can be 
pushed a step further to reveal the crux of the problem. Whether we read the 
molar as one pole of an emergent process or as a fully formed principle it is, 
as they say, the ‘molar organization’; it is that which organises and rigidifies - 
as opposed the ‘molecular milieu’ that dissolves or escapes this organisation. 
We not only have to offer an account of the organising process, an 
explanation of how, why and from where organisation or its breakdown 
occurs, but also an account of what is being organised, rigidified, or escaping. 
Claiming that these ‘molecular movements’ “thwart and break through the 
great worldwide organization” and that from “the viewpoint of micropolitics, a 
society is defined by [these] lines of flight” (2004b: 238) reads like the need 
to provoke political activism wins out over the need to fully understand social 
dynamics. Although such an approach has its merits, its danger is that we fail 
to understand the complexity of the social process. This point, though not in a 
political sense, was made by Serres during an interview with Peter Hallward 
(Hallward, 2002: 234). After speculating that at some point in the future we 
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may be in a position to “grasp the complexity” of the world of networks and 
relations in which we live, but that such knowledge does not exist at the 
moment, he stated that he has “always asked Deleuze the following question: 
in what space do you draw your plane of immanence?” (2002: 234) His point 
was that if we talk of planes or lines of flight then, by invoking spatial 
metaphors we imply the pre-existence of a degree of organisation that 
immanence does not permit but that supports a transcendence. His comment 
that “One could say that all of Deleuze’s thought refuses this idea of 
transcendence but that its very expression presupposes it” (2002: 234) 
succinctly expresses the problem with the approach of A Thousand Plateaus. 
Deleuze and Guattari fail to ‘grasp the complexity’ of the social because they 
fail to understand the emergence (preferable to immanence)54 of social 
organisation, a process that they could only have offered a description of had 
they uncovered that molecular ‘something’ that actually flows and that 
becomes organised. Only by then observing how or from where this 
organisation emerges could an account be given of State organisation, and 
how the molecular flows escape it. 
 
They do offer, though, some indication of what these flows might be of. From 
a capitalist perspective they talk of monetary flows. For an economist this 
may seem to make some sense, at least until you realise that money does not 
flow on its own account (no pun intended) but in response to ‘something’ that 
uses it or acts upon it. From a psychoanalytic perspective they talk of the flow 
of desires - in fact the description of their assemblages as ‘desiring machines’ 
permeate their work. This approach may not be without some merit, providing 
we can become a little clearer about the nature of these desires and how they 
contribute to social organisation. Of particular interest to this project may be 
the contribution desires make to social action, and the extent to which desires 
are not only psychological, but also social in origin. They also talk about the 
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‘molecular flow of sinfulness’ that escapes the power of the church and the 
‘flow of criminality’ that escapes the legal code. Both of these point in the 
right direction in as much as both refer to human behaviour, to human social 
action. I will argue later that social organisation emerges from the codification 
of social action, and that social action is the emergence and actualisation of a 
very complex virtual process. In this sense at least it will be of value to see 
human social action as an emergent process. 
 
There is though a point in the book where they pay homage to Gabriel Tarde; 
an adversary of, and a thinker originally overshadowed by Comte, whose 
work is now receiving a lot more interest, and who is acknowledged by 
Deleuze, both singularly and with Gauttari, as having had a great influence on 
them. I will return to Tarde’s work and ideas in the next section (5.2), where 
the problem of the nature of the flows or of the ‘social atom’ that receives 
organisation, will be explored in some detail. For now, let me simply note that 
for Deleuze and Guattari he was the inventor of microsociology. This was 
because he was not interested in the large scale collective representations 
and overcodifications that interested Comte, the so called ‘social facts’, but 
“instead in the world of detail or the infinitesimal: the little imitations, 
oppositions, and inventions constituting an entire realm of subrepresentative 
matter” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b: 241). For them, he was truly a 
sociologist of the local and the multiple. Deleuze and Guattari themselves ask 
“What, according to Tarde, is a flow?” and answer “It is a belief or desire (the 
two aspects of every assemblage); a flow is always of belief and of desire” 
(2004b: 241). I will suggest later that his could be modified into what I shall 
term an expectation, a quantum of the social that remains radically multiple 
but nevertheless self-organises in a similar way to that suggested by Tarde. I 
will contest, however, whether ‘flow’ is an appropriate term, as it already 
suggests a degree of codification. It will also be worth noting the opposition 
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referred to by Tarde is not of the nature described by Deleuze and Guattari; 
rather than an opposition to a totalising and overcodifying State, it is an 
opposition that remains local, it is the opposition of a differential selection. 
 
4.3 DeLanda: nested sets 
 
DeLanda has not only become one of the leading exponents of the work of 
Deleuze and its relationship to complexity and non-linearity, but has recently 
formulated what he terms an Assemblage Theory of the social – an approach 
to social ontology and social complexity directly derived from Deleuze’s theory 
of assemblages discussed above (2006a, 2006b). In line with the orientation 
of this project he is emphatic that the relationship between the micro and the 
macro is the “most critical question which a philosophical analysis of social 
ontology must answer” (2006a: 250); his use of network theory highlights 
many of the features of complex systems described in the previous section; 
he is one of few, if any, social theorists who recognises the role of scale; most 
importantly his focus on the Deleuzian concept of an assemblage recognises 
the centrality of multiplicity in any account of the social; and, in light of the 
review of Deleuze and Guattari (and Badiou) presented above, he recognised 
the problems associated with ‘the State’: 
Avoiding the use of concepts like ‘the state’ is important not only 
because such reified generalities are not legitimate ontological entities 
but also because such notions are too monolithic, that is, they fail to 
capture the relations of exteriority that exist among the heterogeneous 
organizations forming a government hierarchy. (2006b: 85) 
 
This statement justifying his rejection of ‘the state’ is important for two 
related reasons. Firstly, and quite justifiably, he makes this rejection on 
account of it transforming a general concept (an essentially contested 
concept) into an actual material object. And secondly, a point that he makes a 
great deal out of, the relations that bring large scale organisations into being 
should always be considered through exteriority; they are never totalities 
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formed through relations of interiority. For DeLanda, relations of interiority, as 
I shall go on to explain, are similar to the part to whole relations that exist 
within functionalist perspectives of the social, and are to be rejected in favour 
of those of exteriority. And in line with the arguments above, DeLanda links 
Deleuze’s ambiguity over his use of such a macro social entity as ‘the state’ to 
his Marxism, and heralds his own rejection of it: 
Deleuze remained until the end of his life a committed Marxist 
and...Marxism tends to favour a form of macro reductionism. While in 
the social ontology I will be sketching there is no such thing as ‘society 
as a whole’, it is not clear that Deleuze rejected that notion. (2006a: 
252) 
 
Why then does he completely fail to actually think the social in terms of the 
multiple? Why, having avoided the problems associated with ‘the state’ by 
offering an entirely bottom-up approach which he describes in terms of 
emergence does he fail to explain how this emergence occurs? He fails, I 
suggest, because he also jettisons Delueze and Guattari’s emphasis on micro-
sociology; he fails to recognise the importance of local relations. 
 
A useful entry point into DeLanda’s theory is via his use of the terms micro-
reductionism and macro-reductionism alluded to above. These terms relate to 
the ‘classical’ approaches to social theory. The former to those approaches 
that view the ‘key social entities’ as being the individual social actors, either 
as rational decision-makers or interpreters of routine behaviour, approaches 
that include ethnomethodology, social constructivism and phenomenology. He 
does not include Weber in his list of examples, possibly because he draws 
quite heavily on Weber and his study of the three different sources of 
legitimisation of authority, but I see no reason why his interpretive approach 
should not be included. The point, for DeLanda, is not that these approaches 
deny the existence of society ‘as a whole’, but that in reducing the focus of 
significance to the individual they regard such macro views of society as an 
epiphenomenon, as “an aggregate or sum of either many rational agents or 
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many phenomenological experiences shaped by daily routine”, as a 
phenomenon that has no causal influence of its own. The important point to 
emphasise is that the “macro entity does not have emergent properties of its 
own” (2006a: 250). On this account ‘society’ is constructed through a non-
dynamic, non-complex process of the aggregation of individual social actors. 
 
Macro-reductionism takes the opposite view, “asserting that society makes 
the individual”. Here “what really exists is the world of enduring social 
structures”, with individual social actors this time reduced to mere 
epiphenomenon brought about through a process of socialisation and which 
have no causal effect on the structure. It’s the approach subscribed to by 
Durkheim, Parsons and the older Marx (2006a: 250). He also inserts Giddens’ 
theory of structuration as a third strategy between these two classical 
positions, as what he terms a “‘mesoreductionist’ solution to the micro-macro 
problem.” Here, as we have previously seen, both the micro and macro 
construct each other through a reflexive process that focuses on social 
practices (2006a: 251). DeLanda does not offer a critique of this third 
strategy, but those briefly discussed in the introduction to this thesis apply. 
 
DeLanda’s approach is “to abandon the idea that there are only two (or three) 
levels” and instead to bridge the gap between the micro and the macro “with 
many intermediate levels, each operating at its own spatial scale and having 
its own relative autonomy” (2006a: 251). These levels include communities 
and organisations of all sizes, ranging from families (I assume) and small 
social networks all the way up to cities, territorial states, government 
organisations and multi-national companies. Despite, however, referring 
constantly to emergence, populations and statistical results we discover a 
social world of wholes: 
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each differently scaled individual entity (individual persons, individual 
organisations, individual cities and so on) is made out of entities at the 
immediate lower scale, that is, that the relations among scales is one of 
parts to whole. (2006a: 251, DeLanda’s emphasis) 
 
Each population forms “another concrete, singular entity” (2006a: 252; again 
DeLanda’s own emphasis) that interacts with other entities. This approach, I 
argue, leads to more problems than it resolves. Chief amongst these are: 
1. The problems associated with the invocation of a parts-to-whole 
relationship and its closeness, if not identity, with concepts of unities. 
This is not just a passing comment; the phrase ‘whole-part 
relationship’ dominates his approach. 
2. An explanation, implied but not given by DeLanda, as to how these 
concrete singular entities actually interact with each other. Such an 
explanation is not possible unless the notion of ‘wholes’ or anything 
approaching social unities is abandoned; unless we adopt Serres 
challenge to ‘think the multiple’, adopting it as a motif, as a constant 
guide and reminder not to lose our way. 
3. The dangers of approaching an unjustifiable position where we confirm 
the performance of collective intentionality; a position where our 
casual use of terms like ‘national actors’ (used by DeLanda 2006a: 
263) is used to infer the intentionality of groups or populations, a 
position that radically obscures the complexity and dynamics of actual 
social relations and prevents our understanding of them. 
I will examine each of these in turn. 
 
1. As DeLanda explains in his introduction, the ‘neo-assemblage theory’ he 
develops is “is not strictly speaking Deleuze’s own”. For this reason I will aim 
my comments entirely at DeLanda’s exposition and refrain from any direct 
comment on Deleuze’s own theory of assemblage. DeLanda’s critical target is 
a form of what he terms the ‘organismic metaphor’, “a more sophisticated 
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form of the basic metaphor” that culminated in the functionalist school of 
sociology, a form, that despite the rejection of functionalism, “still exerts 
considerable influence in most schools of sociology” (2006b: 9). This 
persistent version of the metaphor that implies a relationship between the 
nature of an organism and the state involves: 
a general theory about the relations between parts and wholes, wholes 
that constitute a seamless totality or that display an organic unity. The 
basic concept in this theory is what we may call relations of interiority: 
the component parts are constituted by the very relations they have to 
other parts in the whole. A part detached from such a whole ceases to 
be what it is, since being this particular part is one of its constitutive 
properties. (2006b: 9; DeLanda’s emphasis) 
 
A rejection of any seamless totality, or any unity, organic or otherwise, is 
perfectly in accord with the approach of this project, though not necessarily a 
general relationship between the emergent organising principles of organisms 
and states. Moreover, from DeLanda’s perspective, such an approach has to 
be rejected due to its macro-reductionism. As described above, the ‘whole’ 
pre-exists its parts and constructs its parts to serve its own ends such that if 
any of these parts are removed from its totality they cease to exist. The 
problem lays with what DeLanda terms ‘relations of interiority’. In the above, 
‘interiority’ is applicable only from the perspective of the whole; from the 
perspective of the parts, however, the relations that constitute them are 
exterior, and if we have nested sets of assemblages, as we do with this 
theory, it must be close to impossible to state that for any given level of ‘nest’ 
whether the relations that hold it together are interior or exterior. 
Unfortunately DeLanda does not emphasise this relativity.55 
 
‘Relations of exteriority’, on the other hand, argues DeLanda, are what 
characterise the wholes that Deleuze terms assemblages. An important 
difference is: 
that a component part of an assemblage may be detached from it and 
plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions are 
different. In other words, the exteriority of relations implies a certain 
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autonomy for the terms they relate, or as Deleuze puts it, it implies that 
‘a relation may change without the terms changing’. (2006b: 10-11) 
 
The point being made is that the existence of ‘the part’ does not depend on its 
relations to the whole which it constitutes; it is able to be ‘un-plugged’ from 
one assemblage and plugged into another assemblage without undergoing 
any radical change. This concept is vital for DeLanda’s understanding of 
emergence in the social sphere as it prevents any form of reductionism: “the 
properties of the component parts can never explain the relations which 
constitute a whole” (2006b: 10-11); in other words any resultant whole is 
always greater than the sum of its parts. In a broad sense such a concept is 
in line with the arguments this project wants to present, though its 
presentation in terms of wholes and parts, and in terms of interior and 
exterior relations over simplifies the social process, and prevents DeLanda 
from being able to offer an explanation of how such a process works in the 
social sphere. 
 
In this neo-assemblage theory assemblages form nested sets of assemblages; 
they are, to use Badiou’s phrase, multiplicities of multiplicities. Such 
assemblages act as the component ‘parts’ of larger assemblages that exhibit 
emergent properties – properties that cannot be reduced to the sum these 
parts. However, any dynamic system is always an open system, as much 
dependent on its external relations with its environment or milieu, in which it 
needs to survive and flourish (or the assemblage in which it is nested), as 
with its internal relations that hold it together into an identifiable form. This 
being the case, in what sense is it of value to separate relations into internal 
and external, particularly with the intent of prioritising one over the other in 
the sense that the assemblage derives its character or even its existence from 
one rather then the other? A collective may derive its form from the self-
organisation of its internal relations, but it only does so in response to its 
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external relationships which supply its input and receive its output. If you 
‘unplug’ an assemblage from the larger assemblage in which it is nested, and 
‘plug’ it into another assemblage its internal relationship may or may not 
remain the same – it would depend on a large number of factors including the 
robustness of the system and the degree of perturbation it receives as a 
result of having a different milieu. Moreover, I fail to see in what sense any 
assemblage could be conceived as a whole. By any definition of whole 
completeness and entirety is implied, as is the notion of being undivided and 
of being a unified system. If it is accepted that this is not what Delanda wants 
to imply, the question of why he chooses to use such terms (especially when 
it is considered that the formal study of wholes and parts, mereology, is 
closely related to set theory) remains; an approach that has hopefully been 
dismissed. The answer seems to be that DeLanda requires such a concept to 
attempt an explanation of the interaction of social entities; the larger 
assemblages are emergent wholes that interact with other whole 
assemblages.56 
 
However, an explanation of how these emergent wholes interact with each 
other and go on to form even larger scale emergent wholes is only implied. 
The reason why DeLanda fails to offer a full explanation, I suggest, is that, for 
the sake of simplicity, he has blinded himself to the complexity of what 
occurs, and no doubt felt compelled, because of his non-reductionist 
approach, to reject a focus on the local. Such an approach is not reductionist, 
I argue, because the emergent global or macro effects are still of a different 
order, are vastly more than the sum of their ‘parts’, even though they need to 
be understood at the local or micro level. What I will go on to suggest is that 
rather than resolving the micro / macro problem by the prioritisation of one 
over the other, by inserting a third level, or even by the construction of a 
multiplicity of levels as DeLanda attempts, there is a need to conceive of an 
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unbounded inconsistent social multiplicity, or noise, out of which all social 
entities emerge. For the time being this task will be aided by examining how 
DeLanda’s approach fails to explain the interaction of ‘whole’ assemblages 
with other ‘whole’ assemblages. 
 
2. Unities are again implied when it is considered how, for DeLanda, these 
concrete emergent wholes interact with one another. He is no doubt correct in 
arguing that communities become structured through the dynamics of social 
networks, but pushes his description too far in suggesting that these 
communities form political coalitions that “provides a community with 
resources like the legitimacy derived from numerousness and unity, but...also 
constrains it to struggle only for those goals that the whole coalition has 
agreed on pursuing” (2006b: 36). We thus move into a social world where 
social groups (communities and organisations) become united behind agreed 
goals and objectives and interact with one another through a process of 
negotiation and coalition – a process that takes place at the level of the 
emergent whole such that these wholes exhibit causal capacities that cannot 
be reduced or explained by reducing our focus to a lower level. DeLanda 
anticipates an obvious response: “It may be objected, however, that these 
alliances and subordinations are not the effect of these larger assemblages, 
but of the activities of the people that compose them” (2006b: 36). His 
answer to this objection is that “it is possible to accept that assemblages of 
people must act by means of the activity of people and at the same time 
argue that these larger entities do have their own causal capacities” (2006b: 
37). Again, I am not questioning the ability of emergent organisations to have 
causal capacities, but what I do seriously question is the validity of only 
taking into account these capacities, and then describing them in such rational 
terms. To say that this simplifies the process by obscuring the complexities is 
an understatement, but in effect this is what DeLanda does. “The device that 
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allows such a compromise”, he says, “is the concept of redundant causality.” 
(2006b: 37, DeLanda’s emphasis) 
 
This sleight of hand termed ‘redundant causality’ says that we are justified in 
ignoring the micro details of a process if the effects would be the same what 
ever these details. So, for example, in “a coalition between communities...we 
may be justified in explaining the emerging coalition as the result of the 
interaction between entire communities if an explanation of the micro-details 
is unnecessary because several such micro-causes would have led to a similar 
outcome” (2006b: 37). So, assuming that these negotiations are actually 
being pursued by individual social actors, DeLanda is suggesting that what he 
calls “the assembly of subpersonal components (impressions, ideas, 
propositional attitudes, habits, skills)” (2006b: 52) can be safely bracketed if 
different collections of such components would have led the negotiations to 
the same outcome. This bracketing dismisses both a key feature of complex 
systems and a quite obvious piece of logic. Firstly we cannot dismiss any 
feature of such a complex process, no matter how small, because, as has 
already been explained, due to non-linearity (a subject on which DeLanda has 
written)57 and feedback the slightest variation, a clinamen, can produce 
unexpected and unpredictable effects of a magnitude totally out of proportion 
to the cause. And secondly, how is it possible to know that a different set of 
micro-causes would lead to the same outcome without that same set of 
negotiations being repeated under controlled conditions? How often, socially, 
are identical negotiations performed? The only conceivable way such control 
or certainty of a social process could be achieved is where the procedures 
have not only been codified, but codified to the extent that for any given input 
only one output or response was possible – in other words: gross over-
codification. In fact such a situation is implied by DeLanda when he states 
that: 
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a large organization may be said to be the relevant actor in the 
explanation of an interorganizational process if a substitution of the 
people occupying specific roles in its authority structure leaves the 
organizational policies and its daily routines intact...[and]...if the 
emergent properties and capacities of the organization remain roughly 
the same after such a change, then it would be redundant to explain the 
interorganizational outcome by reference to specific managers, 
accountants and engineers. (2006b: 37) 
 
Putting it bluntly, ‘redundant causality’ is achieved by replacing specific 
human actors possessing specific, individual and unique skills with 
automatons trained only to enact the organisation’s codes! However desirable 
some managers in certain organisations may find such a possibility, for 
reasons already explained such a scenario is not possible, and even within 
Stalin’s USSR its attempt produced the inevitable social cancer.58 
 
3. Such an approach implies a concept not directly addressed by DeLanda, but 
which nevertheless requires exposing as a fallacy if I am able to manoeuvre 
my argument into a position whereby the full complexity and dynamics of 
social organisation is to be appreciated. This is the fallacy of ‘collective 
intentionality’ implied in the above quote through the consideration of a large 
organisation as a ‘relevant actor’ and to other references such as ‘national 
actors’. 
 
In making reference to ‘collective intentionality’ I intend neither an 
exploration nor an explanation of the issues surrounding the current debate 
on the subject, merely to, firstly, establish a link between this debate and this 
project, and, secondly, to underline the dangers of such thinking in 
addressing actual social issues and concerns (as opposed to sets of analytic 
propositions representing them). Deborah Tollefsen (2004), in her overview of 
the debate describes collective intentionality as the “idea that a collective 
could be the bearer of intentional states such as belief and intention” and 
points out that even if our reaction to such claims is to fall back on the 
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position that only individual brains / minds feature intentionality we are still 
left with the obvious ‘fact’ that “we do not always act alone and [that our] 
coordination with others...raises issues regarding the possibility of collective 
intentions”, and that, further, we “often attribute beliefs, desires, and other 
propositional attitudes to groups like corporation.” Trying to understand the 
apparently coordinated action of ‘individual’ social actors, and the resultant 
patterns of behaviour or social structures is at the core of this project – 
though the term ‘self-organised’ will be substituted for ‘coordinated’ as the 
latter implies a too greater degree of conscious and planned intent. Even if 
the inclination exists to dismiss ‘collective intentionality’ as a mere fiction, as 
a useful metaphor in everyday speech, the problems that need addressing still 
remain. For example, as Tollefsen points out, part of our system of justice 
involves the attribution of responsibility to organisations, since “we could not 
hold them legally and morally responsible for an action unless they intended 
to commit the act”, and further, that “our ascriptions of intentional states to 
groups have a surprising explanatory power”, a power that provides “prima 
facie evidence that our ascriptions are not simply false.” (Tollefsen, 2004) 
 
The problem with trying to explain these phenomena through the notion of 
‘collective intentionality’ is that such explanations inevitably gravitate towards 
unities – often, paradoxically, at the level of individual social actors. 
Summative accounts, for example, seem to analyse group attitudes in terms 
of aggregates of individual attitudes, such that a group is said to believe or 
intend x iff the majority of the group believes or intends x. Non-summative 
accounts, on the other hand, appear even more focused on the individual. 
Michael Bratman, for example, describes individual social actors sharing 
intentions and coordinated actions with other social actors, and Margaret 
Gilbert suggests that social groups are formed by individuals bonding or 
uniting in certain ways in order to produce a joint commitment to act in a 
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particular way or to participate in a particular project (cited in Tollefsen, 
2004). John Searle’s most recent book argues that human social reality 
results from the imposition of functions upon objects and people. “The 
performance of these functions”, he says, “requires that there be a 
collectively recognized status that the person or object has”, and that “there 
must be collective acceptance or recognition of the object or person as having 
that status.” In other words, these status function “depend on collective 
intentionality.” (Searle, 2010: 7-8, Searle’s emphasis) His belief “that society 
has a logical…structure that admits of, indeed requires, logical analysis” 
(2010: 7) and that it can be understood through the use of “one formal 
linguistic mechanism” (2010: 8) succumbs to the critique of abstraction, 
analysis and formalisation already presented. 
 
Such analytic responses to the problem avoid the obvious fallacy of collective 
or group minds, but at the expense of the reduction down to the level of 
individual social actors who, often with reason and logic, produce collectives 
that act ‘as if’ they were collective agents. Whilst such an approach fails to 
capture the complexity, dynamics and emergence of the social process, the 
greater dangers lie, in a sense, in those non-analytic philosophic and non-
philosophic (political) responses that seem to convert the above metaphors 
into social realities. The problems associated with group responsibility and the 
apparent explanatory power of group intentional states are not resolved 
through the above micro-reduction of explanations to individual social actions 
as such explanations fail to explain how such individual actions are influenced 
by collectives; but neither are they resolved through the macro-reduction to 
the level of the state or society as a whole (as DeLanda quite correctly 
argues) as they fail to explain the influence on the collective by individual 
social actors and we end up debating futile notions such as that of British 
values; and neither can they be reduced to any intermediate level, where we 
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end up trying to explain concrete social wholes acting without causal influence 
from entities of a different scale and debating equally futile and meaningless 
statements such as: ‘this government believes...’ or ‘The Sun says...’, or the 
various intentional states associated with bankers or Muslims. Each approach 
constructs a non-existent unity. To push the point: in order to get anywhere 
near a comprehension of the dynamic and complex social processes that give 
rise to the emergence of social phenomena there is a need to avoid any 
notion of unity; a need to find a way of thinking the multiple. 
 
In the end, then, neo-assemblage theory fails to actually explain both how 
collectives interact and how other less ‘clear’ social phenomena, phenomena 
that do not form concrete singular entities capable of interacting with each 
other, emerge. In his final chapter DeLanda describes the effects of certain 
historic territorialisation and deterritorialisation processes in cities and other 
urban spaces that resulted from social phenomena such as social status, 
social prestige and fashion. For example he explains how the introduction of 
‘internal transportation’ (lifts) into Paris apartment buildings reversed the 
“clear vertical stratification in which the social status of the inhabitants 
decreased with height” (2006b: 97); how the “impetus behind fashion was not 
just the desire to mark social-class territories through the way bodies and 
homes were dressed” but also expressed the desire for increased social 
mobility from rich merchants and artisans (2006b: 98); and how “a desire by 
residents to live in a relatively integrated neighbourhood” resulted in 
relatively homogenous racial, ethnic, class and language congregations 
(2006b: 101). What he makes no attempt to do is explain such phenomena as 
social prestige and fashion and how these territorialisations actually emerged 
and became organised. Such an attempt would have been a move in the right 
direction but could only have been achieved by recourse to the micro-
sociology that was thrown out with the bath water – a micro-sociology, 
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however, that is not micro-reductionism. To anticipate arguments that I 
present later, I suggest that the notion of straight-forward imitation is 
insufficient to explain such phenomena, and that a far more radical critique of 
‘the history of fashion’ would be required here. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
What then can be drawn from this brief survey of three contemporary 
approaches to thinking the social in terms of multiplicities? Well, firstly, that 
in order to truly think in such a manner it is necessary to constantly remind 
ourselves that this is what we are trying to do. It would appear that, despite 
the best of intentions, it is far too easy to create unities. It may be that such 
a tendency is quite natural, in as much that at a pragmatic, everyday level we 
have learnt, even been coded, to think in such a manner – and that for the 
vast majority of our evolution, for all but the relatively infinitesimal last few 
thousand years, such an approach has worked – we have survived. But as the 
problems we face evolve, so must our way of understanding them. In order to 
avoid the fallacy of collective intentionality, in order to understand the 
complexity and dynamics of the social process, we need to move on from 
such a way of thinking. I need, therefore, as I progress through this project, 
to keep questioning myself as to whether I am inadvertently creating unities; 
and if such a recourse seems necessary in order to hold onto some pre-
existing socio-political belief, I need to question that also. The challenge of 
trying to think the multiple is paramount. Secondly, of equal importance, and 
of an equal challenge, I need to ‘discover’ a non-abstract ‘term’ or ‘unit’ that 
emerges from the social noise / void and that is neither a unity itself, nor 
forms unities – even though what it does form can be ‘counted-as-one’ for 
pragmatic purposes. This challenge will be taken up in the next chapter and 
will be guided by a third factor also drawn from the above survey, namely the 
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need to avoid explanations that resort to abstractions, formalisations, and 
collective intentionality. This can be achieved by focusing on the local 
conditions. Or rather, it is because I need to focus on the local conditions that 
I need to avoid abstractions, formalisations and collective intentionality. There 
is a need to remain at the point of emergence, where these yet to be 
discovered ‘terms’ emerge from the noise. Such measures should prevent a 
construction of unities that take on a life of their own and their masking of the 
complexities of the processes we are trying to uncover. As was noted in 3.3, 
for both Cilliers and Serres, each ‘element’ only acts or responds locally, to 
the information that is available to it at the local level, and is ignorant of the 
behaviour of the system as a whole. There is a need, therefore, to be clear as 
to what, in social terms, these ‘elements’ are and the information, within their 
local milieu, that they respond to. All the thinkers examined in this chapter 
have, in their own way, failed to do this. Assuming that I can be successful in 
this task I will then be in a position to workout how such a ‘term’ becomes 
‘organised’ such that distinct patterns of sociality are identifiable – a task 
which will involve a process that uses, in some manner, the codifications / de-
codifications and territorialisations / de-territorialisations referred to by both 
Deleuze and Guattari and by DeLanda. 
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5 Non-units of social organisation 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The American sociologist, Dennis H. Wrong, who makes a contribution to my 
argument below (5.3), quotes the sociologist Jeffrey Alexander in stating that: 
The problem of order is the problem of how individual units, of whatever 
motivation, are arranged in nonrandom social patterns. Defined in such 
a generic manner, as the neutral problem of ‘arrangement’ or ‘pattern’, 
it is clear that every social theory must address the order question. 
(Wrong, 1995: 11) 
 
Now, accepting all that has been argued regarding the problem of ‘unities’ and 
‘units’, and my conclusion regarding the need to focus on ‘the local’, but 
nevertheless accepting the obvious truth of this statement (indeed, one that 
further supports the conclusion reached in the previous section), that for 
organisation or pattern to be perceived there needs to be something that is so 
ordered or organised into a pattern, there is now the need to discover (or 
create) some kind of non-unit of organisation; a term or a ‘count-as-one’ unit 
that, whilst itself being constantly and continuously open and multiple, 
nevertheless forms relationships with other terms such that some degree of 
recognisable organisation can be experienced. That is my task in this chapter. 
 
5.1 Foucault: power relations 
 
Michel Foucault’s description of power relations, particularly in the first 
volume of his The History of Sexuality, is the closest to a description of the 
process of social organisation (in terms of multiplicity and dynamics) that I 
have been able to uncover. Whilst this particular work, or even his study of 
power in general, does not lead me directly to that which I seek, it will take 
this research tantalisingly close, and closer still if it picks up on another 
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thread of his work – the complexity that forms the hinterland to discourse. I 
shall discuss this in section 5.3. 
 
It is difficult to give a definitive reading of power in Foucault’s work. This 
difficulty may arise out of an ambiguity regarding the focal points of power – 
social subjects.59 In attempting to work through the formation of the subject 
it is too easy to regard power relations as dominant structures. Contrary to 
how many people working in the social sciences have understood Foucault, in 
my reading of his work power does not refer to institutions and mechanisms 
that ensure subservience, it is not a mode of subjugation taking the form of 
the rule, it is not “a general system of domination”. Rather, in Foucault’s own 
words: 
power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization; as the process which, through 
ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or 
reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one 
another, this forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; 
and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general 
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, 
in the formation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (1998: 92-
3) 
 
There is so much in this passage that it requires a gradual unfolding. 
 
Power, in straightforward scientific terms, is the rate of supply of energy 
measured in watts. Now energy, the capacity of any system to do work, as 
the first law of thermodynamics states, can be neither created nor destroyed 
– it is ubiquitous and can only become structured such that it flows in a 
reasonably organised manner, and in transferring from one region to another 
does work; it affects, moves or brings about change in something. This 
transfer of energy, this ability to do work, is power, and it loses none of its 
meaning when transferred to the social milieu – in fact, if anything it adds 
another dimension, or layer of complexity, to the same process. Lord Kelvin 
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proclaimed in 1851 that energy is the primary principle, and, for the sake of 
my argument, and to avoid waters so deep that I would no doubt drown in 
any attempt at their navigation, I will accept this as uncontested, and offer 
the no doubt grossly over-simplified suggestion that energy (also leaving 
aside any questioning of an ontology of energy) is that from which everything 
in the universe has been built such that even when organised into a relatively 
stable hierarchy (with corresponding increases in complexity) of energy 
systems – particles, atoms, molecules, chemicals, organisms – it still acts on 
the systems generated and is responsible for their further increases in 
complexity. I will have more to say on this expansion of complexity and what 
Stuart Kauffman has suggested as a fourth law of thermodynamics in 6.2. My 
point is simply that we could quite easily read the formation and evolution of 
human social systems as the result of exactly the same process, the univocal 
process referred to by Deleuze, which has produced quite literally everything 
– the process is the same, the only thing having changed being the degree of 
complexity.60 Power, therefore, in social terms, is not a metaphor derived 
from the physical sciences to describe radically different relations in the social 
sciences – it is the same process, elevated, through emergence, to a much 
‘higher’ level of complexity. Power, as the organised flow of social energy, can 
only emerge from the bio-chemistry of individual social actors – and can only 
become socially organised under the influence of local conditions. 
 
Read in these terms, the above quote from Foucault describes the process of 
social self-organisation that I wish to argue for. No system, no describable 
organisation is either closed or a unity; all such apparent social units, all units 
that for the sake of routine communication and day-to-day behaviour we 
would wish to ‘count-as-one’, have to be understood as being comprised of a 
multiplicity of smaller and relatively less complex ‘count-as-ones’.61 These 
‘non-units’ must be held together by a multiplicity of force relations that 
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themselves are immanent to that ‘count-as-one’ which they give rise to; 
which are emergent from them. In other words, power, in social terms, is the 
emergent organisation of energy flowing through the social realm. To recall 
Goodwin’s description of fractal patterns, this organisation can be understood 
as “patterns that use minimal energy to achieve the most efficient flow 
through a system.” (2007: 43) In order to describe this in any greater detail, 
or with greater clarity, I will need to have given greater descriptions to other 
parts of the process, but suffice it to say (for the moment) that the relations 
that allow for the emergence of the ‘count-as-one’ have been organised within 
these terms as the result of energy flowing through paths of least resistance 
(as described in 3.3 and to be returned to in 6.1) making the ‘that’, the 
‘count-as-one’, which does emerge a self-organising entity. 
 
This emergent self-organisation means a number of things: Firstly that the 
internal relations so formed are very dynamic, a seething mass of “ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations” that are effectively responding to a constantly 
changing milieu that requires periodic re-organisation or adaptation;62 
secondly that the emergent ‘count-as-ones’ themselves find a relative stability 
by forming alliances with other ‘count-as-ones’, thus forming larger and more 
complex systems wherein these ‘higher order’ ‘count-as-ones’ in turn become 
subject to a process of self-organisation that allows for the emergence of even 
higher order ‘count-as-ones’; and lastly, that the state apparatus, the 
formation of laws and “various social hegemonies” are embodiments, or 
codifications, of these emergent and self-organising strategies. This last point 
is of vital importance. Such an analysis of power that Foucault is advocating 
“must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of law, or the 
over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather”, he argues, 
“these are only the terminal forms power takes” (1998: 92). The State, the 
system of laws, and our long-standing structures of social influence are not 
 112 
pre-existing sources of organisation that are external and transcendent to the 
systems or ‘count-as-ones’ which they influence; rather they themselves are 
the results of the same univocal process of self-organisation, and if they are 
pre-existing it is only in the sense that within such a dynamic process systems 
are constantly being formed within milieus where inevitably a whole range of 
systems and influences already exist, and whilst these emergent systems will 
in their turn influence the organisation of these larger systems of which they 
are a part, they will also, through various complex feedback loops, be 
influenced by them. 
 
What Foucault is describing, therefore, is a social state of affairs where power 
is permanently present, where it is omnipresent, repetitious, dynamic and 
very fluid, and where it forms “a grid of intelligibility of the social order”, but 
where power, in the more widely used and traditional sense of the word, is 
“the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities” (1998: 93). The 
dynamism of power relations can be dampened, their fluidity slowed down, 
such that the more dominant structures we more usually associate with power 
are produced. As Serres says: 
They produce unities, through them unity appears in the place and stead 
of multiplicities, they code. Code is nothing more than showing unities in 
the stead of multiplicitary noise. Thus are concepts born. (1995a: 86) 
 
This stabilisation of the flow may be necessary, in the sense that without it 
no-thing will appear (it is responsible for “the great wall of appearance” 
(1995a: 77)) but in losing sight of the disorder and the noise we give 
“obedience to the rule that creates [a] scaled structure of domination” 
(1995a: 96). This same warning was expressed by Foucault, which I shall 
return to later. 
 
This process, though, whilst describing a general system of power relations, 
still needs to be explored such that its complexity is opened up even further. 
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Unless this is done it will not be possible to understand the emergence of 
social forms. But to do this, two separate, but closely related concepts need 
to be created. Firstly, one that describes what these power relations actually 
are (though, what they virtually are will turn out to be a more accurate 
phrase), such that they create social acts and are able to become organised; 
and secondly, a detailed account of how this organisation comes about - a 
description of power relations such that they become non-units of 
organisation, and a description of their relations with other non-units such 
that social structures emerge; effectively the what and how of social 
organisation. I say ‘non-units’ simply to keep in mind the need to understand 
these whats as open and multiple. I also accept the need for a certain 
hermeneutics here, in so far as an understanding of the what will require an 
understanding of the how, and visa versa.  
 
Unfortunately Foucault fails to provide such an analysis, at least as regards 
power relations. In both the earlier and later sections of The Will To 
Knowledge than that referred to above he instead offers a description of 
various emergent organisations of power relations, or rather various 
emergent flows with varying degrees of codification, that are not only 
described in such a way that they get dangerously close to generalisations 
that overlook the multiplicity of relations he himself acknowledges as vital to 
their understanding, but do so in a manner that implies that these emergent 
forms have collective intentionality. Effectively what Foucault achieves is a 
reference to the micro / local relations from which structures emerge, but a 
reference that lacks detail, and a generalised account of some of the macro / 
global structures so produced. He fails to provide a link between them. What 
we actually need is a universal description that is local not global, one that is 
universally local but globally contingent – effectively a self-similarity of 
process that is always actualised differently. 
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Foucault recognises the problem; in fact it could be said that he is attempting 
to directly tackle the problem: “In short”, he says, “it is question of 
orientating ourselves to a conception of power which replaces...the privilege 
of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and mobile field of force 
relations...” (1998: 102). This is exactly what this thesis seeks, an 
understanding of the ‘multiple and mobile field of force relations’ from which 
all structure, including organised power flows, emerge. To this end he 
describes a series of sexual practices, regulating codes, and ‘mechanisms of 
repression’ that whilst being historically contingent nevertheless are dominant 
in a particular historical period. The question remains, though: what is the 
relationship between these various practices, codes, techniques, and 
mechanisms, and the actual social acts performed locally by actual social 
actors? If we accept his claim that all forms of sovereignty, law and 
domination are “only the terminal forms power takes”, where is it possible to 
locate these techniques? Techniques can only be performed by actual social 
actors, so if the ‘terminal form’ of their actions are these codes, how is it 
possible to describe or account for those actions actually performed? Whilst 
the codes in no way have total domination over social action, they obviously 
have a huge influence – but how is that influence applied? And if they are in 
some manner the product of “a multiple and mobile field of force relations”, a 
process whose ‘terminal form’ is sovereignty, law and domination, in what 
manner does this process work?63 Let me explain this problem in relation to 
two specific sections of text, the first concerning sexuality, and the second 
concerning torture from Discipline and Punish. 
 
At one point in The Will To Knowledge Foucault distinguishes “four great 
strategic unities which, beginning in the eighteenth century, formed specific 
mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex” (1998: 103). The first 
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of these is the “hysterization of women’s bodies”, a process that involved, 
amongst other things, the feminine body being analysed “as being thoroughly 
saturated with sexuality” (1998: 104). I do not doubt or question the 
existence of such a ‘mechanism’, nor that the extent of its influence was wide 
and powerful, but what I would like to problematise is its ontological status 
(particularly as some form of unity), and how it influences the social action of 
particular actors. Is the implication that all social actors were in some way 
forced to analyse women’s bodies in such a manner? I do not read Foucault as 
implying such a high degree of coercion – though a less that careful 
interpretation of ‘four great strategic unities’ could lead to such a reading. So 
there must have been a variety of ways of regarding women’s bodies, even if 
there was a degree of coercion to comply with the scientific status that was 
more subtle than implied by force. Even if such ‘mechanisms’ had been 
codified in some form, either through scientific texts that attached a perceived 
authority to them, or even (in an extreme situation) through certain rules or 
laws, there would still be some social actions that did not conform, that were 
influenced by other power flows. Without, for the moment at least, wishing to 
get involved in the psychological arena of the decision making processes of 
individual social actors,64 it would seem reasonable to assume that there 
existed, as Foucault suggests, multiple and mobile power relations that 
influenced how people thought and behaved regarding women’s bodies, that 
influenced what could be said about them, that provided the impetus to 
behave in one way rather than another, and that through some process not 
described by Foucault became channelled into flows of such force and 
significance that they could appear to be omnipotent. This takes us to the 
heart of this project: Of what are these flows constituted such that they can 
be channelled, organised and even codified? How does this channelling and 
organising come about? 
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The same questions can be asked of the other specific mechanisms that focus 
on sexuality: the “pedagogization of children’s sex”, the “socialization of 
procreative behavior” and the “psychiatrization of perverse pleasure”. Take for 
example the first of these. Foucault states that there was:  
a double assertion that practically all children indulge in sexual activity; 
and that, being unwarranted, at the same time ‘natural’ and ‘contrary to 
nature,’ this sexual activity posed physical and moral, individual and 
collective dangers; (1998: 104) 
 
So within this specific and ‘unified’ mechanism of power and knowledge we 
are immediately able to identify several contributory power-knowledge 
streams; mechanisms that are necessary conditions, that form a historical a 
priori,65 such that the implied knowledge and understanding contained within 
such a mechanism as the ‘pedagogization of children’s sex’ could be 
understood and enacted – for example: the nature of sexual activity, 
judgements as to the sanctioning of certain types of behaviour, the existence 
and desirability of natural behaviour, the nature of both physical and moral 
norms, the being of an individual and a collective, and the nature of 
pathological states. I would also suggest that each of these could be broken 
down even further to smaller and smaller streams, and that none of these 
streams would be exclusive to the larger and more powerful stream they flow 
into. In other words, what Foucault describes, with no doubt total validity, as 
various processes, mechanisms and techniques, are effectively various flows 
that have been sufficiently codified as to be able to be described in general 
and ubiquitous terms. As such they are doubtless ‘great strategies’ that at the 
descriptive level allow us to write ‘a history of the present’, but from the 
perspective of this project do not provide the detail needed to explain the 
relationship between the local, micro actions of individual social actors, and 
the larger scale global, macro ‘assemblies’ that are both formed by, and, in 
their turn, influence those actions. 
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Let me briefly offer two further examples, from Discipline and Punish, to 
illustrate my point. In the second chapter, in his discussion of torture, 
Foucault cites three principle criteria that transform punishment into torture, 
and certain rules “that had to be obeyed in establishing the truth” (Foucault, 
1991: 33). The three criteria were: that it must produce a certain amount of 
measurable pain; that it must, in some way, mark the victim; and that “public 
torture and execution must be spectacular” (1991: 34). Now, as above, I am 
not suggesting any inaccuracy on Foucault’s part, that these were not in some 
manner important or significant criteria in the performance of public torture; 
but I am arguing that such descriptions have a far greater efficacy as higher 
level descriptions, not as devices for understanding the multiplicity of power 
relations that cause particular social actors to perform particular social acts.66 
As Foucault says himself in regard to “the general forms of penal practice up 
to the Revolution” as regulated by the ordinance of 1670: “we must not be 
misled. There was a considerable gap between this arsenal of horrors and 
everyday penal practice” (1991: 32). So, even if these criteria were codified 
into a penal code (and Foucault does not suggest that they were), even if the 
executioner was not only fully aware of this penal code, but also had such a 
sense of duty that he always carried out his duties according to it (and that is 
a lot of ‘ifs’), these would not be the only power flows acting upon the 
executioner. We do not need to speculate as to what they might be, but it 
would not be unreasonable to assume that there were a multiplicity of such 
flows, a whole collective of motivations, acting upon, and in some measure 
causing, the actions of any particular act of execution – and that this 
multiplicity would, to some degree, be different at each act. Focusing on the 
three criteria cited by Foucault effectively blinds us to the dynamics and 
complexity of the situation - and likewise with the rules that existed for the 
establishment of the truth during an investigation, and the “nature and use of 
evidence”. Even accepting that “a rigorous model of penal truth” was defined 
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(1991: 36) it seems unrealistic in the extreme to think that the motivating 
factors, the power relations that brought about acts of interrogation, flowed 
only from these codified sources. I cannot believe that these were the only 
relations at work, and I doubt that the person had a solicitor present to 
ensure that the codes were being dutifully followed. 
 
With Serres’ challenge held in mind, there is a need to be mindful of the 
dangers of creating unities, of trying to think the multiple through unifying 
concepts and representations. In defence of Foucault, I see no evidence to 
suggest that this was his intention, but, as I’ve already said, there is a danger 
that a less than careful reading of his work could lead in this direction, and his 
writing style – perhaps the style used by most writers unless they are 
especially vigilant – could give support to such a reading. He does, for 
example, in the quote given above, say that “we can distinguish four great 
strategic unities”, and when he describes various discourses or collections of 
practices / techniques he often does so in such a manner as to at least imply 
a certain unity – he refers to the pedagogical institutions, for example (1998: 
29) and to the “whole internal organization” of “the secondary schools of the 
eighteenth century” (1998: 27). The danger, then, is really the same as that 
pointed out by Serres (and Deleuze) in relation to classification, that in 
offering a description of an open and dynamic collective, which we need to do 
in order to be able to discuss it or have any communication regarding it, the 
descriptive term solidifies into something more than a description, it become 
reified into something with direct causal power. I am not saying that there are 
no causal relations flowing from collectives, but I am saying that these causal 
relations are very complex, and that we lose sight of this complexity when the 
collective is understood as an overly stable entity. This can lead to the 
creation, or at least veer towards the creation of, collective intentionalities. 
This tendency to account for actions and events as the result of an intentional 
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relationship between a singular point of consciousness and its intentional 
correlate, even when the event comes about as the result of a multiplicity, 
from a collective act, may well be an instinctive tendency, deeply rooted in 
our evolutionary past as a convenient and simple method of communication - 
it certainly possesses a certain descriptive efficacy. But its adoption blinds us 
to the complexity of the process that lies behind it.67 It is though a tendency 
that even those trying to think in terms of multiplicities succumb to. And it is 
a tendency that Foucault is guilty of in places.68 To give just two examples: 
He states at one point that “from the eighteenth century onward, Western 
societies created and deployed a new apparatus...” (1998: 106). To view any 
society as an entity that not only created a social apparatus – as opposed to 
new practices emerging out of a certain social reorganisation – but had the 
ability to deploy them is dangerously misleading if one is keen to really 
understand the power relations being effected. At a very superficial level we 
could refer to an army deploying its troops, but to really understand what a 
certain deployment entailed we would need to examine the general or group 
of senior officers who made the decisions, the power flows and influences that 
they received and the process whereby they produced a coherent outflow. At 
another point he states that “pleas for help” emanated from the family, and 
that “the family engaged in searching out the slightest traces of sexuality in 
its midst” (1998: 111). Without wishing to labour the point, pleas for help 
emanate from individual social actors – not in isolation and often as part of a 
collective admittedly – each with their own different collective of power flows 
acting on the singularity that is their ‘self’. To lose sight of this and to view 
any family as a unity, let alone to view a whole social collective of families 
speaking with a single intentionality, means that we lose sight of the 
complexity of power flows and relations that give rise to such collective 
descriptions. It also steers us into that dark social alley where social bodies 
have “functions”, where the “deployment of sexuality has its reason for 
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being”, and where families have “roles” within a social collective (1998: 107-
8). 
  
Despite the value, therefore, of Foucault’s various genealogies at a certain 
descriptive and generalised level, there is a need to avoid the seductive call of 
the sirens and, following the mantra of ‘thinking the multiple’, focus instead 
on the mobile, reversible, and unstable” nature of power relations (2000: 
292). To this end, the possibility of there being some type of small, local 
power relation, ‘something’ that acts in the manner of some type of social 
bond or cord, and enables social action, is worth investigating further. 
However, focusing on the many techniques, practices or mechanism so 
described only has a value if we fully understand how they emerged, and see 
them as a result of a multiplicity of power flows that have been channelled 
into larger, more organised flows that have undergone various degrees of 
codification. Foucault was fully aware of this:  
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one 
sometimes encounters what one may call situations or states in which 
the power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various 
participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. 
When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power 
relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of 
movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with 
what may be called a state of domination. (2000: 283) 
 
There is a need to think of these power relations in their most fluid and 
dynamic form; to consider them as micro-power relations and disregard them 
as strategic or as macro mechanisms. These relations not only act on the 
social subject, but help form the social subject, and are only possible, for 
Foucault, “insofar as the subjects are free” (2000: 292). These relations are 
socially ubiquitous, they could well be the first social structures to emerge 
from the social noise, and it is they that direct social energy such that it flows 
into self-organising, emergent forms. It is only when these flows become first 
codified, and then over-codified that the dynamism is slowed, by degrees, to 
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the extent that individual social freedoms are lost and various states of 
dominations appear; then “power relations are fixed in such a way that they 
are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of 
freedom” (2000: 292). These dominations, to varying degrees, are what 
Foucault describes in his genealogies, and tend to be what most people 
working in the social sciences gravitate towards when discussing power in his 
work. What I want to focus on are the micro-power relations that become 
organised in such a way that these dominations are able to emerge. 
 
But what are micro-power relations? Is it possible to observe them? Record 
them? Provide evidence of their existence? Or, to put the question another 
way: what do these relations relate; what do they provide a bond or 
connections between? After all many (if not all) of the dominations described 
by Foucault, the various techniques and practices that have controlled peoples 
behaviour, can either be observed directly, or documentary evidence 
discovered, that supports their description. It is here that this project comes 
up against one of its greatest obstacles. It is possible to observe and 
document people’s behaviour. It is possible to provide evidence of various 
practices that have been codified into rules, regulations and laws. But I’m 
suggesting that these behaviours and codes are just the emergent forms of 
something more elusive, more dynamic, which resists observation – in fact, 
are resistant to this entire project. All I can hope to do is to offer some kind of 
map that acts as a guide to the social landscape, and a map whose accuracy 
can only be judged by its success as a guide, not by how closely the symbols 
it uses resemble the actual physical features they represent.69 To this end I 
need to offer a description of these relations in far greater detail than 
attempted by Foucault. Following Serres, I need to be able to offer a 
description of that first ‘form’ to emerge from the noise, that non-unit of 
social organisation that forms both the basis for micro-power relations and 
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that upon which they act. Foucault has opened the door with his genealogies, 
and, as I will argue later (5.3) offers substantially more assistance through 
his archaeologies. 
 
5.2  Tarde: beliefs, desires and memes 
 
Gabriel Tarde is relevant to this research in a number of ways. He was very 
influential to the work of Deleuze, prompting the latter to remark that all of 
“Tarde’s philosophy...is founded upon the two categories of difference and 
repetition” (Deleuze, 1994: 307) and that his philosophy was “one of the last 
great philosophies of nature” (1994: 313). Also, his work has been recently 
revived, particularly by social scientists working in the field of memetics, 
prompting Paul Marsden to refer to him has the forefather of this area of 
study – but more of that later. More specifically, his work is relevant in three 
ways. 
 
Firstly, he advocates for a certain univocity of process based upon universal 
repetition; he suggests a certain self-similarity of process across the whole of 
nature. The “subject of social science is seen”, he says, “to present a 
remarkable analogy to the other domains of general science” (1903: 4), and 
this self-similarity is based upon the two categories of difference and 
repetition: “All repetition, social, vital, or physical...springs from some 
innovation” – difference (1903: 7). He divides nature into the three great 
domains of the physical, the vital, and the social, and claims that organisation 
in each emerges from the same interplay of repetition and difference, but that 
in each domain the mode of repetition is different – being vibratory, 
hereditary, and imitative respectively. Although a detailed examination of this 
claim would be too great a side-track at the moment, it is worth noting both 
the similarities to those self-similarities being discussed by scientists as noted 
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earlier (3.1) and the importance of both difference and repetition that will be 
picked up again later (6.1). Secondly, he advocates that imitation is the 
method of repetition and organisation in the social world. I will examine this 
claim in detail in section 6.2, and will argue that the concept (to some degree) 
possibly provides the key to explaining social self-organisation, but not in the 
way Tarde suggested. For now, though, the question that I need to focus on 
is: what is it that is being imitated, repeated, or replicated? Imitation, or any 
other method, concerns the how of organisation, but we are still searching for 
the what. This brings me to his third relevance, and the one that I need to 
focus on now: beliefs and desires, Tarde’s ‘units’ of organisation. Could these 
be the key to understanding micro power relations? Could these form the 
bonds and cords of social action? 
 
According to Tarde, “in the last analysis all social facts are beliefs or desires 
under the different names of dogmas, sentiment, laws, wants, customs, 
morals, etc” (1903: 24), and these social facts (which include wants and ideas 
generally) interact with each other to form societies. On the surface, then, 
they appear to be some type of simple social ‘building block’ that interact or 
become organised such that social structures are formed. Superficially, the 
building process is as equally simple: If they neither “confirm nor contradict” 
each other they do not interfere with each other, but “If they do appear to 
help or confirm each other”, he argues, “they combine”, whilst if they “are 
mutually hurtful and antagonistic” there is some type of evolutionary survival 
of the fittest such that “the less cherished belief or passion is sacrificed” 
(1903: 25). This interaction between these so called social facts seems to 
return this thesis to the same problem it keeps coming up against – the 
creation of some type of social unity (a necessary outcome when the 
complexity of the process, to be explored in the next section, is masked). 
What sense could be made of a belief that is capable of either combining with 
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another belief, or being sacrificed in its favour, unless it was some type of 
unity capable of being isolated as a social fact? But perhaps this is all too 
abstract and I need something more tangible to work with. Tarde provides the 
examples (today we may prefer to say the stereotypes) of “the patriotism of 
[the] Greek or Roman...the fanaticism of the Arab, the proselytism of the 
Christian, and the propagandism of Jacobin and revolutionary doctrines”. 
These forces, he argues: 
…always arise from one person, from a single centre, long in advance, to 
be sure, of the moment when they break forth and take on historical 
importance. An enthusiast, eaten up with an important desire for 
conquest, or immortality, or human regeneration, chances upon some 
idea which opens an unhoped-for door to his aspirations...He embraces 
the idea, it exalts him, and behold, a new apostle! In this way a political 
or religious contagion is spread abroad. In this was a whole people may 
be converted to Christianity, to Islam, and to-morrow, perhaps to 
socialism. (1903: 29-30) 
 
We have then, according to Tarde, an isolatable idea, that somehow is formed 
in a single person, and because of its superiority in some fashion is adopted 
by other single individuals as a replacement for a similar but inferior idea, and 
in a similar manner to a virus or bacterium is passed from person to person 
until a whole body of people have become infected with the idea. We have, in 
his own words, “specific desires” and “specific beliefs” that issue from “distinct 
centres” (1903: 109). Now, admittedly, he does acknowledge that social facts 
form composites and complex combinations, but he also argues that these 
composites are themselves imitated. The main problem is that there exists, 
according to Tarde, something clear and distinct, some type of unity, which is 
passed from person to person by imitation. What sense can we make of this 
‘something’? What is its ontological status? Here even Tarde himself seems to 
acknowledge a problem. He asks: “Do we know anything more about the 
essence of the suggestion which passes from one person to another and 
which constitutes social life?” His answer is that “We do not” (1903: 76). 
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There are two other problems associated with Tarde’s approach that I would 
like to comment on (an almost Hegelian teleology and an approach to the use 
of statistics that gives priority to the generalisations produced by them), but 
first I would like to delve a little deeper into the above problem by way of a 
slight, but very valuable, diversion. In 1956, the English philosopher 
W.B.Gallie gave a paper to the Aristotelian Society entitled ‘Essentially 
Contested Concepts’.70 In this paper he argues that there are “an important 
group of concepts”, those that “relate to a number of organized or semi-
organized human activities” (for example concerning democracy or the 
Christian tradition), for which “there is no one clearly definable general 
use...which can be set up as the correct or standard use” (1956: 168). He 
adds that any dispute centred on these concepts is, therefore, perfectly 
genuine and “not resolvable by argument of any kind”, and moreover, that 
their use “inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the 
part of their users” (1956: 169). None of this sounds particularly radical in 
itself, though it does point towards a problem concerning the imitation of 
certain beliefs and ideas, the usage of which cannot be agreed. What is more 
interesting, though, is the list of characteristics or conditions that these 
concepts possess: 
1. Their “use must be appraisive in the sense that it signifies or accredits 
some kind of valued achievement.” 
2. This “achievement must be of an internally complex character” the 
worth of which contributes to it as a whole. 
3. “Any explanation of its worth must...include reference to the respective 
contributions of its various parts or features”, where rival descriptions 
of its total worth refer to a differing selection or priority of its parts. 
4. Any achievement must be capable of being modified in the light of 
changing circumstance that could not have been prescribed or 
predicted in advance – it is “‘open’ in character.” 
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5. Users of rival descriptions recognise that its use is contested by other 
users, and may use the concept “both aggressively and defensively”.71 
(Gallie, 1956: 171-2) 
In other words, for Gallie, certain significant concepts that are used to 
organise human activity are not unities (even if in use we treat them as 
wholes) but are multiplicities of an internally complex nature whose usage is 
actually determined by differing and rival selections and organisations of their 
internal features; they are open, dynamic systems that result in the ascription 
of values to human activity. 
 
Let me illustrate my interpretation of Essentially Contested Concepts (ECC) by 
way of an example of my own – ‘citizenship’: 
1. The notion of citizenship, what it means to be a contributing member 
to the city, state or community, is without doubt ‘appraisive’; it is 
steeped in values and value judgements, whether these refer to the 
behaviour or participation of good citizens (such that citizenship is 
taught in schools) or in some way acknowledge being accepted into a 
different community or state or as a ‘right of passage’. 
2. Any notion of citizenship (or for that matter any other than the most 
simple concept), if examined and reflected upon, is shown to be 
composed of number of other, possibly (though not necessarily) less 
complex, concepts. For example, in the case under examination, 
concepts related to the good, to belonging, to nationalism, to law, 
order and justice, to political participation, to the family, to social 
status – I could make the list just about as long as I wanted. And each 
of these composites is in turn internally complex. 
3. Any actual attribution of worth or ascription of value given by the 
usage of this concept will refer to differing internal groupings or 
organisations of these constituent concepts. So one community may, 
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as a generalisation, prioritise notions related to nationalism and law 
and order, whilst another may prioritise social status, the family, and 
making an economic contribution. But even here it would not be 
unrealistic to assume, to varying degrees (the degree itself dependent 
on the acceptance of varying understandings of what it means to be a 
good citizen – a feedback loop), that smaller groups within the 
community, perhaps different families or even individuals, have 
differing notions of citizenship deriving from differing sets of priorities 
concerning the composite concepts and their relationship with each 
other. 
4. The notion of citizenship is very obviously open to the influences of 
changing circumstances. Not only was the notion of citizenship 
different in ancient Athens and Sparta, but it adapted through the rise 
and fall of Rome, through the Middle Ages and into more modern 
capitalist nation states – though even here it varies from state to 
state, from community to community, and in response to changing 
political environments. Some social scientists are now referring to the 
notion of ecological citizenship as a way of redefining our relationship 
to our planet in light of what we now know about the results of our 
activities upon it.72 
5. Examples of rival and contested use of differing notions of citizenship, 
often involving aggressive support and defence, are not difficult to find 
– whether they be between supporters of a global, multicultural view 
of citizenship, and those who adopt a more nationalistic and exclusive 
understanding, or whether they be between two groups who base their 
notions of citizenship on two rival and mutually exclusive religions. 
I wish to suggest that Gallie’s notion of ECCs has a far wider and more 
fundamental application to the social than he suggests. It is my suggestion, 
which I hope to be able to substantiate as I proceed, that any concept, idea, 
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or belief held by any person that in anyway at all contributes to the 
organisation of human activities is by its nature an ECC; that due to the 
above features it is impossible to grasp hold of any example and view it as 
any type of unity, and that therefore any explanation of social organisation 
that involves their usage must take into account this complexity and cannot 
rely on simple notions of ‘social facts’ emerging ready formed and then 
passing from person to person.73 
 
As I have already implied, and as I shall explain in a little more detail below, 
Tarde’s approach to the problem of social organisation has been closely 
associated with what has been termed memetics. This is the idea that social 
organisation is somewhat analogous to biological organisation in as far that it 
is based on a ‘unit’ of social replication, the meme, that is analogous to the 
unit of biological replication, the gene. This idea emerged out of a certain neo-
Darwinism, and therefore has strong associations with evolutionary theory. I 
do not want to dismiss this link, in fact, in many ways I hope to strengthen it, 
but I do want to add a note of caution. Tarde fully embraces an evolutionary 
approach, but appears to read into it a wholly unjustified teleology. At the 
centre of this is the claim that “as a society advances it becomes richer in 
beliefs than in desires”, and that, therefore, belief is the “true and final object 
of desire” (1903: 147); that societies ‘advance’ through not just the 
conversion of desires into beliefs, but into a set of unanimous beliefs: 
Social peace, a unanimous belief in the same ideal or in the same 
illusion, a unanimity which presupposes a continually widening and 
deepening assimilation of humanity – this is the goal for which, 
irrespective of our wishes, all social revolutions are bound. This is 
progress, that is to say, social advancement along logical lines. (1903: 
148, my emphasis) 
 
A few pages later he identifies “teleological as logical” (1903: 154, note 1) 
and proceeds to develop an almost Hegelian dialectics by comparing “the 
logical struggle to a dual”, to “a conflict between opposites” (1903: 155); a 
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process in which “the resulting harmony creates a new kind of 
antagonism...until the final solution is reached” (1903: 185). The need to 
strongly resist any notion of ‘a final solution’ is not because of the obvious 
connotations of which Tarde (of course) would have been totally unaware, but 
because the whole concept of an end to the social process, to a goal that 
human societies are working towards, whether we are aware of it or not, is 
alien both to any notion of evolution as a process of differential selection 
within, and adaptation to, a constantly changing open and dynamic 
environment, and to its links (which I would like to emphasise) to the 
dynamics of complex systems. Admittedly Tarde does not base these claims 
on any notion of a predestined or transcendent purpose or meaning, but, 
rather, on what he sees as solid scientific reasons. These are “the Spencerian 
formula of Evolution which states that all evolution is gain in matter with 
corresponding loss in motion” which he translates as meaning “that every 
development in life or society is a growth in organisation offset or, rather, 
secured by a relative diminution in function”, and, more particularly that “As a 
society enlarges and expands, as it perfects and differentiates its institutions, 
its language, religion, law, government, industry, and art, it loses its civilising 
and propelling vigour” (1903: 147). The key here is the notion of perfection – 
a notion which, in terms of open, dynamic systems surviving within equally 
open and dynamic milieus is close to being meaningless. Perfection implies a 
telos, a goal for the system that has, in some manner, to exist a priori. This 
would be opposed to all the features of complex systems already discussed. 
 
So whilst, on the one hand, Tarde’s ideas have been adopted by some social 
scientists working generally with a ‘mobilities’ framework, one that seeks an 
understanding of social organisation through the use of concepts such as 
flows and fluidity, they could also be adopted by structuralists in the field of 
social theory working from a dialectic or conflict perspective – I could certainly 
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see the above being incorporated into a Marxist perspective. His ideas also, 
unfortunately, lend themselves to being adopted by other structuralist 
perspectives, particularly those whose methodologies are dependent upon 
statistics.74 Tarde regards what he calls the ‘science of statistics’ as “pre-
eminently the sociological method” (1903: 105). Whilst archaeology studies 
and classifies historical desires and beliefs in their invention, statistics counts 
and measures contemporary desires and beliefs in their imitation; it “is an 
enumeration of acts which are as much alike as possible” (1903: 102); from 
them is derived “a sort of empirical law or graphical formula for the very 
complex causes of the particular spread of every kind of imitation” (1903: 
140). Now leaving aside any judgement as to the value of the concept of 
imitation for the time being, it can be seen that Tarde is fully aware of the 
“very complex causes” of, shall we say, social phenomena. The problem is of 
course that he then argues that we classify and generalise these phenomena, 
and then study the resultant generalisations in such a way that we produce 
laws that not only explain their emergence, but which actually “govern all 
imitations” (1903: 140). He not only unifies this complexity (if fact going so 
far as to say that the whole social process is working towards unification) but 
then reverses the emergent non-linear causality into a top down simple 
causality. Not only, then, does his ‘unit’ of social replication turn out to be too 
complex, too mobile and fluid, too ‘essentially contested’ to be an object of 
study, but his whole methodology turns out to be an attempt to codify, 
solidify and simplify the social process. In other words, under the guise of the 
science of statistics, he does exactly what Serres is so cautious of – he 
abstracts from the given. His resulting analysis produces an alternative reality 
far removed from that given to our senses / experience. We end up with 
something so abstract that it has very little relation to actual social dynamics, 
and is about as far removed from micro power relations as it is possible to be. 
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As I noted above, Tarde has been closely associated with a new area of social 
research – memetics – such that Marsden has awarded Tarde the title of 
‘forefather’ of the research domain. “One way to conceptualise memetics”, 
Marsden explains, “is as a stance that seeks, using a selectionist rationale, to 
interpret the human social world in terms of the ongoing differential 
reproduction of traits describing that social world” (Marsden, 2000: 2; Tarde, 
1903: 74). In stressing the centrality of imitation to the social world, he 
emphasises Tarde in stating: “What is society? I have answered: Society is 
imitation” (Marsden, 2000: 2; Tarde, 1903: 74), a view endorsed by the 
thesis of psychologist Susan Blackmore’s book, The Meme Machine. In it she 
states “that what makes us different [from other animals] is our ability to 
imitate” (1999: 3).75 Blackmore goes on to add: 
When you imitate someone else, something is passed on. This 
‘something’ can then be passed on again, and again, and so take on a 
life of its own. We might call this thing an idea, an instruction, a 
behaviour, a piece of information...(1999: 4) 
 
This ‘something’, following Richard Dawkins, she terms a meme. The crucial 
assumption here is that when you imitate ‘something’ is passed on. Does 
imitation necessarily involve ‘something’ being passed from person to person? 
Although it is very difficult to separate an item of imitation from the act of 
imitation, as each informs the other in many intrinsic ways, for the sake of 
clarity that is what I need to do. Here I want to take a closer look at what this 
group of researchers term a meme, and later, in 6.2, I will take a closer look 
at the role of imitation. In certain respects I may need to anticipate, even 
take for granted, what I will examine in more detail then, but that cannot be 
avoided. For now, though, the above claim needs my attention. The key 
question is: If imitation is the method of social reproduction, is something 
actually passed from person to person? And if it is, what? 
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Dawkins first speculated on the similarities between biological and cultural 
evolution in his notorious The Selfish Gene. The key component to any 
process of natural selection, he argued was a replicator. As he summarises in 
the Foreword to Blackmore’s book: 
The real unit of natural selection was any kind of replicator, any unit of 
which copies are made, with occasional errors, and with some influence 
or power over their own probability of replication. (1999: xvi) 
 
With regards to biological replication, it is clear what is replicated and how; 
genes are actual bio-chemical entities that are physically replicated and 
passed from person to person; we can study them.76 However, memes are 
not genes, and, as Blackmore warns, we should not fall into the trap of 
thinking that they work in the same way. There is a similarity of process, of 
differential selection, of replication, no more. Following the American 
psychologist Donald Campbell, Blackmore states that “We need to remember 
Campbell’s Rule when we compare memes and genes”: 
Genes are instructions for making proteins, stored in the cells of the 
body and passed on in reproduction. Their competition drives the 
evolution of the biological world. Memes are instructions for carrying out 
behaviour, stored in brains (or other objects) and passed on by 
imitation. Their competition drives the evolution of the mind. Both genes 
and memes are replicators and must obey the general principles of 
evolutionary theory and in that sense they are the same. (1999: 17) 
 
Memes, then, according to this view, are “instructions embedded in human 
brains, or in artefacts such as books, pictures, bridges or steam trains” (1999: 
17), they are instructions for carrying out behaviour, and are passed on 
through their replication / imitation. Accepting, for the time being, that they 
are in fact some type of ‘instruction’ for social behaviour, in what sense is this 
‘instruction’ passed from person to person? This may be possible if either this 
‘instruction’ was very simple (i.e. not complex) or if it was directly coded, but 
for any ‘instruction’ more complex than this I fail to see how sufficient 
information of a high fidelity could be transmitted through imitation such that 
the corresponding behaviour would result. We only directly experience other 
people’s behaviour (in the widest sense), and if we simply imitated this 
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behaviour, and all we needed to do to understand society was to focus on 
people’s behaviour, then behaviourism would be vindicated, society could be 
studied purely on the surface, and all the complexity, fluidity and dynamism 
that I have suggested is so fundamental could be forgotten. If anything more 
than directly imitating another person’s social act (and in that I include 
speech acts, production of written artefacts etc) as experienced is involved, 
then there is a need to probe beneath the surface. 
 
Dawkins gives the following as examples of memes: “tunes, ideas, catch-
phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or building arches” (1989: 
192). There is such a difference in the degree of complexity between the 
imitation of a tune and an idea that it is misleading to discuss them as similar. 
The imitation of a tune or a catch phrase could quite easily be described by 
the above process of ‘instructions embedded in human brains’. Repeatedly 
listening to a tune or catch-phrase makes it (often annoyingly and against our 
will) easy to recall in our imagination, and as Blackmore points out, due to the 
high connectivity of the brain, “imagining conversations activates speech 
areas, and so on” (1999: 39). But even a relatively simple idea is surely 
something much more complex. I hear someone say something about a 
political event, perhaps a debate that is taking place in Parliament. I could 
quite easily imitate their words, just like an actor repeating lines from a script 
– but in what sense has an idea been passed to me in this act of imitation. 
Even the most simple ideas are complex, are multiplicities, and some are in 
effect multiplicities of multiplicities (Dawkins and Blackmore refer to them as 
memeplexes), and as such have all the feature of essentially contested 
concepts described above. They are not unities capable of being passed from 
person to person by imitation, and even if they were sufficiently self-
contained and limited they are surely too internally complex to have the 
information they contain so replicated. I will argue later that imitation does 
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have a role to play, but not by direct replication; that repetition is not 
primarily extensive, between people, but intensive, within people, but also 
that the extensive differences between these intensive series play a vital role. 
 
Accepting, then, that ‘instructions’ do, in some manner pass from person to 
person (and this still needs to be verified) and that imitation is, in some 
manner involved (and again, such a claim still needs to be verified), the 
problems that still exist are those concerning scale and unity. Any ‘instruction’ 
needs to be much smaller and simpler than implied by any of the ECCs usually 
referred to (in fact, it needs to be some type of micro power relation), and 
such an ‘instruction’ needs to be something that only works in open 
complexes; such an ‘instruction’ needs to be very straight forward, yet able to 
work (perhaps can only work) in multiplicities that resist unification. 
 
5.3  Foucault: statements and expectations 
 
And so to a possible solution to this problem (at least regarding the non-unit 
or micro power relations sought in this chapter): Dennis H. Wrong states, 
quite simply, that “order consists of the predictability of human conduct on 
the basis of common and stable expectations” (1995: 5). In a similar manner 
to that in which Foucault, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, separates actual 
sentences and propositions (social acts of discourse) from the statement, the 
unit of order that lies behind them, I will argue that Wrong’s use of 
‘expectation’ works as a non-unit of order that lies behind actual social events 
– events taken in their widest sense, including any social act capable of being 
experienced. Wrong’s suggestion of the ‘expectation’ as the ‘unit’ of social 
organisation is the main strength of his analysis, and in focusing on this 
aspect of his argument I will ignore his careering into a blind alley though his 
focus on the problem of motivation and his seeking a solution within the work 
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of Freud – this just need not concern this project. Using language that could 
quite easily be taken for that of Serres, Wrong regards society as “a process 
or a fluctuating set of events unevenly distributed in space and time”, as 
“nothing but a web of social relations that is constantly being spun, broken, 
and spun again, invariably (unlike a spider’s web) in slightly different form” 
(1995: 44-5). Such a description of the web of social relations and his 
description of the fragility of the social order, of its “insubstantial, evanescent, 
here-one-moment-gone-the-next attributes” (1995: 44-5) fully supports my 
attempt to avoid concepts of unities that try to disguise these qualities and 
replace them with something more solid. However, no matter how fluid this 
web is, it still has to be spun out of something, and for Wrong “Society is both 
the web that is spun and the expectations out of which it is spun” (1995: 44-
5).77 I will term expectations ‘non-units’ not because they cannot be 
individualised and talked of as a very simple unit or atom of social order, but 
because in their emergence they only have a virtual existence – because they 
can only become actualised, can only produce actual social action, by working 
in self-organised open multiplicities of expectations. 
 
Recalling Albertsen and Diken’s call for the reconstruction of the social “in 
terms of...concepts such as differentiation, heterogeneity and ambivalence”, 
and at the same time seeing the social very much through the lens of Serres’ 
general methodology, and in the terms Wrong outlines in the above 
comments, leads to a very similar problem as that posed by Foucault in his 
search for the unities of discourse. In the same way that Albertsen and Diken 
are critical of traditional social theorists in their search for unity, purity and 
order, Foucault is critical of traditional historians in general, and historians of 
ideas in particular, in their quest to “reveal the stable, almost indestructible 
system of checks and balances” (1989: 3), a phrase that sounds that it has 
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been lifted directly out of a ‘traditional’ social theory text book. In a passage 
worth quoting in full, Foucault argues that: 
The old questions of the traditional analysis (What link should be made 
between disparate events? How can a causal succession be established 
between them? What continuity or overall significance do they possess? 
Is it possible to define a totality, or must one be content with 
reconstructing connexions?) are now being replaced by questions of 
another type: which strata should be isolated from others? What types 
of series should be established? What criteria of periodization should be 
adopted for each of them? What system of relations (hierarchy, 
dominance, stratification, univocal determination, circular causality) may 
be established between them? What series of series may be established? 
And in what large-scale chronological table may distinct series of events 
be determined? (1989: 4) 
 
In other words, he is arguing for a move away from a traditional 
conceptualisation of unity and order, one that sought ‘vast unities’ (in history 
‘periods’ or centuries’) and that prioritised continuity, stability and stasis, to 
one that uses concepts like “discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series and 
transformation” (1989: 23). This, he goes on to argue, means that discourse 
(and for my purpose I suggest that this can also be read as ‘social discourse’ 
– as non-verbal behaviour and social acts, as well as those conveyed by 
language, that nevertheless communicate social ‘meaning’)78 “must not be 
referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it 
occurs” (1989: 28). We are no longer tied to interpreting events (historical, 
discursive, social – it does not matter what the events are) by reference to 
large scale structures, transcendent reference points, or distant points of 
origin (this emphasis on the local will emerge as very significant), all of which 
are discovered to be inherently problematic, but are free to open up the event 
in all its local significance and to discover its complexity. This does not mean, 
by the way, that we throw away global structures, but it does mean, as I shall 
argue later, that they are radically reconceptualised. Foucault’s project then is 
that “of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search 
for the unities that form within it” (1989: 29-30). The unities that he seeks 
are to be found not by the discovery of grand, totalising structures, but by 
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exploring the complexities of events, by going inside or underneath them, by 
investigating their multiple layers of formation, and by tracing particular or 
similar series through and across events. These unities are not definitive and 
stable unities (statues), but descriptive, ‘count-as-one’ unities – unities that 
allow us to communicate, to exchange meaning and understanding, such that 
we can live our existence; they need to allow a process of adaptation and 
normativity, and not be considered the definitive and the normal.79 This 
perspective can equally apply to my endeavour to understand social order 
such that social events can be described using the same general methodology 
as discursive events. To do this I need to layout (in general terms) the 
methodology that Foucault developed. 
 
In contrast to linguistic analysis, with its focus on the sentence and the 
proposition, the description of discursive events focuses instead on what 
Foucault terms a statement, a term that Foucault himself struggles to define 
(despite a whole chapter titled to just this task). This is not due to his lack of 
ability but due to the ‘fuzziness’ of any ‘meaning’ that can be attached to it. In 
a way, I suppose, it is a similar problem to defining the function of a word in a 
sentence in isolation of its actual use – it is actually defined by the function it 
fulfils. In describing a statement as an ‘atom of discourse’ he is at pains to 
point out that it is neither a structure nor a unit (though this need not be a 
problem for this thesis), but rather ‘a function of existence’ that only has 
meaning in the relationships it holds together, that defines the relation 
between two (or more) discursive variables. Statements are fewer in number 
than either sentences or propositions, and may be expressed in any number 
of ways through them, but “a statement is always an event that neither 
language (langue) nor meaning can quite exhaust” (1989: 31). Bearing in 
mind my own particular task, Foucault gives four particular attributes to 
statements: 1. They have no correlate – their referential forms a field of 
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emergence that makes correlation possible; 2. They have no author, there is 
no subject as such – rather they allow the position of the subject to be 
assigned; 3. They belong to an enunciative field – a complex contextual web 
in which they play a role; and 4. They have a repeatable materiality – they 
are neither a unique event nor relate to an ideal form. In relation to the 3rd 
point, it is worth noting that Foucault describes in great detail a multiplicity of 
variables, any number of which can come into a relationship to produce a 
statement or series of statements, and notes that “behind the visible facade 
of the system, one posits the rich uncertainty of disorder...an immense 
density of systematicities, a tight group of multiple relations” (1989: 84-5). 
 
Foucault’s methodology then is the description of the relationships between a 
particular grouping of statements, a ‘system of dispersion’ that produces a 
‘discursive formation’. But “can we really speak of unities?” he asks (1989: 
80), and if we can in relation to discourse – discourse being “a group of 
statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (1989: 
131) – does this help in my quest to understand social organisation though 
the discovery of its ‘units’, its building blocks? He answers his own question in 
the affirmative, but stresses that any notion of unity cannot be taken in any 
traditional sense of the word. “These systems of formation” he says “must not 
be taken as blocks of immobility, static forms that are imposed on discourse 
from the outside, and that define once and for all its characteristics and 
possibilities.” Neither are the origin of constraints “to be found in the thoughts 
of men”, rather, they “reside in discourse itself” as “a complex group of 
relations that function as a rule” and which produce emergent “regularity of 
practice” (1989: 82). Such unities are not fixed and are not definitive, rather 
“one is [always] able to describe other unities” (1989: 32) – a unity simply 
becomes the particular path followed. Foucault does not actually use the word 
‘emergent’, but using the language of complexity theory this is what he surely 
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means. His description of these complex groups of relationships carries much 
similarity to those used by complexity theorists in their description of self-
organizing dynamic systems whose higher order properties are emergent from 
the system itself. And it is this similarity, possibly even this identity of process 
that allows for its transference (and translation) to social ‘unities’. The great 
value of this aspect of Foucault’s work, therefore, is that he has attempted 
the description of a human process that displays many of the features of non-
human complex systems, perhaps even displaying a high level of self-
similarity, and in doing so he has made that first important step towards a 
translation of these features, via discourse, into a social ontology. Behind 
social events lie ‘social statements’, effectively what Wrong describes as 
‘expectations’, which, through a complex series of relationships with other 
social statements / expectations produce emergent groupings that we 
experience as social groups, organizations, communities, societies, and 
nations etc. Before outlining what Wrong means by expectations though, it is 
worth noting the similarity of his description of society cited above 
(“fluctuating set of events” and “web of social relations”) to the descriptions of 
the discursive field given by Foucault. Both are describing complex networks 
that, whilst producing actual events, are defined by dynamic relationships. 
 
As I have already noted (1.1), if I was taking a more traditional perspective 
on social order, one that sought totalities, continuities and regular causal 
connections, I would be seeking the predictable characteristics of social 
interactions that previously have been exemplified by rules, values and 
norms. But, as I have already discussed, classical social theory has failed to 
detect the homogeneous presence of these ‘laws’ of social order. In this sense 
at least, attempts at a structural account of society have failed. In opposition 
to such a structural perspective, other theorists have taken an interpretive 
perspective and argued, to varying degrees, that any sense of social order is 
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effectively a construct formed in the minds of interacting social subjects. If I 
may be permitted to repeat my introductory generalisation, such theories do 
not so much deny the existence of society as, due to their focus on the micro 
rather than the macro, fail to offer an account of it. Wrong does not explicitly 
comment on the tensions between these two broad perspectives, but 
implicitly steers a course through them that, I would suggest, effectively 
neutralizes them. In stating that “Society is constructed by an immense series 
of interlocking intentional acts performed by a multitude of people [and that] 
social order is nothing more than this series” (Wrong, 1995: 41) he 
acknowledges the importance of the intentional act of the individual social 
actor but, in a similar manner to Foucault, seeks order in the series, in the 
relationships that form out of those intentional acts. He does not, though, use 
‘an intentional act’ as his ‘atom of (social) discourse’; rather he uses the term 
‘expectation’. The advantage of this, he argues, is its ambiguity, in as much 
as it can be taken in both a predictive and an imperative mode, and thus 
carries both the sense of expected or predicted order that is objective along 
with a sense of wanting or commanding that is subjective.80 Expectations, he 
argues, in as much as they “guide and constrain action...exemplify what 
sociologists call ‘social norms’”, but they also exemplify the “subtle interplay 
of tacit understandings and non verbalized expectations in face-to-face 
encounters [that] endows social life with its varied and spontaneous 
character” (1995: 46). Further, they form a continuum that “runs from 
conscious adherence to clear-cut norms to the sheer automatism of ‘blind’ 
habit” (1995: 47). Expectations, I suggest, have a similar relationship to 
social behaviour as statements do to propositions and sentences in discourse; 
that they are functions that map (variable) elements of (social) discourse to 
one another. In this sense, as I shall go on to explain, expectations are 
virtual; they become actualised as social actions. In order to acknowledge the 
fact that verbalising an expectation (or, more accurately, a complex of 
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expectations) is itself a social act I will differentiate these two senses by the 
use of italics. ‘Expectations’ refer to the virtual, ‘expectations’ to actual 
expressions of expectation.81 
 
However, whilst acknowledging Wrong’s use of the term I would like to re-
position it slightly such that is more in line with both Serres’ search for the 
cords and bonds that make “our relations visible and concrete”, that connects 
the local to the local, the local to the global, and the global to the local 
(Serres, 1995b: 107), and Foucault’s ‘function of existence’ that only has 
meaning in the relationships it holds together. As such, I propose an ‘entity’ 
that ‘exists’ at increasingly complex levels prior to any codification, but one 
whose function is always to ‘hold together’. At its simplest it is a relation, a 
simple connection held in the mind of a social actor (fundamentally, then, a 
neuro-biological relationship or pathway); a simple ‘if x then y’. By this I 
mean a relationship whereby if x occurs then I expect y – either in the sense 
that y is about to occur or that y is what I ‘should’ do, though both x and y 
could range from something very straight forward, a very simple sense 
experience, to a concept with all the characteristics of ECCs described above; 
a relation or link that has been established through experience, and reinforced 
through either habit / repetition or through the sheer power or force of the 
original experience (or both). However, and this is of vital importance for the 
description I am attempting to present, even in the most simple sense 
possible, with regards to social actors, such expectations are already complex 
and multiple. This is so because expectations are emergent from the noise of 
the pre-social, from the realm of the pre-subjective, from the existence of the 
potential social actor when the singularity of experience was conscious but not 
yet self-conscious. In other words, they are emergent from ‘experiences’ 
experienced prior to the formation of the self or subject, but nevertheless are 
carried over into this formation which, in line with the arguments presented 
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by G. H. Mead (1967),82 is the result of the social process. On this general 
point, that the self emerges by means of a process of reflexiveness that 
involves the turning of the experience of the individual, as a centre of 
experience, upon himself, and to therefore, in effect, taking the attitude of the 
other towards himself, this thesis is in full agreement. The role of others in 
this process will be examined in greater detail later (6.2). In section 6.1 I will 
offer a description of the emergence of expectations at the pre-subjective 
level using the ontologies presented by both Serres and Deleuze. Such an 
understanding will be vital for a comprehension of the self-organising process 
that is at the core of social organisation. However, a brief outline of this 
emergence now should enable me to offer a preliminary explanation of what I 
mean by expectations – a full understanding will only be possible following a 
complete description of the social process. 
 
At the pre-subjective / pre-social level the centre of experience is conscious of 
its environment, but not self-conscious;83 it has ‘experiences’ (it receives 
sense stimuli) and ‘responds’ or reacts to those experiences, but there is no 
‘self’ behind either the experience or the response. There is simply a 
continuum or a field of sensory ‘experience’, an inconsistent multiplicity from 
which consistent multiplicities emerge, but no pre-organised subjective centre 
that does the organising. The only sense in which a centre or singularity is 
applicable is in a purely bio-chemical one. This ‘vital’ singularity is the centre 
of organisation that first of all engages with the social other, is thrown into 
the social world, and then becomes active in keeping the social world alive 
through the emergence of the subject. As such, the emerging social subject is 
irreducibly social; born of its encounters with others; born of its own 
repetitions, of its own time. So, for example, x may ‘occur’ as a single ‘event’ 
in the environment of this centre of experience, but not be ‘experienced as x 
because it was lost in the ‘sea of indeterminacy’ or obscured by the 
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background noise. It only becomes an ‘experience’ through repetition. 
Likewise, this centre may exhibit or ‘perform’ a certain action, but not be 
understood to have done so at first as the action was similarly lost in the 
noise of its bodily movements. It only becomes an ‘action’ through repetition. 
If x is repeated a number of times, followed by y, if this link between the two 
is forged through habit and reinforced through other feedback loops, then a 
basic expectation is created – a path has been traced. But even at this most 
simple and basic of pre-subjective states it is already multiple in at least two 
dimensions – through the repetition of each series of x and y, and through the 
differential relationship established between the two series. A relationship has 
been forged in the pre-subjective consciousness that creates a bond between 
x and y, a micro-power relation (or perhaps a nano-power relation would be 
more accurate at this level) has been created such that if x occurs y should 
follow. 
 
From such humble beginnings, I wish to argue, all future expectations / 
expectations are built. As a self, a social actor, emerges from this pre-
subjective state the expectations that form the virtual background to any 
social action develop relationships with other expectations and go on to form 
the developing virtual background of all future thoughts and actions; future 
social expectations evolve from these pre-subjective expectations. But no 
demarcation line can been drawn. Further, it is impossible for any of the post-
subjective expectations (which, in the terms to be described, all social 
expectations must be) to be enacted in isolation; any actual social action is 
always the particular and unique actualisation of a multiplicity of differing 
expectations. I cannot stress this last point enough. Both x and y (and a 
multiplicity of other series) are themselves multiplicities of expectations in 
performance. In other words, that any actual social act is the actualisation of 
any number of virtual expectations brought about by the circumstances of 
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their particular performance. In this sense, expectations remain virtual; they 
are impossible to state. If an expectation is verbalised as a particular 
intention it becomes an actual performance (the actualisation of a particular 
set of pathways within a network) and as such is a very rudimentary 
codification of the complexity that lies behind it. I shall return to this in 
Section 5. 
 
Let me return to Foucault and see whether we can strengthen the connection 
between the above (albeit brief) outline of expectations and his claim that 
statements perform a ‘function of existence’. I will do this through reference 
to the four attributes of statements cited above – which will be a test of the 
applicability of these attributes as much as a method of reinforcing my 
explanation of expectations. 
1. Certainly in their ‘pure’ state (if I can get away with such a phrase) 
expectations are not correlated to other expectations; they are though 
relations (they are quite literally bonds or cords) in that they ‘connect’ 
at least two series of experiences through repetition and habit, very 
much as described by Deleuze (1994) and Hume (1978). But they are 
only in this ‘pure’ state in the very early stages of their formation 
within a pre-subjective singularity, prior to their self-organisation into 
multiplicities, into relatively stable complexes of expectations that 
collectively form a field of social interpretation. At this stage they 
emerge from the social noise,84 from the chaotic sea of social 
perceptions and experiences, but correlations with other expectations 
have yet to occur. However, even in the post-social or post-subjective 
state correlations are no more than a general field of possible social 
relations – a virtual field that makes actual social correlations possible. 
2. This ‘pure’ state, as I have just said, is pre-subjective; the 
expectations formed here have not been created by either an author or 
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a centre of self-consciousness. This pre-subjective singularity is an 
experiential centre that is responsive to its environment, but is more 
akin to a vortex – a centre that pulls in experiences and becomes the 
focus of a self-organising process, but which has, at its core, a void.85 
Self-consciousness, a sense of ‘I-ness’, the subject of social actions, 
forms from this self-organisation as an emergent property. It is formed 
from the correlations of these ‘pure’ expectations. But once the subject 
has emerged from this process it is still being revised to a lesser or 
greater degree, being reworked or reformed into an evolving ‘self’ that 
needs to adapt to its changing social milieu (this revision being the 
result of feed-back loops of expectations that could include 
expectations as to the degree to which the ‘self’ should remain solid in 
the face of adversity, become a statue, or be flexible and adaptable). 
3. Rather than an enunciative field, let me say that expectations belong 
to a field of social action – in fact it is the core hypothesis of this 
research that this field of social action is a complex contextual web 
formed from expectations, their formations into complexes, and their 
various degrees of codifications. The social actions that become related 
through the emergence of expectations are themselves embedded 
within this web, and the emergent expectations so formed will, in their 
turn contribute (in a progressively more complex way) to this field. A 
more detail explanation of this process, and the role played by 
expectations in the self-organisation of the field of social action 
(society) will form the subject of chapter 6. 
4. The precise nature of their repeatability, as I have indicated, will be 
examined in 6.1 below. For now let it simply be said that they are 
formed, both in their emergence from the noise, and in their self-
organisation into open complexes, through repetition, and that as such 
they are neither unique events nor representations, copies or 
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simulacra of some ideal form of social action. As to the nature of the 
materiality of this repetition I can only argue that it exists within the 
mind, the biological and material brain, of the social actor – and as 
such is probably best described as bio-chemical. I would like to at least 
suggest that the actual material basis of these expectations are actual 
neural pathways established in the mind / brain of individual social 
actors through first establishing a connection between one region / 
area and another through direct sense experience, and then developed 
through repetition of that pathway, through the tracing of a 
connection.86 Such a view would certainly be in accord with the 
suggestion to be developed later (6.1) that there is only a single 
‘universal’ process out of which all phenomena emerge, and that 
everything, therefore, has a material base – though, of course, cannot 
be reduced to it. 
 
5.4  Conclusion 
 
Expectations, therefore, as described above, provide an effective description 
of micro power relations as non-units of social organisation. In both their 
most ‘pure’ form, as well as in the progressively more complex multiplicities 
they create (though still below the level of organisation that could be 
described as codified), they form, in their emerging web of relationships, a 
multiplicity of force relations that are emergent to the field in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organisation. They provide, I will go 
on to argue, through their progressive codification, the link between the local 
/micro and the global / macro. Their emergence from the noise, their 
formation into complexes, is a local effect; they can only be a local effect as 
they result from actual, direct experience; they link, provide a bond, between 
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actual experiences. As such they avoid the need to resort to any notion of 
collective intentionality or a fundamental source of collective action. 
 
Such a description of a non-unit also acknowledges their open and complex 
nature, a nature that resists any strong sense of being copied or mimicked. 
But if organisation does not occur by such methods, the question remains: 
how do they become organised such that the non-random social patterns 
described by Wrong can be detected? The value of such a description, 
therefore, can only be evaluated by a detailed description of how such 
organisation comes about, and that it what the following chapter will attempt. 
For the time being they will be held as a provisional notion, as a notion that 
can only be fully validated by an understanding of their self-organisation. 
Such an understanding will show how Foucault’s concept of micro power 
relations provides a very effective description of what they do, of their ability 
to transfer social energy, to do ‘social’ work. It will also show how the various 
practices he describes, as well as the multiplicity of beliefs and ideas that are 
to be found within social structures are all products of their self-organisation, 
are all contingent global effects, but effects which have all the characteristics 
of essentially contested concepts. 
 
 
 148 
6 Social (self) organisation 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
Having established a tentative ‘what’, a candidate ‘non-unit’ of social 
organisation, I need now to turn my attention to the ‘how’. This will feedback 
and strengthen this concept of the ‘what’. To do this I need to build a picture 
of the emergence of expectations from the pre-social / pre-subjective realm of 
‘experience’ and follow their self-organisation into the social and inter-
subjective realms through various degrees of codifications. A very brief outline 
of the emergence of expectations from the pre-social / pre-subjective was 
given in 5.3, in order to explain what I meant by the term. In 6.1 I will 
describe this emergence in greater detail through a reading of both Serres 
and Deleuze. In 6.2 I shall investigate the role of the other in the formation 
and self-organisation of expectations. This will show how what appears to be 
a process of social imitation is in fact something subtly different, a process 
whereby the experienced actions of others acts both as a catalyst for the self-
organisation of expectations already held, and for the emergence of new 
expectations from the multiplicity of those already held. This will be linked to 
a concept put forward by Stuart Kauffman as applicable to biological self-
organisation, that of auto-catalytic sets. And finally, in 6.3, I will endeavour to 
show how these expectations pass through various degrees of codifications 
such that norms, laws, institutions and other social structures and phenomena 
are formed. 
 
6.1 Repetition and difference 
 
My first task, then, is to explain in some detail the emergence of expectations 
from the noise of the pre-social / pre-subjective realm of experience. The 
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work of Serres, particularly in Genesis, is of some help in this, but by itself it 
is insufficient. Serres’ general dislike for jargon and technicalities restricts him 
to a general ontology, one that on its own is incapable of providing the 
detailed description needed for an application to a particular realm. However, 
the ontology given by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition carries the same 
universal application, the same univocity, but the technicalities introduced by 
him are particularly applicable for the task in hand in as far as they provide a 
way of describing this emergence. My aim, then, is to use both ontologies side 
by side. But straight away a problem confronts me. The ontologies that I need 
to use and adapt are actually used by both writers to describe the emergence 
of time, and my initial reaction is that starting to talk about time is too great a 
diversion. But perhaps this is inevitable. Perhaps expectations are not only 
temporal entities (in as much as they would appear, on the surface, to be 
both rooted in the past, in habit, in experience, and to be projected into the 
future, to be focused on future actions and possibilities) but are for us, as we 
experience it, time itself. Anyway, without getting diverted into terrain I have 
not set out to explore, I do need to follow the ‘path of time’ for a while at 
least.  
 
Time, then, is intrinsic to an understanding of both ontologies, and my 
starting point has to be the background nothingness from which it, or to be 
more precise they, emerge. As has already been outlined (3.3), for Serres 
noise “may well be the ground of our being”. It is the pure chaos, the pure 
undifferentiated, totally symmetrical fury, the pure multiplicity out of which 
everything emerges like Aphrodite out of the sea. “Noise cannot be a 
phenomenon”, he says, because “every phenomenon is separated from it, a 
silhouette on a backdrop...” (1995a: 13). “Classes”, states Serres, “are a 
result of fury” (1995a: 82, my emphasis). For my present purposes noise 
refers to the pre-social and pre-subjective realm, a realm in which human 
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individuals are conscious or aware of their environment, but are not yet self-
conscious, are not yet subjects. In this I endorse Mead in stating that the self 
“is essentially a social structure [that] arises in social experience” (1967: 
140), that emerges through a reflexive process such that the centre of 
consciousness become an object to itself through the relations it forms with 
others. As such, all patterns, any notion of social order – classes, genera, 
concepts, unities, entities – emerge out of this noise; and this noise, this pure 
multiplicity is time – or rather time, Serres says, “is a threshold between 
disorder and redundancy, it is the multiplicity next to chaos and prior to all 
spatialities. It is the first injection of redundancy into a pure multiplicity” 
(1995a: 117). 
 
For Serres, ‘redundancy’ is a key term, and one that is closely synonymous to 
Deleuze’s ‘repetition’.  Serres’ use of the term, here as elsewhere in his 
writings, is derived from information theory where it refers to the difference in 
the number of bits of actual information in a transmitted message, and the 
total number of bits that were used to make the transmission. It is the 
wastage, but expressed in positive terms; it is the initial repetition that 
allows, or makes further repetitions possible; at its minimum it is the first, 
faintly perceived echo, that initial repetition from which everything that 
follows depends upon but which will no longer be perceivable as such. As 
Serres describes: 
A fluctuation appears, it is lost in the desert or the packed-fullness of 
background noise, either through lack of reference, or through excess of 
difference. It vanishes, it gets buried. In order to be or to make an 
appearance, it needs a reference, it needs an analogy. It is either set in 
the laminar, then, or it is distinguished through its identity in the 
differentiated. It thus needs an other, it needs a same, it needs an echo. 
The echo alone is discernable here. Either through its position or 
through its redundancy. In the beginning is the echo. Background noise, 
fluctuation, echo. Everything begins on the threshold of the echo...The 
echo is the minimum of redundancy, then, sown in pure multiplicity. 
Time is born with the echo, the echo is from birth to make time begin. 
(1995a: 119) 
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A pure multiplicity, noise, whilst ‘containing’ a multitude of elements or atoms 
is, in a sense, unthinkable, in as far as the perfect symmetry of the laminar 
flow prevents any differentiation, and thus any sense of either space or time. 
None of the atoms have any relationship to any of the other atoms – all is 
chaos. All is an undifferentiated sea of sensory experience, though, in terms 
of human consciousness, it may be pushing it too far to say that various 
sensory experiences (even if they could be so isolated) form no relation with 
other experiences. Evolution has ‘hard wired’ a degree of connectivity that is, 
for the experiencing singularity, a priori. But generally, for relations or 
emergent patterns to begin to form certain elements will start to stabilise into 
quasi-stable turbulent relationships with other elements; relations formed by 
the repetition and redundancy of energy flows between them. From this 
turbulence all things, all classes are born; born from these first relationships 
between certain elements, born from these first codes. As Serres says: “Life, 
invention, violence...a processual flux codes a classing” (1995a: 95). Fury 
becomes a classifier, a giver of form. This is the state of consciousness 
‘experienced’ by a new born child whose field of consciousness is (to a very 
large degree) an undifferentiated sea of sensory experience; the supposedly a 
priori elements of space and time necessary to structure these experiences 
being only partly in place; as Rita Carter notes, “Concepts such as time, space 
and body are absolutely fundamental...But they are not wholly installed at 
birth” (2002: 159). A certain amount of ‘hard wiring’ is present at birth, 
having been determined by the accumulated experience of countless 
generations and passed on through genetic coding, but even so, much of this 
still requires sensory input in the early months of life to become ‘hardened 
up’; but a large amount of the establishment of the neural networks requires, 
is dependent upon, further experiences: “The structuring of this sensory 
onslaught into definite sights and sounds (and later objects) is produced 
partly by genetic determination...and partly by the gradual rationalization of 
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brain connections through learning” (Carter, 2002: 163). Carter goes on to 
note that the complex concepts that go on to become so fundamental to our 
self-consciousness are born from these sensory ‘atoms’: “In a baby, each 
concept begins as a tiny ‘seed’ of sensory experience...But over time it 
becomes more and more complex” (2002: 164). I will explore this building 
complexity in 6.2 and 6.3, but for now I need to remain with the emergence 
of the ‘seeds’ from the noise. 
 
In Difference and Repetition the same background nothingness is found. Time 
is constituted through a series of repetitions, through a series of contractions, 
syntheses and differentiations experienced by the mind. Now whilst Deleuze 
makes a very strong link between time and thinking, it should be noted, 
perhaps, that this link is made stronger by Deleuze’s focus on the later 
‘stages’ of the series of syntheses. So whilst time can only be thought through 
an active synthesis, the passive synthesis is performed by all organisms, and 
in effect we have a description of the emergence first of living organisms, of 
lived time and rudimentary consciousness, and then self-consciousness, mind, 
and the meaning of time. These syntheses are not carried out by a pre-
existing mind, but occur in a ‘mind’ that is being formed by the process itself. 
Put in its most straightforward way, and loosing some of the technicalities 
that only serve to obscure the process rather than reveal it, Deleuze cites 
three instances whose repetition and synthesis constitutes time: the in-itself, 
the for-itself and the for-us. It is the former of these that I wish to focus on at 
the moment, but for purposes of orientation let me say that the in-itself is 
unthinkable as such, that it disappears as soon it appears, and which, I argue, 
equates to noise (as well as the notion of the void in Badiou, and very 
obviously Sartre’s nothingness);87 the for-itself emerges out of this 
nothingness through a passive synthesis (the details of which I will examine 
later) and forms what Bergson would term duration (and in the terms of this 
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thesis, pre-social / pre-subjective consciousness); the for-us is grounded 
upon this passive synthesis but emerges through an active synthesis which 
allows the emergence of reflected representation, of both memory (in the 
sense of actual memories) and understanding. The for-us, then, becomes the 
emergent, reflexive self-consciousness that makes both the subject and 
society possible – it has evolved from an insular itself to a collective us. Both 
the for-itself and the for-us are the results of different/ciation, the former 
existing virtually as a product of differentiation, whilst the latter has actual 
existence as a product of differenciation. This first instant, the in-itself of time 
is, for Deleuze, pure, in the sense that it is the general a priori element of all 
time; it is the pure past, but not in the sense of one instant or present 
passing only to be replaced by another: 
The past...neither passes nor comes forth. For this reason the past, far 
from being a dimension of time, is the synthesis of all time of which the 
present and the future are only dimensions. We cannot say that it was. 
It no longer exists, it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it is.  It 
insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present 
present. It is the in-itself of time as the final ground of the passage of 
time. In this sense it forms a pure, general, a priori element of all time. 
(1994: 83) 
 
It is, in other words, that pure multiplicity that Serres refers to as noise, 
where any ‘time’ is not on the outside, is not ex-istent, but is internal and 
differential, is in-sistent and con-sistent.  
 
Particularly in Genesis, Serres uses various forms of the word ‘clamour’ to 
great effect to refer to the background noise: “What are called phenomena 
alone are known and knowable, avatars of a secret remote process emerge 
from the clamorous sea” (1995a: 18). Perhaps in reference to the modern 
belief that life on earth first emerged and then rose out of the sea, perhaps in 
reference to the mythology of Aphrodite, goddess of love and fertility born 
from the foam of the sea, perhaps even in reference to his own maritime 
experiences of its power, the sea, for Serres, becomes heavily symbolic of the 
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background noise, from which, quite literally, everything emerges. In other 
words, this process of emergence from the noise is a single process; a single 
process in the sense that it describes a universal process of emergence that 
can be used to describe emergence at any level. It is such a process, I 
suggest, that Tarde was proposing when he described a self-similarity of 
repetition across the three realms of the physical, biological and social. In 
similar fashion, Deleuze refers to the univocity of Being, to a “single voice” 
that “raises the clamour of being” (1994: 35-7). This single voice, however, is 
not ‘the One’, it is not in any sense a unity, it is a pure multiplicity – pure in 
the sense that no-thing can be distinguished or differentiated within it (in fact 
it doesn’t even make sense to refer to either ‘within’ or ‘it’). It is, in Badiou’s 
terms, the void, an inconsistent multiplicity. Deleuze aims at the collapse of 
the traditional ‘one / many’ distinction – a distinction that he refers to as a 
distorted dialectic; for him the pure multiplicity of the in-itself, as the noise 
does for Serres (and arguably the void does for Badiou), replaces the one and 
the multiple as the true substantive (1994: 182). The only danger in evoking 
Badiou is that for him the void, cast in terms of set theory, forms a solitary 
null set, a general ontological sump that resists the general descriptive 
application that my current use requires. The important point is that there is 
but a single, universal process, a univocal process, from which all things 
emerge, including the organisation that gives form to the products of the 
process: 
In fact, there is a physics, and that’s all there is to it. There is a nature 
to things, a process of emergence, which is enough. Its function is 
universal. Whether we look at atoms, at species, and later at society, 
the same model is always at work. (Serres, 2000: 176) 
 
Organisation, or distribution, then, occurs from within; it is in-sistent; it 
becomes a self-distribution, or, to equate it to one of the key features of 
complex systems, self-organising; organisation results from the intensive 
relations that emerge from within any emergent consistent multiplicity, not 
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from some transcendent power above or some transcendental principle below. 
There is, to use Deleuze’s phrase, a demonic rather than a divine distribution. 
All limit is imposed from within through the intensive process of immanent 
wrapping or enclosure – enveloping. “Univocal Being is at one and the same 
time nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy” (Deleuze, 1994: 37). This is 
important to note. All the social organisation that I will go on to describe is 
emergent, it comes about as the result of an intensive process (partly codified 
by the results of the experiences accumulated from previous generations 
admittedly, effectively acting as feedback loops, but still intensive from the 
point of view of the emerging singularity), not by the imposition of structures 
or form from without. 
 
Serres’ response to attempting to the think ‘the multiple as such’ is to think in 
a manner he terms ‘vectorially’ – in a manner that maps the relations that 
form between the units or atoms within a multiplicity and which allow the 
emergence of form. It is possible, on the one hand, to group those elements 
that, through repetition and redundancy, have formed an emergent pattern 
together, and view them as a unity, as a collective – as a noun or as a verb. 
This, Serres argues, is the traditional way we believe we make sense of our 
world. His methodology, however, is to abstract what it is that connects these 
elements together, the prepositions; the messengers, bonds, cords, links that 
“comprehend, since they join or grasp or seize several things, beasts or men 
together” (Serres, 1995b: 107). The former method produces stasis, stable 
objects and ‘processes’, linear logic, statues; the latter produces fluid and 
turbulent patterns – patterns, I want to argue, that can actualise into any 
number of different forms in different spatial and temporal locations 
(including, for current purposes, the pre-social / pre-subjective mind), 
patterns that are relational in a topological or non-Euclidian sense rather than 
relational in a conventional geometrical sense, patterns that are fluid, 
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turbulent, non-linear and very adaptable. This is what Serres means by 
weaving together networks into a general theory of relations. My problem, 
then, is to translate this general theory of relations onto the pre-social / pre-
subjective realm, and for that I need to provide a more detailed description. I 
need to be able to think of these bonds or cords (these expectations) as they 
apply within this realm. 
 
Deleuze, fortunately, does attempt a more detailed, a more technical account 
of this emergence, one that can be so applied. But even here such an account 
will need to be modified. He first of all develops a two-fold synthesis of time 
(passive and active) that he later develops into a three-fold synthesis. Which 
of these are needed? Or is it necessary to understand both? Does it really 
matter? Now in asking this last question I do not wish to sound flippant, 
merely to point out that, as Deleuze himself argues, in total agreement with 
Serres, “categories belong to the world of representation”, and that in their 
place he has “continually proposed descriptive notions” (1994: 284). As one 
of the key purposes of Difference and Repetition (again, in total agreement 
with that of Genesis) is to subvert the privileged place that essence and 
definition has traditionally held, a descriptive rather than a definitive account 
of the process is what is called for, and as such there is a need to avoid 
definitive statements as to the precise stages or categorisation of it. This is 
not easy – my very act of attempting to write a clear explanation of this 
process appears drawn towards definitive statements. It is, however, this 
difference between description and definition that lies at the heart of the 
difference between Ideas and concepts that runs through the whole of this 
work; as Deleuze says: “Ideas are not concepts; they are a form of eternally 
positive differential multiplicity, distinguished from the identity of concepts” 
(1994: 288). This is Serres’ challenge, to think the multiple without ‘availing 
myself of the concept’, without recourse to the safety and certainty of identity 
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and definition. Serres achieves this, I suggest, partly through a far more 
descriptive and, dare I say, literary style, whereas, rather ironically, Deleuze 
attempts it through in many ways a more traditional technical philosophical 
style where he very frequently ‘defines’ his terms. Serres is quite opposed to 
this ‘technical’ style, and in his conversations with Latour expresses his dislike 
of jargon, suggesting that ‘hypertechnicality’ is not only “useless, redundant, 
harmful” but also that it “breeds fear and exclusion” (Serres & Latour, 1995: 
23-4). On the other hand, I think it could be argued that in so doing Deleuze 
does at least attempt a more detailed account of the emergence of time 
within consciousness that provides insightful and useful concepts to those of 
us working within the humanities and social sciences. It is with this spirit that 
I will describe two types of multiplicity found in Difference and Repetition – 
one virtual, intensive and implicit, formed from the passive synthesis; the 
other actual, extensive and explicit, formed from the active synthesis. But 
none of the ‘technicalities’ so expressed should be read as definitive. 
 
Both these syntheses are formed through processes of differentiation, but 
different types of differentiation: “We call the determination of the virtual 
content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality 
into species and distinguished parts differenciation” (Deleuze, 1994: 207). 
The former of these, differentiation, refers to the echoes, to the initial 
repetitions that emerge from the background noise or in-itself of time, to the 
faint rhythms that can only be distinguished from the background, and which, 
through redundancy, a series of repetitions emerge. At this ‘stage’, all 
difference is internal to the series, and as such it is intensive. It cannot be 
measured as there is nothing but itself to compare itself to, and measurement 
and extension, like tangos, require two. In the context of that which is here 
being investigated, difference arises from the repetition within a series of 
experiences within the experiential field such that each repetition allows such 
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an experience to ‘stand out’ from the noise of the crowd, and as such it is 
more easily ‘recognised’ in and for subsequent repetitions. Deleuze also 
describes such multiplicities as implicit, as being formed through a process of 
implication. Implication, derived from the Latin for ‘fold’, to enfold, or in-fold, 
suggests a self-same relationship, a relationship formed completely internally 
to the series or system, a coming together or enveloping of emergent terms 
(to use Badiou’s word) to form a series of repetitive ‘states’ whose only 
relations are the internal holding or folding together of these terms. It is this 
passive synthesis that forms the virtual, a ‘state’ that is real, but which has 
not been actualised: “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. 
The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual” (1994: 208). This is important 
because the virtual ‘state’ of the system should not carry any sense of the 
negative, nor any sense of relationship usually associated with representation 
– “the negative is always derived and represented, never original or present: 
the process of difference and of differenciation is primary in relation to that of 
the negative and opposition” (1994: 207). Even though the internal relations 
that form the virtual cannot be perceived, because to be perceived they would 
need to be actualised (the series of states that form them would need to form 
a relationship with another series of states) they are every bit as real – it is 
just that their reality is of a different order than the actual. The virtual, 
though, is the basis of all actual structure: “The reality of the virtual consists 
of the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which 
correspond to them. The reality of the virtual is structure” (1994: 209). This 
is why Deleuze, in terms of consciousness or mentality, describes the virtual 
mental states as Ideas, as opposed to their actualised concepts, as it is from 
them, from their virtual structure, that our everyday concepts capable of 
representation are derived. In this sense, and in this sense only, they are a 
priori – they are prior to, and form the necessary conditions for, any actual 
experience. 
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For Deleuze, actual phenomena are emergent from an active synthesis 
between two or more virtual series, from their differenciation, from the 
establishment or communication of differences between the two series. This 
often invisible and imperceptible difference between two intensities that 
allows ‘thunderbolts’ to explode between them Deleuze terms, rather 
provocatively, the dark precursor - dark because unseen, yet a precursor to 
all seen phenomena: 
Given two heterogeneous series, two series of differences, the precursor 
plays the part of the differenciator of these differences. In this manner, 
by virtue of its own power, it puts them into immediate relation to one 
another: it is the in-itself of difference or the ‘differently different’ – in 
other words, difference in the second degree, the self-different which 
relates different to different by itself. (1994: 119) 
 
Once the thunderbolts start flashing, once Hermes establishes communication 
between two or more series of intensive differences, virtual differences are 
actualised and phenomena emerge. These actualised phenomena are both 
extensive and explicit. Differences of time can now be measured. Virtual 
differences, intensive differences are purely internal to the series, and as such 
measurement of them is non-sense; they are like unheard rhythms that only 
make sense when they form a relationship with another series of rhythms – a 
hearing subject. And, of course, the now formed actual phenomena are 
explicit: they are capable of being unfolded, analysed and represented. 
 
However, as close as the above account is to where I want to get to, it is still 
not quite there. Expectations as just described are formed from a synthesis, a 
bonding, of two or more series of repetitions of experiences, but it would 
make sense to still describe them as being virtual, and to save the term 
‘actual’ for actual social acts (including speech acts and other acts of 
communication) that result from a further synthesis brought about by a 
response to the conditions of the social milieu. In the process as I understand 
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it, distributed networks, formed through the synthesis of two or more series, 
remain virtual – they await the actualisation of particular pathways in 
response to particular events. 
 
In terms of the social, then, there is the birth of relatively simple social 
expectations out of the noise; the building blocks or ‘non-units’ of social self-
consciousness out of the pre-social / pre-subjective realm. These expectations 
are, even at this stage, relatively simple bonds or cords. They have been 
formed though the experienced connection of two or more series of 
experiences, themselves formed through a process of repetition and 
redundancy: A particular sensory input is experienced that activates a 
particular neural pathway / network. Even at this ‘stage’ the experience is 
multiple. Each time a similar sensory input is experienced the pathway / 
network is strengthened – each repetition makes it easier and more likely for 
that pathway / network to be fired the next time a similar input is experienced 
- redundancy. Each sensory input need not even be identical, only similar, to 
strengthen the network (or series of networks).88 Further, when two or more 
series are experienced repeatedly together a further neural network is 
established between them, a bond or cord is established, they become in-
volved and enveloped with each other. It is through these basic expectations 
that a centre of action and experience will be gradually differentiated from the 
experiential field and the self or subject will emerge. As interesting as the 
particular emergence is, focusing on it directly would distract us from my 
endeavour of understanding the emergence of social (as opposed to 
psychological and neurological) form – though it should be noted that the 
difference is only one of focus, not even one of degree, let alone  of kind. My 
next task is to understand how these relatively simple expectations self-
organise into more complex expectations such as beliefs, ideas, concepts and 
norms. 
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6.2 Imitation and autocatalytic sets 
 
Expectations, as described above, form the basic building blocks, the ‘atoms’ 
of social discourse and structure – though, as so described, they are already 
multiple, they are non-units. They are the relatively simple expectations that 
are emergent from the noise of the pre-social / pre-subjective realm; they are 
the relatively simple bonds that tie together two or more series of sensory 
experience; they are, for example, the joining of the sound ‘dog’ (repeated 
many times by the parent of the young child, accompanied by finger pointing 
in an attempt to direct the child’s gaze towards the picture of a dog in a story 
book or an animal in the park) with the visual image of a particular four-
legged creature.89 Both the sound and the image each form a series, with 
each repetition within each series being different to some degree, but also 
possessing sufficient similarity that at each repetition the series is 
strengthened. When a bond is established between these two series an 
expectation is created: the expectation that on hearing the sound ‘dog’ the 
linked image will also be present somewhere; or that on seeing the image of a 
dog by uttering the sound the parent will respond. But straight away it is 
possible to begin to see how other series become tied into the particular 
expectation of the emerging subject – a particular response from the parent 
that creates a particular emotional feeling. This emotional response could well 
be that of pleasure in getting the parent’s attention, but it could also be one 
of fear if an early experience of a dog had been a negative one. The point is 
though, that the emergent expectations are constantly forming links, and 
possibly breaking links, not just with sensory data but also with emotional 
responses, and that by definition these expectations are particular to the 
subject – they are always local. 
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But from these local expectations, global patterns and structures emerge, are 
maintained, or are developed – and I need to chart this path from the local to 
the global. In the following section (6.3) I will attempt a description of how 
our relatively complex expectations, our beliefs and social ideas, become 
codified into norms, laws, institutions etc.,90 but first I need to offer a 
description of how the relatively simple expectations described above develop 
their complexity such that they become recognisable as what we would regard 
as social beliefs, ideas and concepts. I lay out this description in this linear 
manner purely for purposes of clarity and ease of exposition; I in no way wish 
to imply that the social process is similarly linear, because it is not, far from it 
– it is non-linear and features all the aspects of complex systems already 
described (3.3). I intend to point out that imitation, despite being an 
attractive option, cannot, in its simple form of the imitation of memes, desires 
or beliefs, account for this complexity. In its place I will substitute the idea of 
autocatalytic sets. The best way to do this will be to start with what I wish to 
end with (the complex expectation) and then reverse engineer it. I have 
presented a starting point, the simple emergent expectation described above 
- I will now jump to the complex expectation, and chart a way backwards. 
 
Earlier (5.2) I briefly referred to Gallie’s notion of ‘Essentially Contested 
Concepts’ for the purpose of challenging the implied unity associated with 
Tarde’s use of beliefs and ideas. I now wish to return to this notion and use 
certain features of it to examine complex expectations. My point then was 
that although Gallie thought that this ‘important group of concepts...relate to 
a number of organized or semi-organized human activities’ they in fact apply 
to ALL the concepts used to organise human activities, and that these 
concepts ‘are not unities (even if we treat them as wholes) but are 
multiplicities of an internally complex nature’, that ‘they are open, dynamic 
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systems’. The particular features that I wish to use and to suggest are 
features of all social concepts are: 
1. That they are ‘of an internally complex character’. 
2. That ‘various parts or features’ make varying contributions to rival 
descriptions of their value. 
3. That they are ‘open in character’ and are capable of modification ‘in 
the light of changing circumstances that could not have been 
prescribed or predicted in advance’. 
I will examine social concepts through these three features in the light of 
what I have already described of their emergence. My aim will be to draw on 
the ideas and concepts I have presented so far in order to develop a 
distinctive solution to the problem being investigated. But first, one more 
ingredient is necessary. 
 
Deleuze notes that the “reality of the virtual consists of the differential 
elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to 
them”, that “the reality of the virtual is structure”, and that “far from being 
undetermined, the virtual is completely determined” (1994: 209). For Deleuze 
the virtual is every bit as real as the actual, it is simply that the virtual Idea 
has not been actualised into a concept or representation. For my purposes, 
this actualisation is the production of a social act – one capable of being 
experienced, of being represented by another. For Deleuze, Ideas (as opposed 
to concepts) are the mental structures formed through a process involving 
repetition and differentiation whose complexity is of such a degree that they 
are incapable of being represented or actualised ‘as it is’, but only in part, to a 
certain degree, in relation to specific circumstances. “An Idea”, he states, “is 
an n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity.” These dimensions are “the 
variables or co-ordinates upon which a phenomenon depends”, those 
elements from within the structure as a whole whose emergence from the 
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subjective noise makes the definition or standing out possible; and this 
continuity is “the set of relations between changes in these variables”, the 
total connectivity of the system or structure from which these variables have 
been drawn (1994:182). An Idea, then, is an internal, complex mental 
structure, it is an internal multiplicity, “a system of multiple, non-localisable 
connections between differential elements which is incarnated in real relations 
and actual terms” (1994: 183). 
 
This brings me to the resolution of the problem; to my suggestion of how all 
the strands so far discussed flow into a synthesis, a complex place where 
“everything meets and joins together”, the knot “through which everything 
passes like an interchanger.” (Serres, 2008: 80) A speech act is a social act if 
it is spoken to another, or an act of writing if read by another, and that on 
being listened to or read it was capable of influencing the behaviour of the 
other. Let me take the examples given by Tarde (the religious ideas of 
Christianity or Islam, or the political idea of socialism) as working examples of 
social ideas that (in ways that have yet to unfolded) affect social organisation. 
Ideas such as these are far from the simple expectations I described earlier, 
far from the simple bonding together of a series of two or more experiences, 
whether these are vocal sounds, visual images, or written words. Following 
the genesis of the emergent subjectivity a continuity of experiences has 
provoked the creation of a very complex mental structure. Various series’ of 
repetitions have been differentiated from other series’, bonds have been 
formed, connections made; bonded series’ have been connected to other 
bonded series’, pathways forming these connections have bifurcated, merged, 
and produced feed back loops; as a result of the accumulated experience, and 
processing of this experience, the mental structure has developed into 
arguably one of the most complex structures imaginable. The degree of 
connectivity is vast; not only are various sense experiences connected in such 
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a complex manner, but these are connected to (and cannot be isolated from) 
areas of instinct and desire that have been inherited from our animal past, 
and from our emotional experiences, and no doubt to many other areas of our 
accumulated history. What is important though is not listing all the various 
areas or subsystems of this complex mental system, but noting that the 
degree of connectivity is high, very high, and that no area or faculty can be 
isolated as a completely distinct system. So, whilst on a purely verbal level, it 
might be possible to describe how relatively simple ideas have been bonded 
together to form the complex ideas of socialism or Christianity, these cannot 
be disconnected from the desires and emotions which contributed to their 
formation. What exists then, with these virtual social ideas, is a ‘definable’ 
network of n-dimensions (where all that can be said of n is that it is a very 
large number) that is connected to the whole system, from which it is 
nonetheless defined. 
 
This virtual network is too complex, and too open, to be actualised in its 
entirety. Admittedly, speaking or writing the word ‘socialism’ or ‘Christianity’ 
is an actualised social act, but it is no more the appearance of the entire 
virtual network it evokes than the very tip of an iceberg. The words are easy 
to speak or write. Their meaning, at the subjective level, lies in the differential 
network of complex mentality that gave rise to their utterance.91 When a 
subject performs a social act in accord with their socialism or Christianity 
various parts or features of this network are actualised at the expense of 
others and this can give rise to internal conflict and ethical, emotional or 
rational dilemma. Rationality, making sense of what we do and how we act, is 
a reflective process; it is an attempt to actualise by use of concepts and 
representations a process, a complexity that cannot be completely actualised. 
Any actualisation, even through a speech act, can only actualise various parts 
or features of the underlying virtual network, and the process whereby this 
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actualisation occurs takes on all the features of non-linearity; of a dynamic 
system responding, in some measure, to its social milieu.  
 
But even in the evocation of these various sub-networks, there is a need to 
note the open character of the system – for it is this that makes each 
actualisation unique. It is not just the rival features within a virtual network 
that are actualised, but, due to its very high degree of connectivity, any 
number of features from the mental system as a whole, whether these be 
rational, emotional or instinctive. Of course, if these wider features have, 
through a process of repetition, become associated internally with the social 
idea, they will have become part of the virtual sub-network, but this does not 
preclude the future inclusion of features or sub-networks that have never 
before become directly connected with the idea, or the recollection of a 
connection that had been formed in the past (but fallen into disuse) and 
reactivated through the inclusion of some link experienced in the social 
situation being responded to. Each ‘particular’ network, then (the idea of 
socialism for example) is constantly open to new connections being made as 
the result of an open relationship with an ever-changing social milieu. The 
social ideas of either socialism or Christianity, therefore, can never be the 
basis for a straightforward and definable social act, or actualisation of a social 
idea. Even accepting, through a process of inter-subjectivity to be discussed 
in 6.3, that a degree of standardisation occurs as to the meaning of ideas 
(and without such a standardisation no social act would make sense), there 
will always remain areas of the virtual network derived from the particular 
experience of that particular social actor waiting to be actualised in any social 
act – for example the emotional feelings of love, hate, fear or security 
experienced in similar social situations as a child. The importance of emotional 
states to the formation of expectations should not be dismissed; the internally 
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complex networks that I am describing are open, and their connectivity must 
include the emotional centres of the brain. 
 
From the above description it should be obvious that such complex 
multiplicities cannot be based on any straightforward conception of imitation, 
and remember that for Tarde the religious and political ideas such as 
Christianity, Islam or socialism were such that on being exposed to them 
people could be converted. Let me reverse the above description such that 
rather than examining the actualisation of the virtual socio-mental network, I 
examine how exposure to actual social expressions of such ideas by others 
could lead to their adoption by an experiencing subject. If, for example, a 
subject who has never heard of the concept ‘socialism’ were to walk into a 
public meeting and be exposed to such discussion for the first time, would it 
be reasonable to imagine them absorbing the complexities of the concept 
straightaway, and become infected? But asking such a question presupposes 
initial conditions that would be unlikely in the extreme, and completely fails to 
acknowledge the actual complexities it mentions. 
 
Even if a teenager from a very sheltered background were to be introduced to 
the term for the very first time such they were in a position to ask ‘what do 
you mean by that?’, it would be very unlikely that they would have no 
working concepts related to, for example: the notion of rights in general, 
historical movements for workers’ rights, the trade union movement, 
democracy, co-operatives, the ownership of property and the difference 
between private and public ownership, economics and the differences 
between a ‘free’ market and a controlled market (together, of course, with the 
more emotional responses of a feeling of belonging, a cause to fight for, a 
sense of injustice, or even contempt for people who do manual work). So 
assuming that this naive teenager had some working understanding of these 
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concepts, an initial introduction to the term could well do little more than re-
organise existing concepts, perhaps envelop a collection of these concepts 
into a portmanteau concept that could be carried round and used at will. And, 
assuming the worst, that this teenager had little or no exposure to these 
other concepts, then some sense of them would have to be mentally digested 
first before socialism as a life changing concept would stand any chance of 
overcoming his political immune system. In the same way, then, that a virtual 
social Idea is too complex to be actualised in its entirety, an actual social 
experience related to a social idea is too complex to be made sense of, and 
requires the fertile ground of a subjective virtual network in which to take 
root. 
 
And in the same way that there is competition for which virtual sub-networks 
are to be actualised in any social act, which can result in conflict and tension, 
so too is there competition for places when new social concepts are 
introduced. If we accept that no complex concept can be absorbed into a 
conceptual framework without reference to, or rooting in pre-existing (and 
probably less complex) concepts, and that the hinterland that forms this 
conceptual framework as a whole is open in character and has a very high 
degree of connectivity, then there is a good chance that such an introduction 
will require the introduction and assimilation of sub-concepts and that these 
sub-concepts will either have to replace existing concepts that they do not 
agree with or (and in all probability) will find a way of existing side by side 
with them – and thus introducing an increase in the internal tension. 
 
And even if I place to one side such complex concepts as ‘socialism’, and look 
at ‘simpler’ examples of memes such as those of “clothes fashions, ways of 
making pots or of building arches” (Dawkins, 1989: 192) the problem does 
not go away. Even the relatively simple imitation of another person’s fashion 
 169 
style still requires a whole array of virtual roots – roots related to which group 
of people it is good to be visually associated with and which group of people 
not, and the emotional roots associated with in groups and out groups is, 
when examined in a little detail, a very complex and deeply rooted network of 
connections. I will accept that, at possibly the simplest level of all, the 
imitation of a catch-phrase or tune, there are examples to be found of 
straightforward imitation, of the direct replication of another’s social act, and 
ones that reveal the human propensity for imitation. I do not wish to 
disregard our basic ability to imitate, which, as Susan Blackmore (1999) and 
many others have suggested, may well be a crucial facet of our human overall 
evolutionary ability, but it is one of the main arguments of this thesis that 
such a simple exchange of information cannot explain social organisation. In 
other words, if imitation has any role in human social organisation it cannot 
be as the replication, the passing from person to person, of social ideas. 
These are just too complex to be so replicated; if this is the case then, to 
where can I turn for a solution? Well, as it happens, I do not need to stray far. 
In fact I can remain well within the confines of evolutionary biology. 
 
Stuart Kauffman (2000) advocates the notion of a self-similarity of process for 
life (and the cosmos) that has been a central premise of this thesis, but, 
regarding biological processes, one that is not so dependent upon the 
‘traditional’ concepts of replication. He argues that rather than life being 
based on “template replication”, it could be “based on far deeper principles of 
catalysis”. It is his suggestion that ‘autonomous agents’ – any living entity 
from a single cell, to a bacterium, to an organ, to a human being that is 
capable of acting on its own behalf through at least one energy cycle within 
an environment – are autocatalytic sets. These sets are such that: 
...all the molecules whose formation must be catalyzed find molecular 
species within the set that catalyzes the reactions forming each of the 
molecules. All the “catalytic tasks” get done such that the set is 
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collectively autocatalytic. This holism is not mystical; it is an objective, 
observable property of a collectively autocatalytic set of molecules. 
(Kauffman, 2000: 32) 
 
In other words, the organisational properties of any set at any level of 
biological organisation are contained within the set, that they are self-
organising. Kauffman’s argument is based on the notion that any open 
thermodynamic (living) system or set works through the constrained release 
of energy; that as a non-equilibrium entity it ‘works’ to preserve energy, 
whilst at the same time (following Kauffman’s proposed 4th Law of 
Thermodynamics, as outlined in section 3.3) ‘working’ to maximise its 
diversity and propagation. Further, that within the phase space of any such 
system, at any particular phase, the options for the next phase are finite. On 
the one hand the system is ‘working’ to expand into its environment, but on 
the other, the need to conserve energy restricts the number of viable ‘next 
moves’. Which move is made, however, is determined by this environment. 
 
“In a collectively autocatalytic system”, he explains, “no molecule catalyzes its 
own formation, but the set of molecules as a whole catalyzes its own 
reproduction from input molecular species” (2000: 31). So, whilst the possible 
states of organisation are contained within the system undergoing 
transformation, the particular state adopted results from the presence of an 
outside system that acts as a catalyst. For example, a protein undergoing 
transformation will have the limits (and possibly the options) of its possible 
future states set by the cell DNA in which it resides and of which it forms part 
of a collective, but the actual state adopted will be determined by the 
presence of an adjacent protein which actually takes no part in the self-
organisation. In the presence of protein B, protein A will become identical to 
protein B even though no organisational code or information has been 
transferred between them. All that was necessary was the presence of the 
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‘shape’ of B for A to adopt it, which, given the state of its own phase space, 
was one of its options. 
 
I suggest that this notion provides the basis of a solution to my problem. And 
its translation from the biological to the social would be one that Kauffman 
supports. He argues that “there must be principles of coevolutionary 
assembly” that apply equally to biospheres, economic systems and legal 
systems; principles such as the univocal presence of power law distributions 
throughout nature; principles that describe the co-evolutionary organisation 
of all life. “There are hints”, he adds, “that general principles govern the 
coevolutionary construction of lives and livings, organisms and natural games, 
firms and economic opportunities. Perhaps such a law governs any biosphere 
anywhere in the cosmos” (2000: 20-21).92 
 
The solution that I have been working towards is now obvious. The actions of 
others act as catalysts for the organisation of internal and open sets of 
expectations, and the formation of expectations of increasing degrees of 
complexity. No social replicator, no meme is passed from person to person 
like a virus – in fact, I seem to have reached a solution that was beyond my 
earlier ability to express. Expectations, as virtual n-dimensional open sets are 
too complex, and have too higher a degree of connectivity, to be actualised in 
their entirety. In act fact, it does not even make sense to talk of their 
entirety. There is no unit, no unity – that which I describe are quite literally 
unbounded multiplicities. There is no ‘thing’ that becomes organised. A word 
of caution is required though. I said earlier, in relation to the process of 
autocatalysis at the biological level, that one protein becomes identical to 
another. In translating this general idea to the social I need to drop any 
notion of identity. This may be reasonable at the biological level where the 
number of stable adjacent possible states are limited, but not at the much 
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more complex social level. The experienced actions of others may act as the 
‘templates’ of the autocatalysis of expectations, but the resultant self-
organisation always remains virtual, open and unique. This uniqueness is path 
dependent on the (social and genetic) history of the emergent subject. In 
other words, despite the complexity at the biological level, in transferring to 
the social the degree of complexity and non-linearity is increased 
exponentially. Two social acts may appear to be very similar, if not identical, 
in their actualisation, but the virtual structures that gave rise to them were 
unique, and could be actualised into different acts at different times or places. 
 
It is in response to its social milieu that the social subject first emerges from 
the pre-subjective and pre-social realm, and it is this continuing relationship 
that provides the catalyst for its self-organisation. Bonds or cords are 
constantly being tied and untied between the growing number of series’ of 
experiences in an attempt to construct a conceptual map that will enable the 
social subject to navigate its environment. As the degrees of complexity and 
connectivity increase in line with the increase in social experiences, for the 
reasons explained above, internal tension between competing sub-networks 
increase, the degree of uncertainty for any particular situation rises. On the 
one hand the mental system as a whole is working to diversify, to resolve 
conflict, to be able to negotiate an ever-changing social milieu, but on the 
other hand its release of energy needs to be constrained. The social acts of 
others, whether they are bodily gestures, speech acts, or the production of 
written texts, act as catalysts to this dynamic system. They allow links to be 
made, networks to be created, that allow ‘mental energy’ to flow by the most 
energy conserving route whilst at the same time resolving ‘far from 
equilibrium’ states of internal tension.93 Within the phase space of any mental 
system, for any particular state, there are only a limited number of likely next 
moves. These have been determined by repetition, by the repeated tracing of 
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internal pathways. The experienced social actions of others determine which 
of these next moves will be made. They may, of course, simply reinforce well-
trod pathways, further entrench patterns of behaviour such that the 
expectation lying in the virtual shadows is almost revealed as an actual 
expectation – as an expressible expectation such that if this experienced 
situation should occur again then this is what will or should occur. But what 
can never be revealed, however, is the dark hinterland in which this 
expectation is rooted. On the other hand, the next move may take on all the 
appearances of novelty. Within the particular state a number of tensions or 
conflicts may exist which, through a particular social experience, may find 
partial resolution, and create a novel next move – create a new expectation. 
 
This dynamic system is essentially self-organising. All the organisational 
energy flows, all the pathways through which it flows, are internal to the 
system. But the routes taken are always in response to events outside of the 
system, to its social milieu, where the behaviour of others act as catalysts 
that determine, to varying degrees, the future state of the system. To return 
briefly to a point made earlier. Such a system is at its most creative, is 
socially at its healthiest and most adaptable, when it is ‘on the edge of chaos’; 
when it is neither entrenched in mechanistic habitual cycles (expectations in 
the strong sense of the term), nor floundering in a chaotic state with little or 
no expectations to help determine possible next phase states. And as such 
subjective systems are open systems, connected to the social sea that in part 
determines, through catalysis, these next states (and hence, through 
repetition, future states), we are actually referring to a vast inter-subjective 
social network – a system that, in its turn, is at its most creative at the ‘edge 
of chaos’: social chaosmos. 
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6.3  Codification: norms and laws 
 
A social act, then, is the actualisation of a virtual inter-subjective expectation 
or social Idea. These bonds have been formed at a purely local and subjective 
level. They do not possess the objectivity of a social something that has been 
passed from social actor to social actor through imitation or replication, nor 
even the objectivity of a unified subjective ‘thing’. Rather they are the result 
of a uniquely individual process that is nevertheless dependent on the social 
actions of others which act as catalysts for their formation – hence inter-
subjective. They are complex, n-dimensional, open multiplicities rooted in the 
accumulated social experience of the actor; they would, therefore, in social 
terms, and purely hypothetically, be in a constant state of flux were not their 
dynamism dampened to some degree; self-organisation would be centred on 
the emergent subject, with inter-subjective organisation being loose and very 
contingent. In this hypothetical state all social phenomena would remain at 
the local level; there would be no global as such phenomena would be too 
unstable. For social (as opposed to subjective) organisation to occur certain 
feedback pathways need to be established that stabilise this flux – though in 
actuality, of course, there is no opposition between the social and subjective 
levels; there was no natural state or original position that became socialised. 
The subjective self has only been able to emerge from its pre-subjective state 
due to its relations with others – the social and the subjective are co-
extensive and ontologically born from the same sea. But for this to occur, for 
both the social and the subjective to emerge, feedback loops in the form of 
codes need to emerge as part of the process. Social (and subjective) 
organisation emerges on the strength of the codification of expectations. 
 
In passages, Serres appears to place a great deal of importance on actual 
objects rather than codes. “The object, for us”, he says, “makes our history 
 175 
slow”, and that our “relationships, social bonds, would be airy as clouds were 
there only contracts between subjects.” These objects stabilise our 
relationships (1995a: 87). And it was this focus on the importance of objects 
as well as social subjects that led Latour to his now rejected Actor Network 
Theory.94 There is no doubt that objects do become involved in social 
organisation. A rugby ball, for example, acts as the focal point for the game, a 
process of social organisation that could not occur without it. On a larger scale 
perhaps the American flag could count as an example. But difficulties appear 
if, as with Latour, too much emphasis is placed on the object. The above 
quote from Serres states that apart from objects there are also contracts 
between subjects, and it is surely these that give the ball or flag its meaning 
in the first place. 
 
In other passages Serres refers instead to quasi-objects. These objects, 
rather than actual objects like rugby balls, are “more a contract than a 
thing...a bond.” These bonds, in the terms I have been developing, are 
expectations, and it is their varying degrees of objectification that stabilise the 
social flux and allows social phenomena to appear: “The social bond would 
only be fuzzy and unstable if it were not objectified” (1995a: 88). So for 
Serres, it is the process of the objectification of social bonds that stabilises 
the flux, a process that could produce an actual object, but does not need to. 
I am talking, then, not just of the actualisation of expectations in individual 
social acts, but of the objectification of these acts to some degree, such that 
the resultant quasi-objects are available for spatially and temporally wider 
repetition and thus have the effect of building stability and allowing the 
emergence of social phenomena. This is brought about through the 
codification of the bonds, a process that produces, in the first instance, 
concepts, and the appearance of unities: “Coding is nothing more than the 
showing of unities in the stead of multiplicitary noise. Thus concepts are born” 
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(1995a: 86). In other words, the initial objectification of social actions means 
their conversion into something that can be spoken, and once spoken a whole 
additional layer of feedback is instigated. It is no longer just the observed 
action of others that acts as a catalyst, but their spoken, and in time, written 
actions as well.95 These concepts, of course, are emergent in exactly the 
same manner as the expectations that gave rise to them, and are just as 
rooted in the mental hinterland of the acting social subject, but their use 
codifies or bonds together a far greater number of ‘sub-expectations’ than 
mere observed social action could. This objectification, though, as I have 
repeatedly pointed out, is a double bladed sword; whilst totally necessary for 
the emergence of social organisation, it hides its own tracks from our 
enquiring gaze: “Not only does the classed manifold of combinations slow it 
down as it codes it, but the classing manifold of combinations blinds out 
conception to the process” (Serres, 1995a: 96) – focusing on the codes 
covers the process of their emergence. 
 
In order to understand the emergence of social organisation, therefore, there 
is a need to understand “the flux and its way of coding” (Serres, 1995a: 95), 
a flux that “is at all points self-coded” (1995a: 99). This codification is subject 
to Venutian law, foedera naturae, rather than Martian law, foedus fati, a 
process whereby “nature generates the living flows” from within (Serres, 
2000: 111).96 This is a self-organising process – Venus assembles, “she is not 
transcendent” (2000: 123). Venutian Law, like Aphrodite rising out of the sea, 
is an emergent process. The codes produced do not exist in the way some 
believe the laws of physics pre-exist, they are neither Platonic nor 
transcendent in any manner. They have not been determined in advance as 
the way the social should be assembled. But what do I mean by codes? What 
are these codes that emerge quite naturally from the social inter-subjective 
process? 
 177 
 
Let me briefly recall Wrong’s comment that the “problem of order is the 
problem of how individual units...are arranged in nonrandom social patterns” 
(1995: 11). In the context of the current discussion the individual units are 
the actualised social acts performed by individual actors; the problem 
concerns how these acts, emergent from processes that can be traced back 
into pre-subjective and pre-social aspects of the actor, come into relationships 
with the actions of other actors such that ‘nonrandom social patterns’ can be 
identified. The problems I identified with the formalisations discussed earlier 
was how the they could produce ‘nonrandom social patterns’ rather than 
merely describe them once produced. I accepted that any solution must occur 
at the local level as it is only here that the emergent subject can experience 
the necessary causal stimuli. However, the question remained as to how this 
occurred at the local level. I have so far dismissed, to a large degree, the 
obvious solution of imitation, but have admitted that part of the solution to 
this question is provided by the notion of the actions of others acting as a 
catalyst for the subjective organisation of expectations such that patterns of 
behaviour, based on repetition and habit, can be observed. Admittedly, due to 
the catalytic effect, a degree of similarity will be observed between social 
actions, but the argument is that, without other factors, this degree of 
similarity would be too unstable for the degree of non-random social 
patterning that we do observe to come about. What is needed is a method 
that allows the actualised expectations of one social subject to be converted 
into a piece of relatively stable information such that it will act as a catalyst 
for the formation of similar actualisations in many others, not just those who 
directly experience such an actualisation. Such a method is vitally important 
for the emergence of structure or order – for the development of a global 
pattern out of local actions. Such a piece of information I term a code. 
Codification is quite simply the process by which relatively complex 
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information from a source is converted into a form that can be communicated 
such that information that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to 
communicate can be achieved to some degree. 
 
There are two particular forms of codification that are relevant to this 
discussion, and are therefore worth noting: linguistics and the legal. Linguistic 
codification is the process of the development and standardisation of norms in 
language, not just the rules for grammar, spelling, and pronunciation, but 
also the meaning of words and phrases. Since the publication of Saussure’s 
ground-breaking work language has been understood as based on codes 
which derive their value and meaning from the differential relationships 
established within the system of their use, and Wittgenstein has argued as to 
the extent that we follow the rules of grammar, syntax etc. without realising 
that we are (Saussure, 1983; Wittgenstein, 2001). Bearing in mind that both 
Serres and Deleuze describe a process whereby concepts emerge, and that I 
have derived my understanding of expectations in part from Foucault’s 
understanding of discourse, the importance and relevance of linguistics for the 
social should be obvious. It was the emergence of language that allowed for 
the emergence of the social subject out of the pre-social / pre-subjective 
noise.97 
 
Under the general banner of the legal code it is worth noting the difference 
between common law and statutory law. In societies that operate under 
common law the rules or codes that prescribe what is permissible and what is 
not in terms of social behaviour have emerged firstly out of common practice 
or tradition, and have then been further codified or standardised through 
court decisions whereby precedents are set. Both aspects can be seen as 
pragmatic solutions to actual problems, the latter applying a degree of 
reasoning and mental consideration, the former perhaps relying on what has 
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been found to work. Such a system most closely resembles the ‘natural’ 
aspect of the process I’m outlining. In a society based on statutory law, 
however, whilst the laws produced are still codifications of emergent 
behaviour, this behaviour is more abstract and theoretical. They are based 
not so much on what has been found by trial and error to work, but on what 
rational reflection says should work. In this sense, common law closely 
resembles Venusian law (in that it is emergent from the social flux) whereas 
statutory law is closer to Martian law. This is not a straight forward distinction 
though. Strictly speaking, it would only be Martian law if it was thought to be 
‘natural law’, with its legitimation derived from outside of the social process 
yet imposed upon it. However, if these laws were constructed by social 
subjects (even in very theoretical and abstract circumstances) it could still be 
argued that they are emergent. The important point, though, is that laws that 
form part of a legal code effectively (in various ways) attempt the 
objectification of expectations.  
 
There are, of course, degrees of codification: the degree to which the dynamic 
variance of social behaviour is slowed, or the degree to which the rigidification 
of the social occurs. I use the relative terms ‘low’ and ‘high’ purely out of 
convenience, and in so doing I in no manner wish to suggest a quantitative 
scale – at least not one that can be calibrated and that allows measurement. I 
do, though, want to suggest at the least a theoretical continuum that has at 
the ‘lowest’ pole a minimal degree of codification that permits a maximal 
degree of fluidity and variance, and at the ‘highest’ pole a maximal degree of 
codification that permits a minimal degree of fluidity and variance; at that 
latter pole the fluidity of the system has become very rigid, and stasis is 
close. Depending on the degree of codification, the codes prescribe the 
relevant social action to be performed or avoided. At the highest level the 
codes prescribe in detailed and very objective terms the expected social 
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action. Conforming to such expectations may produce a great deal of tension 
within the social actor due to the inability of his own emergent expectations to 
organise in such a manner that they ‘fit’ the template prescribed. The path 
dependency of their virtual network of expectations is very resistant to the re-
organisation required. At the lowest level, due to there being less objectivity 
and more ambiguity, the ‘fit’ is far easier to achieve. 
 
At this lowest level of codification there is the emergence of language – the 
birth of concepts. As Blackmore notes, our “human language capacity is 
unique”, and that as “far as we know, no other species has any kind of 
grammatically structured language – nor are they capable of learning it” 
(1999: 88). She also notes “that people do not learn language by being 
systematically corrected for their mistakes, nor by listening attentively and 
slavishly copying what they hear. Instead, they just seem to pick it up, using 
minimal input to build up richly structured grammatical speech” (1999: 87). 
This is surely where our ability to imitate comes to the fore. We learn speech 
by imitation; we copy the sounds we hear. We do not, however, as Blackmore 
also argues, imitate memes or concepts – for all the reasons given above. We 
imitate the signifier, not the signified. The latter is built up in the manner 
explained above through a process based on difference and repetition, whilst 
the signifier, the code, is attached through a process of trial and error in the 
communication of the signified.98 Hearing words and forming concepts, 
attempting to make sense out of them through trial and error, means they act 
as catalysts for the formation of social Ideas and expectations within the 
subject. This low level of codification does not require, in itself, a precise 
social action in response. The response need only be general, in the broad 
range of what of what was meant – though constantly being fine tuned 
depending on circumstances. So, for example, on hearing or reading about 
concepts related to socialism or Christianity we need, in order to attach 
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meaning to the concepts, to embed them within our own mental relational 
framework. But whilst the pre-existing element of this framework will allow 
for meaning to emerge, in order for the new elements to be absorbed into it a 
degree of re-organisation will ensue, and the re-organising of the virtual 
background will (again to varying degrees and depending on circumstances) 
result in new or different actualised actions. At this level of self-organisation, 
whilst concepts may influence actualised action, this influence is very non-
specific. 
 
When normal everyday language is used to reflect upon social behaviour, 
when it is purposefully used to describe (encode) social action we see the 
emergence of what we generally refer to as social norms. Georges 
Canguilhem (1991) has made a comparison between biological health and 
social health, and has described norms as the product of a normative process, 
as the “functional solution found by life as a response to the demands of the 
environment” (1991: 144). In the same way that “physiological norms define 
less human nature than human habits as they relate to the kinds, levels and 
rhythms of life” (1991: 168), a social norm “offers itself as a possible mode of 
unifying diversity, resolving a difference, settling a disagreement” (1991: 
240). Norms, again to varying degrees, go a step further towards the 
standardisation of behaviour than the general use of concepts in language. In 
the same manner as language / discourse, norms “are relative to each other 
in a system” (1991: 249), but, in the context of my argument, they differ in 
so far as they particularly refer to social behaviour – they inject an element of 
the ‘ought’ into expectations. At their lowest level they may only be 
articulated as a result of something not happening ‘as it ought’, but the point 
is they can be articulated if required. And this articulation enables them to act 
as a ‘stronger’ form of catalyst than a general concept: there is a far clearer 
image of what the resultant behaviour ‘should’ be, of what the product of the 
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self-organisation of expectations should be, even if this behaviour is not 
prescribed in every detail.  
 
Norms, as so understood, as expectations codified to the extent that they can 
be articulated, form the basis of all social organisation, and at their highest 
level they form some type of rule – either written or unwritten. Once both 
actualised and codified the resultant norms (or expectations in their usual, 
specific and non-virtual sense) cannot be reduced back to the expectations 
that gave rise to them. These actual expectations form the catalysts for the 
organisation of the behaviour of others, and most institutions and 
organisations are formed from a mixture of many types of such expectations. 
An organisation may have a written constitution or a set of written rules that 
prescribe in quite some detail the types of behaviour that is expected. These 
act, in catalytic terms, as quite a rigid template; they prescribe the type of 
behaviour to be produced by a social actor, whilst the process that leads to 
that behaviour will be different for each actor based on their own unique self-
organisation of existing expectations. Codes, therefore, are always 
synthesised at the local level. This process of producing social action from 
existing expectations guided by rules of behaviour can, of course, produce 
new expectations; such a production being the outcome of a very complex 
feedback system. The written rules are the objective codifications of a 
generalised set of social actions, themselves the actualisations of complexes 
of individual expectations, which, in their turn, affect the production of social 
behaviour of other social actors, and in so doing, contribute to the formation 
of new expectations in these other actors. There is, of course, no guarantee 
as to what these new expectations will be. They may be sympathetic to the 
organisation and closely resemble their norms – an extreme case of which 
would be a state of complete institutionalisation – or they may react against 
the organisation in the form of some resistance to their norms. Many of these 
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norms / expectations, however, will be unwritten. The same process will 
apply, but it will be far looser, less rigid, less objectified – quite literally, 
because unwritten, less an object for inspection. Such norms can be 
discussed, but for all the reasons given previously, only to a very superficial 
level. At a deep level they are rooted in a unique hinterland of accumulated 
subjective social experience. 
 
In most societies, the highest level of codification is the production of laws 
and legal codes. And as we reach the highest level of codification, we also 
reach the highest level of abstraction, and all the problems that result in 
attempting to apply such abstractions back to examples of actual behaviour 
performed at the local level. Here the ‘oughts’ and ‘ought nots’ are prescribed 
(codified) in such detail that there is no ambiguity as to the social behaviour 
that is expected – or, at least, such is the aim. The problem is, of course, that 
in order to lose the ambiguity in describing an action as something that is not 
permitted the background complexity from which all social actions emerge is 
effectively masked or ignored. This, as I have discussed, is the problem with 
all abstractions. This means that when such an abstraction is then reapplied 
to any particular social act all that complexity comes flooding back, and the 
clearly defined act looses all its hard fought for definition. 
 
As was noted earlier (4.2), Deleuze and Guatttari point to the dangers of over 
codification, whilst extolling the virtues of the ‘line of flight’, a minimum of 
codification. In actuality both of these poles present us with social and 
political problems, and such an understanding of social organisation as 
presented in this thesis may well form the basis of the political issue of the 
current era. Within any social group, the degrees of codification can vary, but 
this degree directly affects both its fluidity (its ability to respond and adapt 
quickly and easily to changes in its milieu) and its predictability (the more 
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rigid a system, the greater the ability to predict its future states) – poles that 
are inversely proportional.  
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 
In order to substantiate the notion of expectations as the ‘non-unit’ of social 
organisation it has been necessary to describe two important modes of their 
being. First, it was necessary to account for their genesis, their initial 
appearance. As far as I have been able to ascertain, no account of the social, 
even those theories broadly sympathetic to the general approach of this 
thesis, have so far achieved this without resorting to some notion of 
transcendental norms or values. This has been achieved through a description 
of their emergence from social noise, a process that remains speculative, for 
the time being at least, yet has the advantage of conforming to the certain 
‘basic facts’ of scientific understanding. Secondly, it needed to describe how 
they become so organised without resorting to a process of imitation that is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to justify. This has been achieved through the 
notion of the self-organisation of an individual social actor’s distributed 
network of expectations. This network was associated with the actor’s neural 
network, and the process of its self-organisation brought about, in part (a 
significant part), through a process of auto-catalysis. This process of auto-
catalysis allows for the behaviour of social others to become significant (in 
fact it requires them as a necessity) without resorting to their direct imitation.  
 
Finally, to account for the detection of non-random social patterns I have 
argued that this self-organisation of expectations is subject to a process of 
codification. This codification of internal relations effectively slows down or 
dampens the dynamics of the system, but the cost is a loss of creativity and 
adaptability. Systems with a minimum of codification (regulation) are very 
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responsive to external events and are very adaptable, but also very 
unpredictable – you cannot control the direction they take.  
 
This last point, the general uncertainty of such systems, and the fact that 
their degree of certainty and predictability, on the one hand, and their degree 
of creativity and adaptability on the other, are inversely proportional, could 
well have important (and uncomfortable) political implications. Yes, the 
system in general, in some form, may well survive, but the cost may be that 
certain parts are not fit enough to. This is natural selection at its most 
dynamic and would be typical of a free market economy – with the proviso, of 
course, that (ironically) neo-liberal governments have intervened to ‘create’ 
such markets. At the other extreme, a system can be codified to such an 
extent that it becomes effectively over-codified. In such a system it would, in 
theory, be possible to control the outcome of any process, but this would 
require that the environment in which the system is nested does not change – 
and this just does not happen. Such a system will die, sooner or later, from 
stagnation or, as Deleuze has remarked in referring to Solzhenitsyn’s 
allegorical novel of the totalitarian Soviet state, through becoming cancerous. 
However, in human terms, a degree of predictability is essential for our 
survival; it may well be that our ability to predict events in our environment 
has been crucial for human evolution as it enables us to plan and overcome 
contingencies. The golden zone in this relationship is the place that I have 
already referred to as the edge of chaos; it is a point somewhere between 
these two extremes. This is where any system, as a coherent and 
recognisable system, is at its most creative – is most adaptable to changes in 
its milieu.99 In social terms there is neither strict order nor creative, yet 
unpredictable chaos, but social chaosmos. 
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7 Conclusions and implications 
 
Two broad conclusions can be drawn from this thesis: a primary one that 
responds directly to its original question regarding the ontological status of 
society and its corollary regarding the relationship between the micro and 
macro in society; and a secondary one that vindicates the methodology 
adopted by this thesis in answering these questions. 
 
This methodology was to a very large degree drawn from the methodology of 
Michel Serres and was both comparative and empirical. It was comparative in 
the sense that it recognised that there is a deep self-similarity across the 
multiple manifestations of life, a recognition that is supported by the 
emerging science of complexity theory. It was empirical (and materialist) in 
the sense that it recognised that an understanding of the social for any social 
actor and observer can only come about through their direct sensory 
experience of their social milieu. In this sense it warned against placing too 
great a degree of explanatory power on abstract notions. But perhaps even 
more important was Serres’ challenge to ‘think the multiple’. Whilst the 
adoption of complexity theory forces its users to recognise the multiplicity of 
life, as I have demonstrated even with those writers sympathetic to this 
general approach, it is very easy to be drawn into the creation of false unities 
and abstractions. Having Serres’ challenge in front of me, as it were, almost 
as a mantra, helped prevent this. In accord with all of this, this thesis has 
conformed, I suggest, to the ‘certain basic facts’ (particularly the evolutionary 
theory of biology) as called for by Searle (2010); or, at the very least, it is not 
antagonistic towards them.  
 
I would like to think that whilst this was not the primary objective of this 
thesis, the actual successful demonstration of this methodology vindicates 
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both its selection and its efficacy, together with its choice of writers and 
thinkers whose work has directly contributed to its conclusions. This choice 
was based on a philosophical rather than a directly socially scientific approach 
to those problems derived from social theory; an approach that has allowed 
the degree of freedom necessary for an act of translation from a broad 
understanding of complexity science into the arena of the social world. Its aim 
has been to allow the exploration of the familiar territory of the social world in 
a new way – a way that would lay the foundation for the resolution of deep 
seated problems in social theory whilst remaining firmly rooted in certain 
basic facts. To this end it was necessary to have a broad understanding of the 
problems facing social theory and various approaches being made to resolve 
them, without having the creativity of the research process overly dampened 
by the existing codes of social theory and social science methodology. In a 
similar fashion, it was necessary to have a broad understanding of complexity 
science and its various incarnations without being drawn into the conventional 
codes of science itself. These codes, or scientific functions as Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994) have referred to them, would also have mitigated the fluidity 
and dynamism of the creative process of translation. 
 
The main objective of this thesis, however, was an account of social order and 
the construction of a social ontology. Its conclusion is that our experience of 
‘non-random social patterns’ is the effect of an emergent and self-organising 
process that is not only complex, as described by complexity science, but one 
that at every level, and from every angle, is irreducibly multiple. It defies 
unification, and any attempt to create unities from or within it will only lead to 
misunderstanding, confusion and paradoxes.  It even defies, as I have shown, 
being understood, in an ontological sense, through any degree of 
formalisation (through axiomatisation or status functions for example) and 
through abstractions (through statistical generalisations). These methods of 
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social analysis may have some efficacy at a certain level of description, but 
they are close to useless for any understanding of the ontological status of the 
social. This is because any such method masks the complexity of social 
relationships, and most importantly fails to recognise that such social 
relationships are forged under local conditions – forged from the furnace of 
the emergent social subject in response to its experiences within its social 
milieu. Our experiences of the macro or global, of social order, is our 
recognition, at the local level of experience, of patterns of behaviour that 
have been stabilised through varying degrees of codification. 
 
Strictly speaking, though, order is not the most accurate term to describe 
such patterning; it would be more accurate to state that social patterns, 
patterns of social behaviour and action, are at the edge of chaos: social 
chaosmos. This is important for number of reasons. Firstly, there is a need to 
jettison any concept of society that involves any form of a top down 
interpretation of social structure, any sense of how society ‘ought’ to be, and 
any sense of discoverable objective rules and norms that govern such 
structure. Society, social structure, is at all points self-organising and 
emergent – it adapts, it evolves, in response to the changing milieu in which it 
is nested. This milieu may involve, of course, an understanding (by way of 
codifications) of larger scale social structures or the physical / ecological 
environment itself. The only question is how effective such an adaptation is. 
Secondly, and leading on from this, such an understanding directly affects 
both the possibility and the method of any intervention on the part of 
politicians or practitioners working within the social sector that attempts to 
effect changes upon this structure – both in terms of actual social / 
community work, economic understanding and control, and political power 
structures. Any attempt to influence the emergent macro structure can only 
be achieved through the influencing of what I have termed expectations. But 
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for all the reasons associated with complexity theory such outcomes are 
inherently uncertain. In this sense Keynes has been vindicated:100 The key to 
economics (and all the social sciences) is to understand the uncertainty of 
expectations. Also in this sense Camus has been vindicated:101 Life, social life, 
is inherently absurd; our survival, to varying degrees, depends upon the 
recognition of pattern, order and meaning, but we can only discover its 
inherent uncertainty. 
 
The observable fact that there appears to be a large degree of non-
randomness to social behaviour, I have argued, is due to a process of 
codification that effectively slows down these emergent and very dynamic 
social systems; a process that can only occur at the local level – at the level 
of the individual social actor. The link, therefore, between the local / micro 
level and the global / macro level of society is produced by this system of 
codes – a system that effectively provides a multiplicity of feedback loops that 
both directly and indirectly influences individual social actions. The macro is 
emergent from the micro and comes into focus due to this process of 
codification. 
 
This process, however, is far from straightforward. At its most objective level, 
though never entirely so, are, perhaps, the social group’s collections of legal 
codes. Here codes attempt to clarify as to what actions are permitted, even 
expected or demanded, and which are not permitted. They are objective in 
the sense that they have been written down, codified into language in such a 
way that ambiguity regarding expected social action is reduced to an absolute 
minimum. This ambiguity however, as experience tells us, is never entirely 
eradicated. This is due, as I have attempted to demonstrate, because social 
action can only take place at the local level, and for any code to be ‘enacted’ 
it needs to be absorbed into to the self-organising, dynamic, inter-subjective 
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system that is the social actor, and this process of absorption is always unique 
– both for each actor, and, to some degree, for each time of its ‘occurrence’. 
 
On a similar level of objectivity, perhaps, lies what John Searle (2010) has 
termed ‘status functions’, functions that have been imposed upon objects and 
people by society that cannot be said to exist solely by virtue of their physical 
structure. Examples given by Searle are “a piece of private property, the 
president of the United States, a twenty-dollar bill, and a professor in a 
university” – all of which “are able to perform certain functions in virtue of the 
fact that they have a collectively recognised status that enables them to 
perform those functions” (2010: 7). However, the recognised status of each of 
these is no more clear-cut and universal than those of legal codes. The 
function of each of these, in as far as they influence the actions and behaviour 
of social actors, still needs to be determined though the same unique process 
of absorption by individual social actors in response to local conditions. 
 
So called social facts, of course, are no more objective, perhaps even less so. 
For what we like to think of as real and tangible aspects of society, those 
statistics, classes, and classifications that we so love talking about, are shown 
to be nothing more than abstract generalisations. At their best, these 
abstractions offer us little more than a set of descriptions that allow certain 
features and trends within the social flow, certain types of non-random 
patterns, to be noticed. At their worst, however, these higher-level 
descriptions are taken to be definitions – definitions of society and of what 
controls it. It is inevitable, of course, that such solidifications of the social 
process have some influence on individual social action, they effectively 
provide another system of feedback loops, but they do not directly control the 
social process, nor do they define it. 
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These codes, these abstractions and solidifications, are absolutely necessary 
of course, as they slow down a highly dynamic and fluid social process into 
something that allows a degree of stability and predictability to enter our 
lives, and life would be very difficult, if not impossible, without some degree 
of this stability and predictability. We would be unable to work cooperatively 
to respond to the demands of our environments and physical needs. But we 
need to remind ourselves that they are not themselves the source of the 
social; rather, that they, themselves, are the product of ever more fluid 
codes. They have emerged as responses to the above demands, as practical 
solutions to the problems posed by our various (social, political, economic, 
and ecological for example) milieus – and to this end they work. Their source 
codes are likewise emergent; emergent from repetitions and habits of 
everyday social action, repetitions that are both conscious and non-conscious, 
repetitions that can be codified to the extent that they can form a discourse 
on social behaviour and action, and repetitions that cannot. These social 
actions, I have argued, are the actualisations of virtual networks that whilst 
organised within each social actor extend well beyond them. These networks, 
to the extent that they refer to any general set of social situations, I have 
termed expectations. However, any particular expectation, one that is capable 
of having a particular description or referent, becomes an actualisation as 
soon as it is so described. To this extent, the virtual hinterland in which 
expectations have their existence remains forever in the shadows. 
 
Tracing this emergent process ‘back’ even further, I have argued that these 
expectations are themselves emergent from the pre-subjective / pre-social 
realm. This realm is effectively the condition of new born child; a child who is 
conscious of their environment and can respond to it to some degree, but who 
is not yet self-conscious, whose subjectivity has yet to emerge in response to 
the presence of others. In effect, socially, this environment amounts to 
 192 
nothing more than social noise. But it is from the very first repetitions and 
rhythms within this noise that both time and expectations for the future 
individual social actor are born. There is, of course, no clear line to be crossed 
such that at one moment the social singularity becomes a social subject, 
though sociality and subjectivity are effectively the same – inter-subjectivity. 
And because of this, expectations, right from the very earliest point when 
they could be said to exist, will always be open networks, and multiple in their 
very nature. 
 
I have further argued that these expectations, despite in many respects being 
the ‘atoms’ or ‘non-units’ of social order, are not passed from person to 
person, they are not copied or imitated – even though, in a certain sense, 
imitation has a role to play. Rather, expectations are always the emergent 
results of the unique history of individual social actors, and are, right from the 
very earliest of stages of this emergent process, too complex, too multiple, 
and too dependent on local conditions to be copied. They are, however, 
heavily influenced in their emergence by the experienced actions of others. 
These actions act as catalysts to their formation; they form (in a sense) a 
mould or template that provides a form or shape that the internal self-
organising process can grow into. It makes no sense what-so-ever, though, to 
call them copies, as everything from which they are emergent and which 
provides the dynamics that holds them together, not only ‘resides’ within the 
social subject, but this hinterland, with its path-dependence, is always unique 
and incapable of being copied – it is just too complex! 
 
Individual social actors, therefore, are only individual to the extent that they 
are singularities of social action – they are centres, biological centres, for the 
processing of social information. In this sense each action is, to some degree, 
unique and local. As subjects, however, they are irreducibly social – their 
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subjectivity could not have emerged from the social noise without the 
presence of others. Further, it is their adaptation to their social milieu, both 
individually and collectively (in the sense of ‘shared’ codes), that provides the 
dynamics of social evolution and survival – and this is at its most creative 
when society is ‘on the edge of chaos’; when there exists a state of social 
chaosmos. 
 
A final comment: Nothing remains stationary, least of all this line of research. 
As I have already stated, this thesis has not attempted the production of a 
new social theory that can now be applied to the direct description of social 
phenomena or to the design of interventions into the social process. It has 
merely attempted to produce a map that will allow the exploration of familiar 
territory in a new, and hopefully useful, way. It has been a creative act of 
translation from one field of knowledge to another, and as such claims to be 
no more than the work of philosophical reflection. To my understanding, 
however, the value of philosophy comes from just such explorations; from the 
creative process of reflecting on familiar problems in new ways. As such, 
however, further acts of translation will be required before it can be directly 
applied to social issues and phenomena. 
 
There are two other, more philosophical, directions that this line of research 
could take; directions that whilst having a theoretical base, have (I suggest) 
quite urgent practical implications. One of these concerns ethics, from which 
two particular questions emerge. First of all: To what extent can the norms or 
codes as this thesis has described them be regarded as normative? Now in 
one sense this is a very straightforward question. As described from this 
theoretical perspective, and as described by Canguilhem (1991), they would 
appear to be normative by default – they ‘naturally’ regulate the social 
process. But the problem is, of course, that humans have the ability to reflect 
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on this process, and purposefully attempt to steer it in certain directions; 
when faced with ethical dilemmas they are not only able to automatically 
respond, but to reflect on the decisions they face. So, from where do we 
derive our guidance as to how to make these decisions? This is of particular 
importance since, having rejected any notion of an absolute reference point, it 
is all too easy to slip into either a general moral relativism, or perhaps, even 
worse, a media / market led set of expectations or norms. In this respect, it 
would be of value to explore the degree to which a ‘virtue ethics’ could be 
adapted to, or developed out of, this thesis. Secondly: To what extent can 
Sartre’s notion of responsibility be re-grounded in such a social ontology? This 
would appear to have value in a number of directions. Firstly, because if we 
accept how any of our actions can become catalysts for the formation of 
expectations in others, our level of responsibility for those actions is 
significant. Secondly, because of the very high degree of social connectivity 
and complexity, the effects of our actions can spread very widely and have 
many unintended consequences. And lastly, and following on from this last 
point, this connectivity extends well beyond the realm of even a world-wide 
humanity. We need to understand our connectivity to our planet, to our eco-
system, and to many other non-human systems. 
 
The other direction (though not unrelated to the above) concerns politics. 
Here a number of questions demand answers: Accepting that some degree of 
codification of the social process is absolutely necessary, what degree or level 
of codification is the most effective? How do we decide on what ‘effective’ 
means? Who has control over this process? Who makes the decisions? Why is 
‘democracy’ the most effective method of making these decisions regarding 
the degree and type of imposed social codes? Questions regarding this 
process of codification appear to me to be the most urgent of our current 
political concerns; concerns regarding the degree of control or regulation of 
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the financial system; concerns regarding the ‘marketization’ of education and 
the health service. I would suggest that whilst there are many other areas 
that would benefit from being re-evaluated from the perspective of the social 
ontology offered by this thesis, for example notions regarding the ‘unity’ of 
the state or other collectives of citizens and the relationship between these 
‘collectives’, that the problems concerning this process of codification cuts to 
the very core of modern politics, and could, in many ways, define it for some 
time to come. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 By referring to ‘order’ here I imply only a general sense of regularity or degree of prediction 
regarding future conditions, not a strict sense of mechanical order that would permit of an exact 
prediction. 
2 If they had been successful another problem would have opened up, namely the ontological 
status of these of these laws and structures, and their causal relationship regarding the behaviour of 
social agents. 
3 For an excellent overview of the tensions between these two perspectives written from a 
multicultural viewpoint, see Fay (1996). The phrase ‘pernicious dualism’ is his. 
4 See Wittgenstien (2001). 
5 Or such problems are deemed to be ‘psychological’ and therefore outside of the realm of social 
theory. One of the advantages of the deconstruction of unities is the corresponding problematizing 
of academic boundaries. If concepts only have meaning in terms of open networks then this is 
inevitable. 
6 As I explain in section 2.5, the methodological  approach of this thesis is empirical. This requires 
that any existent must be capable of being ‘sensed’ in some manner, even if this requires the aid of 
technology. 
7 This has not escaped the attention of many very eminent thinkers of the 20th Century of course. In 
terms of social science, Robert Skidelsky argues that “Uncertainty pervades Keynes’s picture of 
economic life” (2010: 83), and it could be argued that it was such a phenomenon that led to Camus 
and others to describe life as absurd. 
8 Taken from the transcript of the speech made to Fabian New Year Conference held at Imperial 
College, London on Saturday 14th January 2006, available at www.fabian-
society..org.uk/press_office/news_latest_all.asp?pressid=520 (accessed 25/01/2006) 
9 See Hobbes (1985). 
10 Taken from ‘Course Guide to Understanding Connexions’ (p4), Crown Copyright 2002, ref. 
UCX/CG. 
11 The other aspect to this, of course, which is not discussed in this thesis, concerns the ethics of 
such interventions. It is one thing to respond to an individual who approaches a practitioner for 
help, it is another for that practitioner to attempt to influence the expectations of every individual 
they meet. 
12 Higher Education Initiative Fund, round 4. 
13 In other places, Serres refers to this process as ‘cross-breeding’, a process he regards as his 
‘cultural ideal’. See Serres & Latour (1995). 
14 From here on, I shall italicise ‘expectations’ when I use it specifically in the sense developed by 
this thesis, and leave it not italicised when used in the general sense. 
15 Following Serres’ own practice I shall italicise ‘noise’ when I use it the sense described in 
section 2.1 in order to separate this meaning from its everyday use. 
16 David Webb has been my supervisor throughout this project and was responsible for my 
introduction to the work of  Serres in the first place. He was able to provide guidance as to the 
contents of Serres’ Hermes series together with translations of several sections of test from this 
series for post-graduate seminars.  It is impossible to overestimate his influence and inspiration to 
my research. For this and his continued support I offer a very sincere thank you. 
17 See also Serres’ Hermes I, and Webb (2011) 
18 Serres makes numerous references to maps as analogies to guides that help us navigate between 
academic disciplines. Brian Fay (1996) also makes much of such an analogy; he points out that 
maps are not meant to represent reality, but merely show the relationship between certain aspects 
of it. 
19 This will be explained in greater detail in section 2.2. 
20 ‘Statue’ is a regular metaphor used by Serres to refer to a fixed or frozen state of affairs, as 
opposed to being fluid and mobile. He may well have derived its use from Moliere’s Don Juan, 
which is the subject of any essay written by him (in Serres, 1982). 
21 Hermes was not only the Greek messenger god, but also the god of traders and thieves. As such 
he perfectly represents the themes of communication, translation and distributions that permeate 
Serres work. 
22 The phrase complexity science is probably more accurate than complexity theory for, as Durie et 
al point out (2007): “at this stage in the development of complexity theory there are no generally 
agreed set of concepts or ideas that define it as a separate academic discipline.” 
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23 As I explain in greater detail later (5.1) the notion of time cannot be separated from Serres 
understanding of emergence, so cannot be ignored, but a full exposition of it would be too great a 
distraction from the task in hand. 
24 See Serres’ The Birth of Physics (2000), a reflection on Lucretius’ epic poem, On The Nature of 
the Universe, itself a versification and celebration of the atomism of Epicurus. 
25 In using the capital  letter here I am highlighting our tendency to not only fix these descriptions 
into definitions, but to confer upon them a transcendent (Platonic) ontological status. 
26 Though, as I have already pointed out, Serres was familiar with network and information theory 
which no doubt influenced his thinking in this direction. 
27 Kauffman’s model of 6N dimensional space provides a relatively simple description of such 
‘space’. See pages 58-60 of his Investigations. 
28 See also Philip Ball’s The Self-Made Tapestry for a wider, but perhaps more reductionist 
approach to pattern formation in nature, but nevertheless, one that explains much of the physics 
and chemistry involved. 
29 I have also referred to an unpublished paper ‘New Communities, New Relations: The Impact of 
Community Organization on Health Outcomes’ by Robin Durie, Katrina Wyatt & Hazel Stutely 
form the Health Complexity unit at the Peninsula Medical School. This paper uses complexity 
theory to evaluate a community regeneration programme. 
30 This concept of connectivity is explored by Mark Buchanan in his Small World: uncovering 
nature’s hidden networks (2003). 
31 Regarding this connectivity, Leibniz’s influence on Serres is an interesting line of research. 
Important in this, perhaps, is the difference between Leibniz’s physics and metaphysics, for whilst 
in the former all matter is irreducibly open and multiple, in the latter the monads do not connect or 
communicate with each other at all. 
32 The emergence and effect of the Internet has greatly added to the complexity of the range of 
interactions, and has made an understanding of ‘local’ problematic. 
33 The Birth of Physics was originally published in France in 1977. 
34 See pages 58-60 of his Investigations for a more detailed description of 6N dimensional state 
space. 
35 Kauffman writes: “A candidate fourth law: As an average trend, biospheres and the universe 
create novelty and diversity as fast as they can manage to do so without destroying the 
accumulated organization that is the basis and nexus from which further novelty is discovered and 
incorporated into the propagating organization.” 
36 My use of words in single quotation marks is similar to Derrida’s use of “under erasure” –not 
strictly accurate in an ontological sense, but necessary in order for my ideas to be explained. 
37 These terms and ideas are not original to Cilliers. For an early exposition of them ideas see the 
work of Paul Churchland (particularly 1992), but even Churchland does not claim complete 
originality. 
38 For a more detailed explanation see Churchland (1992). 
39 Taken from an unpublished translation by David Webb. 
40 Serres may well have derived this model from his engagement with the development of 
Information Theory (see Hallward, 2003b).  James Gleick notes that one discovery by Claude 
Shannon “showed how to maximise flow through a network of many branches, where the network 
could be a communication channel or a railroad or a power grid or water pipes.” (Gleick, 2011: 
264-5) 
41 Taken from the same unpublished translation as note 33 above. 
42 I do not wish to imply that the social can be reduced to individual brains, or that brains, in some 
manner, are the source of the social. I merely wish to make the (to me) obvious point that the 
actual processing of social information can only be accomplished through actual brains. 
43 See also Derrida (1997) Part I, Chapter 2. 
44 The term ‘nested set’ is that used by Delanda (2000). 
45 It seems to me that Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus describes the human response to this paradox 
perfectly. 
46 Nietzsche makes a similar point in his originally unpublished essay ‘On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense’. 
47 I make no apology for equating the mind and the brain, even though such an assumption would 
require another thesis (at least) to fully justify. Based on everything that I proceed to explain 
regarding the emergence of the self-conscious and social self I see anything other than such an 
assumption as introducing a dualism that is at odds with everything that I argue. 
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48 The axiom of choice states that from every family of disjoint sets (sets having no members in 
common) a set can be constructed containing exactly one element from each of the given family of 
sets. It is independent of the other axioms and is rejected by some mathematicians.  
49 Serres also points out that the words addict /addiction are derived from the Latin ‘addicere’ – to 
declare. 
50 In this respect I am inclined to think that Schopenhauer makes a valid point when, in The 
Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, he differentiated objects into four independent 
realms with independent means of reasoning. In this respect, only material things are subject to 
cause and effect; abstract concepts are subject to reason in terms of logic, but cannot enter into 
causal relationships. 
51 As abstract concepts their existence is that of a mental phenomenon. They do not exist outside 
of human brains; they are not Platonic in any sense – there is simply no evidence to suggest such 
an existence. 
52 A Thousand Plateaus was originally published (in French) in 1980, and Genesis in 1982. 
53 In discussing the introduction of the formal properties of completion into government practise 
(2008: 131) Foucault effectively describes their conversion from  the formal into codifications. 
54 Immanence implies both an outgrowth of something that pre-exists internally and an emphasis 
on the mind – neither of which are implied by emergence. 
55 In Genesis (and many other places), Serres questions whether it is possible to make such clear 
boundaries: “I hear without clear frontiers, without divining an isolated source…” (Serres, 1995a: 
7) 
56 This notion of a component part capable of being unplugged from one assemblage and plugged 
into another would also appear similar to Serres’ notion of a ‘black box’ – a notion he identifies 
with the subsuming of multiplicities under unities. See Serres (1995a: 5) 
57 See, for example, his A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (1997). 
58 Even though I argue for the uncertainty of process, I would justify my use of ‘inevitable’ by 
arguing that if it is attempted to illuminate as much variation as possible a certain social tension 
will be created that will gradually build until the pressure causes a breakdown. This breakdown is 
inevitable even though its time and place cannot be predicted. 
59 As Beatrice Han points out: “an analysis is needed of what the individual (as not yet formed 
subject) is as a point of departure for subjectivation. However, such an analysis cannot be found in 
Foucault’s work.” (Han, 2002: 166) 
60 In using the term ‘univocity’ I do not wish to imply any sense of monism. It does not refer to the 
‘oneness’ of all things, rather to the fact that all ‘things’ are emergent and multiple – but emergent 
from a single process. In other words, quite literally, nature speaks with a single voice. 
61 This invokes what could be termed ‘the fractal dimension’, a self-similarity through scale. 
62 See also Canguilhem’s description of the process of  normativity (1991) ; also see Foucault’s 
Preface to his History of Sexuality Volume 2 in (2000: 200) 
63 I would suggest that these are questions that Foucault was unable to answer due to his attempt to 
understand the constitution of the self; the enacting of codes and techniques can only be performed 
by social subjects – but it was the emergence of the social subject that he was attempting to 
describe and which he could not therefore presuppose. See also note 49. 
64 For Foucault such a psychological attitude would imply the presence of a subject, a 
psychological individual that, in the Archaeology of Knowledge, he was trying to uncover the 
necessary pre-conditions for. 
65 Beartrice Han argues that Foucault offers no clear meaning of the term ‘historical apriori’ (2002: 
38) and that this is because of the ambiguous position of the subject in his work. She suggests that 
it is a “nonanthropological version of the fundamental”, a version of the “transcendental without a 
subject”. (2002: 6) Han, though, does not appear to appreciate the importance of emergence. She 
accepts that the term refers to the conditions of possibility of the subject and the acceptability of 
truth though. To my understanding it refers to the historical (multiple and complex)  conditions 
into which a being is thrown at birth, and out of which its subjectivity emerges. It forms, therefore, 
the necessary conditions of that subject, but it is historical and not transcendental. 
66 I do not wish to disregard Foucault’s critique of the subject, but, at the same time, I cannot avoid 
making the obvious statement that social actions are only performed by particular actors in 
particular situations. I do though think that there is a way to explain the emergence of the subject 
that would satisfy Foucault’s concerns whilst remaining at the local level. This I do in sections 4.3 
and 5.1. 
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67 Searle is critical of Foucault for the opposite reason. He writes that “not all of Foucault’s 
examples seem to be able to satisfy our constraints of exactness and intentionality. We cannot say 
who exactly is exercising power over whom and what exactly is the intentional content of the 
exercise.” (2010: 154) 
68 Or, perhaps, this is something his interpreters are more guilty of. Perhaps he intended no more 
than a descriptive account. As Han points out, in The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault: 
“proposes to study discourse at  level of the purely discursive, with no referent, to analyze the 
‘discursive practices from which one can define what things are and identify the use of words’” 
(2002: 53-4). He therefore accepts a nominalism and a discursive methodology. However, such 
description does not account for any causal relation. 
69 In addition to the comments of note 12, a map, in this sense, acts as a guide to living. The absurd 
paradox of living is that our survival depends on our ability to make predictions about the future 
state of affairs, whilst at the same time accepting our inability to make 100% accurate predictions. 
A good guide will reduce uncertainty to the minimum possible. 
70 This paper was referred to by Albertsen & Diken (2003) – so I have them to thank for bringing 
this wonderful paper to my attention. 
71 I do not take this to mean that a complete relativism applies. I would suggest that the 
contestation would result in a process of normativity not unlike that described by Canghuilhem 
(1991). 
72 Serres argues that we need to renegotiate our relationship with the Earth in The Natural 
Contract. 
73 It is worth noting that the problems highlighted here also apply to that other favourite 
explanation used by politicians and some social scientists, namely values, particularly ‘British 
values’. 
74 I do not wish to be totally dismissive of statistics. ‘Statistical mechanics’ and ‘population 
theory’ are of great value, but only as a descriptive method – of allowing certain trends and 
phenomena to be seen that otherwise would go unnoticed. They do not, however, have any direct 
causal influence – though there may be indirect influences through various feedback routes. 
Statistics, therefore, have a greater value in sociology that social ontology. 
75 But do not let us forget that the importance of imitation can be traced back to at least Aristotle: 
“Imitation is natural from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that 
he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation.” (Poetics 4) 
76 I accept that this is a somewhat simplified claim, but a more detailed examination of the role of 
genes would be too much of a diversion. Stuart Kauffman’s critique of the emphasis on replication 
in the process, outlined in section 5.2, does go some way to rectify this. 
77 Serres makes frequent reference to the Greek myth of Penelope, and her endless task of weaving 
and unweaving. 
78 Foucault would not disagree. In The Archaeology of Knowledge he points to the applicability of 
his description to events beyond discourse. 
79 For an explanation of the difference between ‘normal’ and ‘normative’ see Canguilhem (1991). 
80 Although Wrong does not make this claim, I would suggest that the value of this ambiguity 
points is that it is indicative of the complexity that lies behind intentional relations. 
81 Expectations had a significant role within the economic theory of Keynes (see Skidelsky, 2010). 
It would be interesting to apply this virtual / actual distinction to this theory. 
82 It is also interesting to note that in commenting on the role of imitation Mead also refers to 
Tarde. 
83 It is a ‘centre of experience’, what Deleuze has referred to as a ‘pre-individual singularity’ – a 
biological centre (a brain) that has yet to develop self-hood. 
84 I refer here to the noise of the social milieu, not the ‘internal’ noise of the pre-social. 
85 In this sense Sartre was correct in making a link between consciousness and nothingness. 
86 For possible models of this see Churchland (1992). 
87 As I’ve already noted, in this sense at least, Sartre was correct: consciousness is, ‘in-itself’, no-
thing. What he didn’t realise, of course, was that this was a relative nothingness emergent from the 
materiality of the biological being. 
88 For a neuro-biological description of how this works see Churchland (1992), particularly chapter 
10 and ‘prototype activation’. 
89 I am not suggesting that ostensive learning is the only method of learning, but I am suggesting, 
in line with Quine (1965), that objects need to cause sensory stimulation, and thus engender 
stimulus meaning, in the early stages of language learning. Quine’s use of such terms as ‘pre-
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linguistic space’ and ‘to weight qualitative differences unequally’ (1965: 83) also suggest a degree 
of agreement with this thesis. 
90 Although these appear to be very different things, it will be my argument that in fact they are all 
the emergent effects of varying degrees / types of codification of expectations. 
91 Quine (1965) makes the same point regarding the Indeterminacy of Translation. His analogy of 
two bushes cut to identical shapes, yet held together by completely different patterns of branches is 
particularly illustrative of this point.  
92 This ‘translation’ across academic boundaries is central to the entire work of Serres. In The Birth 
of Physics, for example, he reprieves the physics of ancient atomism as ‘the science of relations’. 
Serres’ isomorphism is derived from a such univocal understanding of relationships. 
93 In The Birth of Physics, Serres refers to this flow by the most energy conserving route as the 
thalwig – the route of the quickest descent. 
94 See Latour (2005). 
95 In this sense I agree with Searle when he argues “that all of institutional reality is created by 
linguistic representation.” (2010: 14) However, the danger with this general linguistic approach is 
that expressed by Serres’ critique of abstraction and the philosophy of language. 
96 Serres makes this distinction in The Birth of Physics. Martian law represents transcendent law;  
law that in some manner exists outside of the system it controls – as opposed to the emergent law 
of Venus. The trouble with the former is that it is understood in absolute and atemporal terms – 
terms that are unresponsive to changing circumstances. 
97 Serres, as I have already noted, accepts the importance of language, but does not directly refer to 
the emergence of the social. Others, like Searle, whose formalism I would otherwise critique, do 
stress the fundamental importance of language. 
98 For a more detailed account of language learning see Quine (1965), particularly chapter 3. 
99 An interesting ambiguity emerges here. As all systems are effectively open systems the question 
may arise as to where a system ends and its milieu begins. Any answer to this question is, in a 
sense, both arbitrary and pragmatic. For some systems (such as biological beings) it is fairly 
obvious, but for others (like communities and societies) this is less so. For the purpose of this 
thesis the only relatively obvious ‘system’ is that of the emergent social subject, purely because 
each human brain becomes the centre (the attractor) of organisation. 
100 See Skidelsky (2010). 
101 I am referring, of course, to his writings on The Absurd, particularly his The Myth of Sisyphus 
(2005). 
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Appendix 
 
The Role of Expectations in Social Change: Project Report 
 
1. Aims and methodology 
 
The aim of this project was to work with a local social sector organisation that 
made interventions to promote social change (e.g. regeneration). It was our 
hypothesis that such organisations tended to develop both the overall aims / 
outcomes of these interventions and the actual practices of that bring them 
about. However, despite policy and practice decisions being evidence based 
(normally based on reports of what has worked in similar situations 
elsewhere) we believed there to be a lack of understanding as to the detailed 
process that links practice to outcomes, in particular regarding the object of 
intervention. Our research suggests that practice actually intervenes on 
people’s expectations; a term we take to refer to embedded sets of complex 
relations that undermine any simple understanding of cause and effect. This 
research further suggested that these expectations display many 
characteristics of complex systems, including self-organisation. It was our aim 
for these research findings to be examined in a concrete setting and then 
used to develop guidelines that will enable more effective interventions to be 
made in the future. 
 
An initial meeting was arranged with Conrad Parke, from Regeneration West 
Midlands, to discuss the feasibility of this project working with a local 
regeneration scheme, and if so, who should be contacted. The outline project 
met with a very positive response. We were informed that there were three 
regeneration projects running in Stoke-on-Trent (covering the town centres of 
Stoke, Longton and Burslem), and were advised it would be best to focus on 
Burslem, as it was the most developed. We were given the contact details of 
Julian Read, the manager of the Burslem project (Burslem Regeneration 
Company). An initial meeting was then arranged with Julian to explain our 
project and to discover details about the structure of both his and the other 
local regeneration projects. It was agreed that we would interview him, his 
two full-time project workers, and the chair of his regeneration company. 
 
We also decided that we should interview the managers of the other two local 
projects, to get a wider perspective, and also the Programme Manager from 
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the City Council who had overall responsibility for all three projects. All these 
interviews took place except for that with the Programme Manager, which 
proved impossible to schedule. The interviews were semi-structured, and 
were based around the following four questions: 
1. What is it you are trying to achieve? 
2. How will you know whether you have achieved this? 
3. What is it that you do, on a daily basis, to achieve this? 
4. In your daily work, what is it that you are trying to change / affect? 
These questions were constructed to try and uncover the object of 
intervention, even if such an object was not recognised as such. 
 
2. Evaluation of theoretical research findings against practical 
research findings 
 
The PhD thesis (Social Chaosmos) that provided the theoretical background to 
this research project drew heavily on the emerging science of complexity 
theory and its application to social systems. This was not a completely novel 
approach, and both this thesis and this research project were informed by an 
existing retrospective “case study of a process of sustained regeneration 
which took place on a severely deprived estate in West Cornwall” carried out 
by the Health Complexity unit at the Peninsula Medical School (Durie, Wyatt & 
Stutely, 2007). This study used “complexity theory as the theoretical 
framework with which to understand a community regeneration process.” 
Both this case study and Social Chaosmos drew heavily on Paul Cilliers’ 
Complexity & Postmodernism (1998) for our understanding of complex 
systems, though the thesis, in attempting a translation of these ideas into a 
social ontology added significant elements into the description. Rather than 
provide a list of the key features of complexity theory here, we refer the 
reader to either of these two works. 
 
Regarding social regeneration, however, Social Chaosmos restricted itself to a 
description of a ‘natural’ self-organising social process – one that occurs 
relatively spontaneously, i.e. without the planned intention of regeneration. 
By self-organisation we mean a process whereby the internal organisation of 
an open system increases in both complexity and structure without the 
guidance or management of an outside source. As Cilliers notes, this “is a 
process whereby a system can develop a complex structure from fairly 
unstructured beginnings” and adapt that structure “in order to cope with 
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changes in the environment” (1998: 12). In this sense, then, Social 
Chaosmos only provides a background theory for the emergence of the social 
system. It does not, not directly at least, comment on how to intervene into 
that process – on how to subject the system to guidance or management 
from without. However, it does provide the concepts from which such an 
intervention could be developed. The question becomes, therefore: How do 
you intervene in such a process to achieve particular, desired structures? How 
do you affect the emergence and development of people’s expectations? 
 
It is regarding this point, the object of intervention, people’s expectations, 
that a practical problem arises. The sense in which Social Chaosmos uses the 
term expectation is very particular and novel, and it would be unrealistic to 
find direct evidence that this was the intended object of intervention in any 
actual regeneration project. However, even though it is not a widely accepted 
or used term within the social sciences, it would still be applicable in the 
sense used by Wrong (1995) as the actual expectations people have of what 
will or should happen in a given circumstance. To this extent, the results of 
this research project did provide some evidence to suggest that the 
theoretical focus on expectations can be useful and effective. 
 
Two points need stating from the outset, however. First, none of the three 
project managers interviewed could cite any theoretical perspective from 
which their strategies or actions took shape or direction. Each appeared to be 
working on the basis of what one termed “an intuitive sense”, which we took 
to mean a mix of relying on their own personal knowledge, experience and 
skills of assessment, together with an assessment of “what works in other 
areas”. As one of the managers explained, there is generally an attempt to 
distil 'best practice' from initiatives that have taken place in other areas of the 
country – though it was pointed out that it was “difficult to prove success”. 
This last point we interpret as an intuitive grasp of the non-linearity of the 
regeneration process. By ‘non-linearity’ we refer to the difficulty of identifying 
a direct causal link between a given state and the circumstances that brought 
it about; that there is no straight-forward linear link between the two. This 
means that for any accepted ‘successful’ project (one whose ‘outcomes’ are to 
be replicated) it is next to impossible to state the causes of those outcomes; 
that even if an accurate set of ‘causal’ factors could be isolated, there is 
absolutely no guarantee that in a different environment they would produce 
the same effect. This problematizes the value in identifying such successes in 
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one socio-geographic area as a method of identifying possible causal features 
of successes in another such area, even though such research may provide 
certain insights. One manager told us that the “picture is so complicated”.         
 
Second, due to this lack of a theoretical regeneration framework, there was 
nothing, in a theoretical sense, to compare our own theoretical framework 
against. Consequently, we are only too aware of the tendency on our part to 
offer an interpretation ‘that fits’ our own purposes. We took some care to try 
and not lead answers in the direction, or in the terminology, that made an 
easy fit into our own, but, due to this lack of a theoretical framework on their 
part, their answers were in ‘every-day language’, which lacked the precision 
of a more technical ‘jargon’. Some degree of interpretation on our part was, 
therefore, inevitable. 
 
Having said that, in trying to ascertain what it was that they believed they 
were working to change, to actually make an intervention on, all their 
answers were easily interpreted as various descriptions of expectations – 
albeit expectations that have undergone at least some degree of codification 
such that they were much more in line with the term as used by Wrong 
(1995), as the actual expectations people had of what will, or what should 
happen. What perhaps was of more significance was the absence of a strong 
consensus as to anything different; no person interviewed had a firm opinion 
on what this certain something was. One manager actually talked of 
“translating expectations”, in the sense that in meetings with local politicians 
there was a need to match the expressed ‘expectations’ of the community to 
those who had the political power, and the “matching of expectations”, this 
time in the sense of community expectations to those of potential economic 
investors. Other general terms used in this context were: motivation, public 
opinion, vision, belief, hope, aspiration, perception, and attitude – all of which 
can be interpreted as various codifications of expectations as so described. 
 
There also existed amongst those interviewed what could only be described as 
an intuitive understanding that the communities that they were working with 
were complex systems, at least in terms of a high degree of connectivity. One 
project worker, for example, talked of trying to create communication 
networks between local traders and various resident and community groups, 
of trying to encourage the exchange of information, of getting different 
groups of people talking to each other. 
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One of most frequent comments made by all those interviewed was the 
existence of a strong negative attitude towards the City Council, an attitude 
that was often cited as the biggest obstacle to regeneration. There appeared 
to exist a widely held belief that whatever the council decided to do or support 
was, by definition, wrong; this has become the starting point of public 
opinion, a condition that needs overcoming for any Council led or supported 
project to succeed – in other words, there exists a strong prejudice against 
the City Council. Another often cited problem working against regenerative 
success is the existence within the City of a strong sense of parochialism; that 
individual communities see themselves as exactly that, as individual, with the 
members of these communities having a stronger sense of affiliation with 
their community than with their City or region, to the extent that they often 
appear to be in competition with other communities within the City – a 
situation perhaps not helped by there being three regeneration projects, each 
focused on a separate ‘town’, rather than one for the City.  
 
In complexity terms, these key features, the prejudice against the City 
Council and the strong parochialism, could be cited as examples of sub-
systems that have become ‘locked-in’, that the codes that hold the sub-
system together have become, in a sense, over-coded, and are approaching 
that mechanistic state where stagnation threatens. This is a double-edged 
sword. Such an over coding is often the result of a lack of communication with 
other communities in the first place, but once established, through repetition 
and habit, it works against such communication. The solution, in part at least, 
is exactly as proposed – the creation of communication networks. These 
should allow for an increased ‘flow’ (or more accurately, according to Social 
Chaosmos, the greater opportunity for a catalytic effect for change brought 
about by contact with others from different communities or backgrounds) of 
expectations from the wider community and the building of trust and 
understanding with the City Council. This, though, would be more effective, in 
regeneration terms, if it took place within structures that allowed contact and 
communication with communities in other cities that have been involved in 
successful regeneration schemes themselves, and if the communication 
networks allowed for a greater degree of practical involvement by members of 
the community. This last aspect was not addressed by Social Chaosmos, but it 
was significant in the retrospective case study conducted by the Health 
Complexity unit. From our perspective, it emerged in and through a 
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consideration of how the research into expectations in Social Chaosmos could 
be applied, which can be taken as evidence that the research will have a 
practical dimension.  
 
In the Health Complexity unit’s case study, such locked-in behaviour was a 
very significant factor in the economic, social and health decline of the estate, 
and was cited at clear evidence of “path dependency of both agency 
representatives and residents”. The case study explains that typically such 
locked-in behaviour occurs: “when there is insufficient experience of different 
outcomes to persuade elements within the system to experiment with 
alternative behaviours; and when local experience reaffirms the expediency of 
current behaviour patterns. Current behaviour is thus exacerbated or 
strengthened through the effect of reinforcement by [negative] feedback 
loops” (Durie et al, 2007: 8).1 Two related solutions were offered to this 
problem. First, citing Buchanan (2003), it notes that “social network theory 
suggests that, for the most part, we maintain strong connections to those 
who are close to us, such as immediate family and neighbours, and that the 
effect of these relations is to reinforce current views and behaviours.” It 
proceeds to suggest that the potential for change is facilitated through a 
system of ‘weak connectors’. These, in contrast to ‘strong connectors’, “link 
people who are mere acquaintances”, people who can facilitate the formation 
of further acquaintances. Without such connections, it points out, social 
systems lack “the potential for any examples of innovative behaviour”, 
behaviour that has the potential to influence small internal  sections of itself 
with the possibility of such innovative behaviour spreading through the whole 
system (Durie et al, 2007: 8). Second, it was noted that in the case study, a 
decision was made to hand over a large degree of control of the regeneration 
process to the residents themselves. This, the report noted, “was seen as 
very significant by both the statutory agencies and the residents” (ibid: 12). 
This, it argued, was due to “the way in which problems and needs emerge” 
out of “the self-organising nature of the behaviour of the community” and the 
regeneration partnership. It states that the evidence from their case study 
suggests “that the process of discovering, and responding to, problems is 
itself a ‘creative’ process.” This, the report writers believed, was “amongst the 
most significant” of their findings. “It challenges”, they write, “our dominant 
understanding of how problems function, and, as a consequence, of how we 
should think about the process of solving problems” (ibid: 15). 
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To return to the subject of this report, there was clear evidence that due to 
local ‘over-codification’, subsystems within the Stoke-on-Trent community, if 
not the community in general, have become locked-in, and that such a 
situation makes successful change or re-organisation unlikely or very difficult. 
There was evidence that the local regeneration projects did look towards 
other projects, to what works elsewhere, to ‘good practice’. There was also 
evidence of project workers trying to establish communication channels 
between different groups within the City, but not directly with other 
‘successful’ regeneration areas, and there was no evidence given to me of 
more direct involvement. The problem with this limited engagement with 
examples of ‘good practice’ occurring in other areas is that when local project 
workers translate their understanding or interpretations of this practice into a 
number of clear approaches to be applied locally, with the best of intentions 
they effectively codify the dynamics that produced this success. To avoid this, 
local people need to be directly engaged and involved in the regeneration 
process. This way their own expectations are directly and practically engaged 
with the ‘reality’ of the situation. And ideally, these people need to have direct 
contact with people involved in other regeneration projects; they need to 
develop ‘weak connections’ that facilitate engagement with innovative 
practices. Direct contact with new, different, and broadly successful, role 
models creates the conditions for expectations to be re-organized. 
 
In summary, regarding these local regeneration projects, we would say that 
there exists an intuitive understanding of the social dynamics that lie behind 
the communities that are the subject of regeneration. As a general point it 
may be advantageous if staff involved in these projects, particularly those 
working at the planning and strategic level, had a greater understanding of 
complex systems. The single most significant factor affecting these projects, 
however, was the extent that the communities showed indicators of being in a 
‘lock-in state’. This needs overcoming before any significant regeneration can 
take place. To this end we would strongly recommend that clear emphasis is 
placed on the development of the communities’ weak connections, and on the 
direct involvement of members of these communities not just in problem 
solving, but in discovering for themselves what these problems are. 
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3. Possible Evaluation Model 
 
If we focus on the actual process of social self-organisation, there are two 
main aspects: the process of codification, and the catalytic effect of other 
social actors. If we extend this focus to an attempted intervention, to a 
directed re-organisation, two further aspects emerge regarding the catalytic 
effect: the relative balance between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ social connections, 
and the degree of direct involvement in this re-organisation. If we want to 
develop a model for evaluation such an intervention project, therefore, three 
main areas of interrogation emerge:   
 
1. The process of codification. 
 
Codes are a blunt tool for the shaping of social structures; they are too 
general and not sufficiently focused on the local situation. There is, most 
importantly, an inverse relationship between the degree of certainty of 
outcome and the degree of creativity needed to achieve that outcome. It is 
possible to put codes in place that facilitate the process, various rules and 
regulations, but at the risk of dampening a creative and emergent response. 
 
2. The extending and strengthening of weak social connections. 
 
This makes it possible for the social actions of others to serve as a kind of 
template to assist in the self-organising process. More specifically, they act as 
catalysts, encouraging individuals and groups to explore alternative and 
possibly innovative initiatives (what Kauffman calls ‘adjacent possibles’), 
thereby reducing the relative strength of the ‘strong connectors’ that lock the 
system into negative feed-back loops. 
 
3. The degree of involvement of members of the community. 
 
Members of the community should be directly involved in the regeneration 
process, not just by exploring problems and possible responses, but by being 
actively involved in identifying problems. This should be approached as a 
creative process, one that challenges the expectations of those involved 
through the discovery of problems. 
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From these three areas of interrogation a number of models for regeneration 
projects can be constructed. At the ‘ideal’ end of the spectrum the project and 
its funding would be largely handed over to the community. This would 
initially require the recruitment of number of members of the community who 
had both the necessary organisational / communication skills and who were 
respected by the community who could act as organisers. The aim, though, 
would be for the community itself to investigate their needs, decide for 
themselves what their problems are, and then construct solutions to these 
problems. Support and advice should be made available, but not imposed. 
 
If this was thought to be too much of a ‘leap of faith’, a more planned and 
controlled model would involve the co-opting of a number of community 
members with the appropriate skills and respect onto the regeneration 
project. They would form, along with others appointed by the fund holders, a 
steering, planning and decision making board. They should (ideally) be full-
time paid members, should have full and equal decision making rights, and 
should be involved in researching projects taking place in other areas. They 
should also organise wider public meetings and consultations, and provide 
feedback to their community. 
 
As a bridge between these two models, it would be useful to allow a number 
of small projects suggested by the community to ahead, even if they were 
thought to be trivial or not economic by the above board. These projects 
should be run and organised by members of the community recruited for the 
purpose, and funds should handed over to them. The economic viability of 
these projects should not be of importance. Their value should be understood 
in a number of ways: 
• As directly engaging the community with the problems they face 
• As ways of ‘kick-starting’ a self-organising process 
• As ways of developing inter-group communication 
• As a means of directly experiencing the need to develop 
communication skills 
• As stepping stones towards the more ideal of the two models given 
above 
• As a way of building trust between the community and those in 
positions of power 
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Six key theoretical concepts need to be held onto when designing each 
project: 
1. It must be understood that any successful structure needs to be 
emergent, and not imposed. 
2. The presence of others from outside the community will be necessary 
in order to act as catalysts to the self-organising process. 
3. The problems to be solved need to be discovered by the community 
themselves. 
4. The inter-connectedness of these problems needs to be born in mind 
at all times. 
5. The relationships between causes and effects are non-linear. 
6. Due to 4 & 5, all suggestions from the community should be taken 
seriously and given equal consideration. 
 
From the above, there are a number of practices to be avoided: 
1. An over analysis of the causes of particular problems and issues that 
channels discussion in advance, and gives more weight to certain 
factors than others. 
2. The imposition of ready-made solutions. 
 
An evaluation model would, therefore, be developed from the above 
numbered points, together, perhaps, with an assessment of the degree to 
which staff at the strategic or planning level understand complex systems. 
What becomes very obvious, of course, is that such an evaluation model itself 
then needs to become the subject of a further, far more rigorous evaluation. 
 
4. Report summary for Burslem Regeneration Company 
 
We would first of all like to thank all the managers and project workers (and 
Ed York, the chair of the Burslem Regeneration Company) for their 
cooperation with this project. 
 
From the responses we received in the six interviews we conducted (four with 
members of the Burslem Regeneration Company, and two with the managers 
of the other Stoke-on-Trent projects) we learnt the following: 
• That the ‘object of intervention’, that which the projects were 
attempting to influence in order to achieve their objectives, were 
people’s expectations. This conclusion on our part, however, involved a 
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degree of interpretation due to the fact that there did not exist any 
other clear theoretical framework in which the projects could be 
explained. 
• That despite having no obvious familiarity with complex systems the 
project workers / managers appeared to have an intuitive 
understanding of such systems, at least in as far as they appreciated 
the need to develop communication networks within the communities. 
• That the single most important phenomenon that appears to be 
mitigating the success of the projects can be explained, and possibly 
resolved, using complexity theory / social network theory. The 
prevalence of a very negative attitude towards the City Council and a 
strong sense of parochialism can be understood as examples of what is 
termed a ‘locked-in state’. We explain this below. 
 
Members of communities tend to maintain ‘strong connections’ with those 
they are close to, such as immediate family and neighbours. These ‘strong 
connections’ or ‘strong expectations’ are established through repetition and 
habit and tend to reinforce current views and behaviour. If these ‘strong 
connections’ dominate the communities become ‘locked-in’ to existing 
behaviours and attitudes. Communities that are creative and amenable to 
change have these ‘strong connections’ balanced by a large number of ‘weak 
connections’, as it is through these that the potential for change is facilitated. 
‘Weak connections’, in contrast to ‘strong connections’, link people who are 
mere acquaintances. 
 
We appreciate that it was not in our remit to in any way evaluated the 
practices that were described to us. If, however, we were asked to make 
recommendations, these would be: 
• The development of ‘weak connections’ between the target 
communities and those where successful regeneration has taken place. 
This, we believe, would help balance the dominance of ‘strong 
connections’ and allow different ‘expectations’ to be created. 
• The direct involvement of members of the community, not just in 
working to overcome problems, but in actually discovering for 
themselves what these problems are. This would require a level of 
involvement that goes beyond consultation. If people are simply asked 
their views and opinions their expectations are not challenged to any 
perceptible degree. If, however, they are directly involved in problem 
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solving (and ideally problem discovering) then their expectations are 
directly engaged, and they will be an incentive to view their local 
environment in a more positive light. 
• Managers to have some training regarding complex systems and social 
network theory. 
 
We would, of course, be willing to explain any of these points in greater detail 
if it was considered of value. 
 
Kelvin Clayton 
David Webb 
28th March, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
1 The actual report reads “positive feedback loops”, which I take to be an 
error. As this report itself states earlier (page 4): “Negative feedback works to 
return a system to specified initial conditions...positive feedback amplifies 
divergences from these initial conditions. 
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